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Donald Redfield Griffin (1915-2003) was an American zoologist best known for his 
discovery of echolocation and for his later work on animal consciousness. He was a 
central figure in behavioral biology and sensory physiology in the United States, and he 
made important contributions to the disciplinary and intellectual development of animal 
behavior research in the second half of the twentieth century. During his early career, he 
focused on the sensory physiology of animal navigation. Along with fellow Harvard 
graduate student Robert Galambos (1914-2010), in the late-1930s Griffin discovered the 
ultrasonic method of orientation in bats; in 1944 he coined the term “echolocation” to 
describe this phenomenon as a general method of perception. In addition to his discovery 
of echolocation, Griffin also made several contributions to understanding the 
physiological basis of bird migration and navigation, and he popularized zoologist Karl 
von Frisch’s (1886-1982) dance language theory of the honeybee in the United States. 
In 1976, Griffin surprised the scientific world by raising the question of animal 
consciousness, a taboo in professional science for most of the twentieth century. 
Although the animal mind was of central importance in post-Darwinian biology, the 
onset of behaviorism and mechanistic conceptions of behavior in the twentieth century 
relegated such inquiry to the dustbin of pseudoscience and amateurism. Beginning with 
his provocative book, The Question of Animal Awareness (1976), Griffin devoted the 
second phase of his career to making animal consciousness a scientifically respectable 
topic once again. Here again he made significant contributions to the study of animal 
behavior by establishing a new field of science, cognitive ethology, which is centered on 
 iii 
the evolutionary and comparative analysis of consciousness and cognition in animal 
behavior. 
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Donald Griffin and the Mechanistic Character of  
Twentieth-Century American Biology 
 
Donald Redfield Griffin (1915-2003) was an American biologist and leader in 
advancing the study of animal behavior, sensory physiology, and physiological ecology 
in the mid-to-late-twentieth century. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 
1942 and went on to a distinguished career at Cornell University, Harvard University, 
and finally Rockefeller University, from which he retired in 1986. Retirement did not end 
his scientific research, and he continued to study the behavior of birds and mammals 
throughout his life. The scientific work for which he is best known was the discovery that 
bats navigated their environments by emitting ultrasonic sounds and analyzing their 
echoes, a method that Griffin dubbed “echolocation” in 1944. This work, initially 
conducted in collaboration with Robert Galambos (1914-2010) at Harvard, solved the 
centuries-old problem of how bats sensed their environments without relying on vision. 
Griffin also conducted important research on bird migration and homing behavior, 
another longstanding biological problem that had drawn the attention of many 
researchers. In this work he developed innovative methods to study these problems and 
clarified many of the key issues involved. In tandem with other ornithologists, he 
advanced the celestial theory of navigation by showing that many migratory species used 
the motion of the sun and stars to orient themselves homeward from unfamiliar territory. 
 Griffin’s colleagues admired his research for its rigor, and for the care he took to 
base conclusions about animal behavior and perception on scientific evidence derived 
from laboratory experiments and field observations. It came as a surprise therefore when 
his colleagues heard him raise a formerly taboo subject – the thorny question of animal 
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consciousness – at a scientific conference in 1975, following it up with a book in 1976, 
The Question of Animal Awareness.1 The idea that animals possessed anything like 
human awareness or consciousness, although important in Darwinian biology and 
psychology in the nineteenth century, had long since been relegated to the dustbin of 
pseudoscience and amateurism. Griffin himself had been trained at Harvard to eschew 
anything but a mechanistic approach to behavior that avoided any reference to the animal 
mind. Yet thirty-five years later he was emboldened to raise this problem and to 
challenge his colleagues to take animal consciousness seriously as an object of scientific 
inquiry.  
This dissertation explores how this change occurred in Griffin’s thought. I will 
argue that, contrary to his own statements that the intellectual transition to animal 
consciousness was relatively abrupt, it was in fact a gradual but logical development of 
his increasingly sophisticated understanding of how animals navigated and perceived 
their environments. In reopening the problem of animal consciousness, Griffin was not 
departing from his earlier habit of thought but was carrying his life’s work to a logical 
endpoint, to the seemingly strange idea that scientists needed to think harder about what 
it was really like to be a bird or a bat. By pursuing such questions, Griffin concluded that 
the subject of animal consciousness had to be raised for serious discussion and that 
scientists needed to be more open to the idea of viewing the cognitive abilities of animals 
in new and perhaps unexpected ways. His ideas, although controversial, helped to 
stimulate the new field of “cognitive ethology” which subsequently flourished as a 
                                                
1 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience (New 
York: Rockefeller University Press, 1976). 
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subject of scientific research and philosophical discussion.2 In part due to the force of 
Griffin’s reputation and ideas, cognitive ethology has been a thriving area of research on 
animal behavior and consciousness ever since. 
 While charting Griffin’s path leading to his reformulation of the question of 
animal consciousness, this dissertation also has other goals. One is to make a careful 
study of the long process of discovery that led Griffin to identify the phenomenon of 
“echolocation” when he coined the term in 1944. Commentaries on Griffin’s career 
locate the discovery of echolocation in the late-1930s in Griffin’s work with Galambos.3 
In those early studies, however, Griffin and Galambos concentrated on just one problem, 
how bats avoided obstacles. I will argue that we must see the discovery of “echolocation” 
as a longer intellectual process and that it is significant that Griffin did not coin the term 
until 1944, after he had ceased his work with Galambos. By this point bats were firmly on 
the backburner, and he had taken up his doctoral research on another topic, bird 
migration.   
By 1944 Griffin began to understand bat behavior in a new and more general way: 
not only did bats use echolocation to avoid obstacles, but they also used the method for 
more complex interactions with their environments, such as discriminating among the 
different objects they encountered. It was, in short, a general sensory tool used by bats to 
acquire all kinds of information about their environments. This discovery led him back to 
the study of bat behavior for deeper analysis, at which point he discovered that they used 
                                                
2 See for example the discussion in Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff, Species of Mind: The Philosophy and 
Biology of Cognitive Ethology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
3 Eileen Crist, “Griffin, Donald Redfield,” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. 21 (Detroit: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2008), p. 177-186; Carolyn Ristau, “Donald Redfield Griffin,” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 149 (Sep. 2005): 399-411; Charles Gross, “Donald R. Griffin,” 
Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, Vol. 86 (2005): 1-20; H. 
Raghuram and G. Marimuthu, “The Discovery of Echolocation,” Resonance: Journal of Science Education, 
Vol. 10 (Feb. 2005): 20-32. 
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echolocation for such complex feats as hunting insects on the wing. As Griffin grew to 
appreciate just how sophisticated and general was the use of echolocation, he felt the 
need to coin the term and to explicate its relationship to other forms of navigation by the 
use of echoes (including the human use of sonar and radar). What caused him to 
recognize and to name “echolocation” as something new? My argument, developed in 
chapters 2 and 3, is that Griffin’s wartime work at Harvard, and especially his work with 
military technologies of communication and remote sensing, was crucial to the 
intellectual evolution that led him to conceive of echolocation as a general mode of 
perception. In chapters 2 and 3 I also explore the role played by technological analogs in 
his analysis of bat behavior, which led him to ask new questions about echolocation. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to other studies of animal behavior and navigation, 
including the problem of bird migration, which Griffin studied for many years, and Karl 
von Frisch’s (1886-1982) discovery of the “dance language” of honeybees, which had a 
profound impact on Griffin’s ideas about animal behavior and communication. His 
doctorate was devoted to another longstanding biological problem of great significance, 
the physiological basis of bird migration and navigation. Although Griffin had entered 
Harvard an amateur naturalist, his undergraduate and graduate education led him to seek 
explanations of behavior through the analysis of physiological mechanisms. This, he 
learned, was how one did proper science.  
He conducted his doctoral work on bird navigation under physiological 
psychologist Karl Lashley (1890-1958), who studied the neurophysiology of rats and the 
homing behavior of birds, among other topics. One of the early proponents of John B. 
Watson’s (1878-1958) behaviorism, Lashley had given up the strict brand of Watsonian 
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behaviorism by the 1930s, but his approach to animal behavior was still firmly within the 
strictures of biological mechanism. For example, whereas Watson sought to reduce all 
behavior to simple mechanisms such as stimulus-response reactions and pure 
associationism, Lashley’s neurophysiological study of rats and his bird research 
convinced him that the nature of the environmental stimulus was far more complex than a 
one-to-one correspondence with behavioral responses in the animal subject. In his 
conception of the instinctual basis of behavior, Lashley drew on concepts from Gestalt 
psychology to understand the ways in which animals perceived broader, more complex 
features and patterns within their environments.4 Nevertheless, he held that the animal 
mind and consciousness remained nothing more than the immediate effects of 
neurophysiological processes, and should be studied as such. Lashley’s approach to 
problems of animal behavior, therefore, consisted in identifying the sensory mechanisms 
and environmental cues that determined the animal’s relationship to its environment. 
Griffin applied this same approach in his initial work on bats and birds, which established 
his reputation as a rigorous thinker, a skeptic when it came to explanations that extended 
beyond the simplest that the evidence allowed, and an authority on animal behavior.  
In the 1950s, however, several new discoveries about the complexity of animal 
behavior caused Griffin to question the validity of restricting his interpretations to 
mechanistic frameworks. He found that echolocation was both a complex and general 
process, and that bats were able to modify the physical properties of their signals to 
accomplish a wide range of behaviors, including hunting insects on the wing. In addition, 
he became central to the popularization of zoologist Karl von Frisch’s theory of the dance 
                                                
4 Karl Lashley, “Experimental Analysis of Instinctive Behavior,” Psychological Review, Vol. 45, No. 6 
(1938): 445-471. 
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language of the honeybee, one of the most significant discoveries in twentieth-century 
behavioral biology. Von Frisch showed that bees had an acute understanding of the 
temporal and spatial features of their environments, and that they were able to 
communicate this information through repeated “dance” movements to one another for 
the purposes of locating nectar and other biologically significant resources. Griffin wrote 
extensively about the discovery, organized a promotional tour for von Frisch at several 
American universities, and defended the theory against objections from Adrian Wenner 
(b.1928) and his behaviorist colleagues.5  
Eventually, these discoveries about the complexity of animal behavior led Griffin 
to challenge what he saw as the unwarranted and unhelpful reductionism in purely 
mechanistic approaches in biology. As discussed in chapter 6, this transformation 
culminated in the 1970s when he began to tackle questions about animal consciousness 
and its relationship to behavior. In the final decades of his career, he established the 
intellectual and disciplinary foundations of a new field, “cognitive ethology,” which was 
focused on the evolutionary and comparative analysis of animal thinking and 
consciousness. In a sense, this work, which took the mental continuity of humans and 
animals for granted, represented a return to Darwinian biology and psychology 
characteristic of the late-nineteenth century. The significance of Griffin’s cognitive turn 
consisted primarily in his arguments against behaviorism and reductionism, and in his 
call-to-arms within the behavioral sciences to take the idea of animal consciousness as a 
serious object of critical inquiry.  
                                                
5 Tania Munz, “Of Birds and Bees: Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and the Science of Animals, 1908-
1973,” (Doctoral Thesis, Princeton University, 2007); Tania Munz, “The Bee Battles: Karl von Frisch, 
Adrian Wenner and the Honey Bee Dance Language Controversy,” Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 
38 (2005): 535-570. 
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With mixed success, he sought to place such questions within a sturdier 
experimental and theoretical framework, so as to avoid the charges of excessive 
anthropomorphism that had drawn criticism to the work of earlier Darwinians such as 
George John Romanes (1848-1894). While not all of Griffin’s ideas were taken up, 
numerous biologists and psychologists were inspired by his ideas and by his challenge to 
take the animal mind seriously. This led to the intellectual expansion of cognitive 
ethology, which continues to be a thriving interdisciplinary field relying on modern 
techniques in neuroscience, sensory physiology, and cognitive psychology to understand 
the minds of animals. Despite the continuing presence of behavioristic skeptics who 
remain unconvinced by Griffin’s arguments and by subsequent research on animal 
consciousness, the taboo has largely been eradicated. 
In tracking Griffin’s intellectual and professional growth, I also pay particular 
attention to the broader influence of key institutions—and especially of interdisciplinary 
interactions—in the evolution of his thinking about animal behavior. My analysis of the 
physiological character of Harvard biology during the 1930s, for example, shows how 
this positivistic and mechanistic climate constrained his approach to understanding and 
investigating animal behavior. Consistent with Jacques Loeb’s (1859-1924) mechanistic 
conception of biology and John B. Watson’s behaviorism, Harvard biologists broadly 
deemphasized the functional, evolutionary, and cognitive dimensions of behavior, 
focusing instead on physiological mechanisms as the key to understanding behavior.6 
Harvard’s unique interdisciplinary climate, however, facilitated Griffin’s discovery of 
                                                
6 Harvard biologists such as George Howard Parker (1864-1955) and physiologist William J. Crozier 
(1892-1955) sought to reduce complex behavioral phenomena to the quantifiable and measurable results of 
sensory mechanisms within stimulus-response frameworks. The quintessential neo-behaviorist of the 
postwar period, B.F. Skinner (1904-1990), received his PhD here under Crozier’s reductionistic influence. 
 8 
echolocation, and shaped his thinking about the sensory physiology of bats. His 
experimental analysis of behavior, which synthesized approaches in physiology, natural 
history, biophysics, and engineering, was the unique product of Harvard’s workshop 
culture.7 Similarly, Griffin’s interdisciplinary wartime research on psychoacoustics and 
military technologies led him to reimagine the significance of ultrasonic perception in 
bats, which he came to see as a general process analogous to radar and sonar. Thus the 
timing of his discovery of echolocation during the war was not coincidental: wartime 
technologies had an important role in stimulating new thinking about animal behavior, 
indeed in giving Griffin a new appreciation of the surprising complexity of that behavior. 
Griffin spent the second phase of his career at another key institution in the 
postwar behavioral sciences, the Rockefeller University. In 1965 Rockefeller president 
Detlev Bronk (1897-1975) recruited Griffin to strengthen the newly created behavioral 
sciences program. Bronk was firmly committed to the ideal of interdisciplinarity, and he 
sought scientists who could attack problems from a diverse range of approaches while 
challenging scientific convention in the process. Griffin answered the call, and in his later 
career at Rockefeller he came to focus intently on the problem of animal consciousness, 
working to convince his colleagues and critics that the animal mind was a valid scientific 
subject.  
Reflecting on his career in the 1980s, Griffin aptly described himself as an 
experimental naturalist. Methodologically, he used the tools of experimental sensory 
                                                
7 In this sense, the mechanistic climate within the biology department was consistent with the various 
manifestations of operationism embodied in the work of Harvard physicist Percy Bridgman (1882-1961) 
and psychophysicist Stanley Smith Stevens (1906-1973). Historian Joel Isaac has shown how these 
methodologies were bound up with the pedagogical practices and the particular workshop culture of 
interdisciplinary science at Harvard during the middle-twentieth century. Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: 
Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 
especially p. 92-124. 
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physiology in order to better understand the behavior of animals in their natural 
environments. Much of the work on animal behavior in the United States during this 
period took place within the field of comparative psychology, which ran somewhat 
parallel to Griffin’s work. American psychology in the first half of twentieth century was 
largely characterized by behavioristic approaches that utilized laboratory conditioning to 
investigate learning within a stimulus-response framework. Griffin’s work, however, 
shared more with European ethology, as he focused primarily on the natural behavior of 
animals, and he was less interested in questions about learning.8  
Griffin was a widely known and highly respected biologist in the postwar period, 
and I have taken a biographical approach to his intellectual and professional 
development. In doing so, my dissertation explores several major themes and discoveries 
that are crucial for understanding the new directions taken within biology and the 
behavioral sciences in the postwar period. Griffin’s career provides an excellent window 
through which to view some of the most important changes in behavioral biology and in 
our understanding of the relationship between humans and animals.9 My aim has been to 
construct a focused account of Griffin’s career, rather than to write a comprehensive 
biography of his life in science. To this end, I analyze how Griffin’s approach to 
                                                
8 On the history of ethology, see Richard Burkhardt, Patterns of Behavior: Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, 
and the Founding of Ethology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); W.H. Thorpe, The Origins 
and Rise of Ethology: The Science of the Natural Behaviour of Animals (London: Praeger, 1979). Neither 
Burkhardt nor Thorpe discusses American work on sensory physiology, which was an important area of 
animal behavior research. 
9 Several scholars have argued for the importance of biographical perspectives in the history of science. See 
for example, Thomas Hankins, “In Defence of Biography: The Use of Biography in History of Science,” 
History of Science, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar. 1979): 1-16; Robert M. Young, “Biography: The Basic Discipline 
for Human Science?” Free Associations, Vol. 11 (1985): 108-130; Tania Munz, “Of Birds and Bees: Karl 
von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and the Science of Animals, 1908-1973,” (Doctoral Thesis, Princeton 
University, 2007); Daniel Todes, Ivan Pavlov: A Russian Life in Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
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understanding animal behavior has changed over time, and I identify the key influences 
that have shaped his scientific thought. 
 
Reductionism, Mechanism, and Behaviorism: Animal Behavior in the Twentieth Century 
Before giving a brief account of Griffin’s early life and education, it is necessary 
to establish more fully the major philosophical commitments within the American 
behavioral sciences in the early twentieth century. In the scientific analysis of animal 
behavior, the foremost methodological principle was known as “Morgan’s canon,” which 
called for the rejection of unnecessary mentalistic hypotheses in behavioral explanations. 
British comparative psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936) formulated his 
canon primarily as a broad criticism of his predecessor and colleague, George John 
Romanes (1848-1894). Romanes, like Morgan, was a staunch Darwinian, and his goal 
was to explain animal behavior in terms of the evolutionary continuum from the lower 
organisms up to man. However, Morgan criticized Romanes’ methodology for its heavy 
reliance on anecdotal evidence, which lacked objective rigor. He also argued that 
although behavior ought to be understood within the Darwinian evolutionary framework, 
Romanes was guilty of excessive anthropomorphism in attempting to reconcile animal 
behavior with human psychological states and mental processes.  
Thus Morgan argued that explanations of animal behavior ought to be constructed 
in accordance with the principle of parsimony, using the fewest and most reductionist 
assumptions possible. He first articulated his canon in An Introduction to Comparative 
Psychology (1896), explaining: “In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of 
the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the 
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exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.”10 By the turn of the 
century, this psychological formulation of Ockham’s razor became the gold standard for 
biologists and psychologists, and it was epitomized in methodological commitments such 
as E.L. Thorndike’s associationism, Jacques Loeb’s mechanistic conception of biology, 
and John Watson’s behaviorism. 
Complementary to this philosophical perspective was another reductionist 
framework, the mechanistic conception of behavior. Largely developed in the work of 
German-born American physiologist Jacques Loeb (1859-1924), the mechanistic 
conception held that to explain animal behavior was a matter of identifying and 
describing the physiological mechanisms causally connecting the animal to its sensory 
environment. In his 1912 book, The Mechanistic Conception of Life, Loeb argued that all 
apparently psychic phenomena were merely the result of physico-chemical processes.11 
And because physiological mechanisms were the common substrate of animal life, he 
explained, the behavior of the higher animals, and even man, could likewise be 
understood mechanistically. The “animal will,” Loeb argued, “was only the expression of 
our ignorance of the forces which prescribe to animals the direction of their apparently 
spontaneous movements just as unequivocally as gravity prescribes the movements of the 
planets.”12 Essentially, Loeb sought to reduce all explanations of behavior to a framework 
of stimulus-response mechanisms, which encompassed the physical and chemical forces 
within the external environment that wholly determined the behavior of animals.  
Historian Philip J. Pauly has identified a handful of direct descendants of Loeb’s 
mechanistic epistemology, including John Watson, Harvard physiologists George 
                                                
10 C. Lloyd Morgan, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology (London: Walter Scott, 1896), p. 53.  
11 Jacques Loeb, The Mechanistic Conception of Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1912). 
12 Jacques Loeb, The Mechanistic Conception of Life, p. 36. 
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Howard Parker (1864-1955) and William J. Crozier (1892-1955), and neo-behaviorist 
psychologist B.F. Skinner (1904-1990), who studied with Crozier at Harvard in the 
1930s.13 Sensory physiologist and zoologist George Howard Parker applied Loeb’s vision 
to Harvard biology, where he united the formerly separate departments of zoology, 
botany, and general physiology into the Institute of Biology. He and Crozier, who helped 
create the institute, thought that it should represent the intellectual and institutional 
synthesis of Harvard biology, based on the Loebian ideal of physiological reduction. 
Beyond those individuals that he immediately influenced, Loeb’s impact on early-
twentieth century biology was tremendous.14 The long shadow of Loeb is truly realized 
when we see how his mechanistic epistemology shaped the types of questions one could 
legitimately pose about animal behavior, and the approaches one took to answering such 
questions.  
When Griffin came to Harvard in 1934 as an undergraduate and then graduate 
student, he entered a milieu that had been dominated by Loebian ideals of science, 
although the intellectual climate was by that time starting to change. Nevertheless, in 
fields such as sensory physiology, and particularly in places such as Harvard biology, 
Loeb’s mechanistic vision was very much alive. Behavioral causation was still reduced to 
the mechanistic relationship of the animal to its environment, and the cognitive and 
psychic dimensions of behavior were seen as irrelevant and unscientific when it came to 
understanding the animal.  
The last methodological principle of this reductionist triumvirate was Watson’s 
behaviorism, which is closely related to Loeb’s mechanistic view. Indeed Pauly 
                                                
13 Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 164-200. 
14 Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology, p. 164-200.  
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characterized Watson as one of the prominent Loeb-influenced scientists of the next 
generation. Since Watson worked with Karl Lashley, Griffin’s thesis advisor, another 
connection to Loebian ideals came through that line of descent. Watson formulated his 
“behaviorist manifesto” in 1913 when he was working with Lashley. In the manifesto he 
argued that the ultimate goal of a purely objective psychology was the prediction and 
control of behavior, and that questions concerning consciousness or mental states should 
be permanently jettisoned from science.15 The rapid and nearly universal sanctioning of 
Watson’s behaviorism among American psychologists in the decades that followed has 
been well documented in histories of psychology.16 Behaviorism was based on the idea 
that a truly objective science of experimental psychology must reject the seemingly 
unknowable aspects of the subjective mind (along with methods such as introspection and 
the anthropomorphic analysis of anecdotal evidence). Proponents of behaviorism insisted 
that explanatory frameworks of behavior ought to be reduced to observable, quantifiable 
actions based on the stimulus-response model of conditional learning. Watson’s 
manifesto was the most forceful articulation of that view. 
During the heyday of American behaviorism from the 1920s to the 1950s, fields 
such as experimental sensory physiology—with no apparent need of hypotheses about 
animal minds or subjective states—flourished in academic biology. Research in sensory 
physiology paralleled approaches to animal behavior within behaviorist psychology, 
although scientists within the latter field were focused mainly on questions of learning 
                                                
15 John B. Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It,” Psychological Review, Vol. 20 (1913): 158-
177. 
16 See for example Robert Boakes, From Darwin to Behaviourism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984); Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Kerry Buckley, Mechanical Man: John Broadus Watson and the 
Beginnings of Behaviorism (New York: The Guilford Press, 1989); Roger Smith, Between Mind and 
Nature (London: Reaktion Books, 2013); Jamie Cohen-Cole, The Open Mind: Cold War Politics and the 
Sciences of Human Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
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and conditioning in laboratory animals such as the pigeon and the white rat. Nevertheless, 
the scientific topics selected and their methods of analysis by sensory physiologists 
reflected this behavioristic intellectual climate. Even though one might be incapable of 
discerning the cognitive dimensions of phenomena such as bird migration, for example, 
the sensory physiologist had much to discover about the mechanisms involved. Broadly 
speaking, these areas of research included the biophysical nature of environmental cues—
visual, auditory, olfactory—that provided information crucial to a bird’s orientation, the 
comparative anatomy of sense organs, and the physiological mechanisms by which the 
senses operated.  
For biologists interested in animal behavior, therefore, a truly comparative 
physiology of the senses was an indispensable aspect of their work. Once these 
physiological mechanisms were sufficiently understood, it was thought, more general 
theories might be formulated in explaining animal behavior, including questions about 
ecological adaptation, evolution, and development—subjects that became central in the 
midcentury work of European ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) and Niko 
Tinbergen (1907-1988). Although Watson’s brand of behaviorism became increasingly 
less popular in the postwar era, especially with the spread of Gestalt psychology and the 
rise of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, one important element remained 
untouched.17 Consciousness—and in particular, animal consciousness—was unscientific, 
and to discuss it seriously meant risking one’s reputation as a serious and credible 
scientist.  
                                                
17 Despite its increasing unpopularity, behaviorism remained prominent in the work of psychologists such 
as B.F. Skinner (1904-1990), who took Watson’s ideas to their most extreme by suggesting that human 
behavior could be predicted and controlled with great precision. 
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Griffin entered a Harvard environment dominated by methodological 
reductionism, although the climate was beginning to change with advances in biology. By 
the late 1930s, the simple stimulus-response mechanisms that Loeb championed began to 
fall out of fashion. Lashley for example showed that the causal relationships between 
environmental stimuli and animal behavior were much more complex than Loeb 
imagined them to be. But those like Lashley who were instrumental in challenging the 
over-simplifications of Loebian science did not abandon the basic point of view that 
served as a bulwark against discredited forms of anthropomorphism. This environment 
was quite different from Griffin’s early experiences as a naturalist, and it shaped him as a 
scientist in profound ways. But he did not completely abandon his early interests in 
natural history, nor the fascination with studying animals in the wild that grew out of his 
early educational experiences. As we probe his later research and its evolution toward the 
problem of animal consciousness, it is important to keep in mind that as a young man he 
started out not as a Loebian, but as a keen naturalist, as the next section briefly discusses.  
 
Donald Redfield Griffin: A Biographical Introduction 
Donald Redfield Griffin was born to Mary Whitney Redfield and Henry Farrand 
Griffin on August 3, 1915, near Scarsdale, New York. His father ran a successful 
advertising agency, while his mother stayed home to care for Donald. Griffin’s earliest 
“quasi-scientific recollections” were of the woods and fields in the rural vistas 
surrounding his boyhood home.18 Wild mammals and birds were a lifelong fascination 
for him, and exploring nature and the behavior of animals played a central role in his 
                                                
18 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” in Leaders in the Study of Animal 
Behavior, ed. Donald Dewsbury, p. 120-142 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated Universities Press, 1985), p. 121. 
 16 
early development. Natural history books were also a beloved pastime. In two 
autobiographical memoirs, Griffin recalled that as a youth one of his favorite activities 
was to have his mother read aloud from Ernest Thompson Seton’s fanciful 
anthropomorphic books on animals, and from National Geographic’s Wild Animals of 
North America.19  
In 1924, his father had the misfortune of being diagnosed with high blood 
pressure, and so he retired and relocated his family to peaceful Barnstable, 
Massachusetts.20 From this New England wilderness near Cape Cod, Griffin’s fascination 
with wild animals took center stage. Here he became an avid-outdoorsman and amateur 
naturalist, obsessed with observing, trapping, and collecting skins of the rich mammalian 
fauna surrounding his childhood home. His early life was thus defined by his exploration 
of the outdoors and by his relationship to wild animals. An only child and notably 
independent, Griffin was at home in nature, and he took great pleasure in his interactions 
with birds and mammals.  
During this romantic Twainian adolescence, Griffin’s education became 
“extraordinarily irregular.” A year at the Barnstable Grammar school (1925-26) 
convinced his parents that he “had learned nothing except how to play craps.” Perhaps 
more tellingly, Griffin’s most vivid memory of that first and only year at the school was 
of a “forbidding white-haired principal [who] suddenly let fly a violent diatribe against 
that hideous doctrine of evolution” when in April 1926 the botanist Luther Burbank was 
“struck dead by the Lord because of his blasphemous advocacy of evolution.” Cornish 
                                                
19 Wild Animals of North America was created from two separate articles on large and small mammals of 
North America from 1916 and 1918, respectively. His mother read to him so frequently, in fact, that Griffin 
recalled his parents’ anxiety that he might never learn to read himself. 
20 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 122. 
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harangued a gathered throng of elementary students, “Do any of you believe your 
grandmother was a monkey?” According to Griffin, “my faint objections were drowned 
out by the chorus of horrified NOs.”21 The degree to which he was truly a convinced 
Darwinian at the age of ten—as this autobiographical reflection suggests—is difficult to 
assess. Perhaps the appeal of casting himself a precocious evolutionist outweighed the 
fidelity of his memory later in life. His next two academic years (1926-28) were spent at 
the Tabor Academy, a small school where, when he was not otherwise reading books and 
periodicals on hunting such as Fur, Fish, Game, he spent “a great deal of time in study 
hall designing cages for a future fur farm.” Such distractions, he recalled, drove his father 
“nearly to despair.” Deciding to pull him out of school, his parents hired a private tutor to 
assist his father in educating him at home. Henry, an amateur historian and novelist, 
presided over his son’s instruction, which “was almost continually punctuated with vivid 
comments on the stupidity of conventional education.”22  
Griffin’s maternal uncle Alfred C. Redfield, “another important guiding influence 
on [his] scientific interests,” helped to cultivate his nephew’s interest in natural history. A 
distinguished Harvard comparative physiologist, amateur ornithologist, and early leader 
at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Redfield occasionally took his precocious 
nephew to the Boston Museum of Natural History, exposing the young naturalist to the 
professional side of biological inquiry. At the museum, “a whole new world of scientific 
books and journals” was opened to Griffin. Curators Francis Harper and Clinton V. 
McCoy also guided Griffin’s “clumsy efforts to become a mammalogist” by introducing 
him to literature on preparing skins, while simultaneously discouraging him from 
                                                
21 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 121-123. 
22 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 123. 
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becoming a professional trapper.23 Under their influence, Griffin was led at the young age 
of fifteen to subscribe to the Journal of Mammalogy—it would remain a lifelong favorite 
of his.24 
During his teenage years he became increasingly interested in bats, particularly in 
their seasonal migration patterns and the ways in which they moved through their 
environments. He spent much of his free time banding birds and bats in order to track 
their annual movements, ultimately tagging thousands of individuals over the course of a 
few years. Significantly, he became interested in the scientific practices of studying wild 
animals; for example, recording anatomical features of taxonomic value, and learning to 
chart migratory patterns for documenting a species’ geographic range. As a teenager he 
submitted reports of his discoveries to scientific journals.25 Evidently much of Griffin’s 
exploration was solitary. An autodidact in many respects, he taught himself how to catch 
little brown bats (myotis lucifugus), and around 1934 he applied to the U.S. Bureau of 
Biological survey for a permit to use aluminum bird-bands on the bats, which he was 
eventually allowed to do after some initial pushback from the Bureau. He also made a 
name for himself in nearby neighborhoods and towns as someone who knew how to deal 
humanely with a bat or skunk infestation—a reputation that he maintained even late in 
life, as attested to by numerous such requests preserved in his personal papers.26  
                                                
23 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 122-123. 
24 During the 1930s the Journal of Mammalogy mainly published articles on mammalian systematics, 
geographical distribution, and migration. Articles about behavior or sensory physiology were rare. 
25 Griffin subscribed to the Journal of Mammalogy at the age of 15, and published five articles in it, his 
favorite journal, by the time he finished his undergraduate degree (1938). 
26 Griffin received written requests from people interested in eradicating bats from their attics and garages 
throughout his distinguished career. He took care to write thoughtful responses, urging his inquisitors that 
bats were mostly harmless, and encouraging them to deal with such “problems” in a humane fashion. 
Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 122-124. 
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Worried that they had perhaps not prepared him enough for a successful 
profession, in 1931 Griffin’s parents sent him off to the elite preparatory Phillips 
Andover to better his chances for a college education. “After some initial academic 
disasters,” Griffin did “reasonably well” in algebra, French, and Latin. Biology classes 
were unavailable to tenth-graders, so he received informal tutoring from biology 
instructor Larry Shields.27 Due to a series of “rather severe grippe infections” that spread 
to his inner ear, however, Griffin had to finish both tenth and eleventh grades 
recuperating at home.28 After he passed the eleventh-grade college board examinations, 
his parents agreed to let him stay home (with his “enthusiastic concurrence”) for his 
senior year in order to recuperate physically. Amid more “vigorous” instruction from his 
father, he continued exploring the outdoors, banding birds and bats, and improving his 
sailing skills. In addition, just before his nineteenth birthday (1934) he published his first 
scientific article in the Journal of Mammalogy, on trapping and marking bats with both a 
tattoo method, and his preferred method using aluminum bird-bands.29 Henry Griffin 
would later write to Donald, upon his graduation from Harvard: “In spite of occasional 
misgivings that I had helped to make you a little too old for your years—I always 
                                                
27 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 123. 
28 There is some confusion about Griffin’s time at Andover in the published biographical sketches. His 
NAS biographical memoir states that he left Andover before finishing his junior year, but another piece 
written by his colleague and friend Carolyn Ristau indicates that he graduated from Andover in 1934. 
Andover’s web site lists Griffin as a distinguished alumnus from 1934, though that does not necessarily 
mean that he actually matriculated from there. In his autobiographical memoir, he indicates that his years at 
Andover were “interrupted by illness,” and that he had to finish tenth and eleventh grades at home due to a 
series of colds. A useful draft of a letter that Henry Griffin wrote to a Harvard dean is a crucial piece of this 
puzzle. It is here that I learned about Donald’s grippe, and some other recurring health and physical 
problems that are absent from the other published sources. Henry Griffin to Delmar Leighton, [Undated 
1934, draft], Series 1, Box 5, Folder 57, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller 
University Archives, RAC. 
29 Donald Griffin, “Marking Bats,” Journal of Mammalogy, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug. 1934): 202-207. Writing 
was also a lifelong activity begun in his teenage years. He published early, often, and late in life, and in fact 
his last article was remarkably accepted just four days before his death in 2003. 
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believed that you would justify my faith that intelligence and straight thinking wins out in 
the end—that the play-boys pay too heavy a price for their play in after years.”30 
In chapter two I analyze how Griffin’s aptitude for intelligent straight-thinking 
would be shaped by the very different context of Harvard biology, where he learned what 
it meant to do science. The experiences at Harvard exerted a profound effect on his 
approach to animal behavior, and gave him the rigor that established his reputation as one 
of the rising stars in this field, someone very much in the Harvard mold: indeed after a 
stint at Cornell, Harvard decided to hire him back. But he had begun his biological 
training as a naturalist and one might surmise that his willingness, much later in life, to 
ask deeper questions about what it meant to be like a bat or a bird revealed the lingering, 
though now matured, interests of the natural historian. 
 
                                                
30 Henry Griffin to Donald Griffin. 19 May 1938. Rockefeller University Archives. RU RG 450G875 Series 
1, Box 1, Folder 1. Griffin’s educational background is also important in another respect. Later in his 
career, he often criticized too heavy a reliance on Ockham’s razor in scientific explanations, and lamented 
the failure of scientists to consider creative solutions to problems. Perhaps his father’s insistence on the 
shortcomings of conventional education, which he saw as too narrowly constricting areas of learning into 
specializations, influenced his son’s willingness to remain open-minded to ideas that were outside the 
mainstream of academic thought. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Obstacle Avoidance and the Mechanistic Conception of Bats 
 
Introduction 
Despite decades of advances in experimental zoology and physiology in the early-
twentieth century, several basic questions of animal behavior remained unanswered by 
the 1930s. One such problem—the sensory basis of bat navigation in the dark—dated 
back at least to the late-eighteenth century. Whereas most nocturnal animals have large 
eyes adapted to capture as much light as possible, bats have tiny eyes that are ill suited 
for life in the dark. Complicating this problem further is the fact that bats are capable of 
impressive feats of navigation and orientation—swiftly threading tight passageways in 
deep caves, and capturing tiny insects while darting about in nearly complete darkness. 
The Italian naturalist Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729-1799) took an experimental approach to 
this problem in the 1790s, discovering that bats depended not on their eyes for 
navigation, but apparently on some sense related to their ears—whether it was hearing or 
the sensation of mechanical pressure more generally, he could not be sure. Spallanzani’s 
experiments, which were concurrently repeated and confirmed by the Swiss naturalist 
Louis Jurine (1751-1819), demonstrated that while blind bats were capable of navigating 
the darkness and capturing insects, deafened bats were not. However, a full solution to 
“Spallanzani’s bat problem” eluded these investigators, since bats seemed to fly in 
complete silence.1 If auditory cues or hearing were necessary for navigation, then what 
were the cues? The problem lay dormant for most of the nineteenth century, and in fact 
by 1900, most naturalists apparently accepted Georges Cuvier’s purely speculative 
                                                
1 For a brief history of Spallanzani’s and Jurine’s experiments, see Robert Galambos, “The Avoidance of 
Obstacles by Flying Bats: Spallanzani’s Ideas (1794) and Later Theories,” Isis, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1942): 132-
140. 
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explanation that bats navigated via a highly sensitive membrane located on their wings, 
which supposedly sensed pressure changes that alerted them to the presence of obstacles 
while flying.2 
The problem was finally resolved in the late 1930s when two Harvard graduate 
students—Donald Griffin and Robert Galambos—conducted a series of experiments 
using a new acoustic technology, revealing that bats navigated via the perception of 
echoes of ultrasonic sounds that they emitted while in flight. Further electrophysiological 
work by Galambos showed that indeed, bats were capable of hearing sounds in the 
ultrasonic range. Their discovery depended not only on bat research from prior decades, 
but also on elements external to experimental zoology. One such factor was the 
development of new acoustic technologies in the 1930s that could create, detect, and 
translate ultrasonic sound into the audible range of humans. The particular device that 
Griffin and Galambos used in their discovery was made possible by the flourishing of 
electro-acoustic technologies that were initially developed for submarine detection and 
electronic communications during the First World War. Additionally, the 
interdisciplinary workshop culture of Harvard science in the late-1930s encouraged the 
exchange of ideas, methodologies, and technologies between scientific disciplines.3 
Griffin and Galambos took advantage of this interdisciplinary climate, discussing their 
                                                
2 Robert Galambos wrote a useful review of the scientific literature on “Spallanzani’s bat problem.” Robert 
Galambos, “The Avoidance of Obstacles by Flying Bats: Spallanzani’s Ideas (1794) and Later Theories,” 
Isis, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Autumn 1942): 132-140. I accept his conclusion that Cuvier’s wing-membrane 
hypothesis reigned supreme during most of the nineteenth century. However, I do not agree with his 
whiggish explanation that the solution to this problem was merely the inevitable result of increasingly 
progressive methods of experimentation, particularly that of physiology. Other factors, which I have 
highlighted in this chapter, were certainly in play. 
3 On interdisciplinarity at Harvard during this period, see: Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012). Although Isaac focuses mainly on Harvard’s workshop culture and its 
influence on the human sciences, he identifies key interstitial bodies in the “Harvard complex” such as the 
Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory and the Society of Fellows, which fostered such collaborative exchanges. 
These particular institutions influenced Griffin’s psychophysical and technological approaches to 
investigating the navigation of bats. 
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work and borrowing equipment from physicists, physicians, and engineers who were 
willing to assist them on solving the bat problem.  
Furthermore, the particular character of Harvard biology in this period was 
overwhelmingly physiological, and thus encouraged approaching problems of animal 
behavior through methods firmly grounded in experimental sensory physiology. In the 
case of bat navigation, this entailed a careful analysis of the senses that formed the basis 
of navigation. From such a perspective, Griffin viewed the basis of bat navigation as 
constituted by particular sensory mechanisms that could be isolated and quantified with 
great precision. This mechanistic approach sought to identify the relationship between 
specific environmental cues and the sensory anatomy and physiology that mediated such 
stimuli in determining the bat’s navigational behavior. Thus to explain behavior such as 
the bat’s entailed describing the physiological mechanisms that undergirded it, ignoring 
concepts such as instinct, intelligence, awareness, or other mental faculties. A secondary 
consequence of the mechanistic approach to problems of animal behavior was that 
sensory mechanisms could be understood in terms of technological analogs designed for 
similar functions in human activities. This, as we will see in future chapters, would play 
an important role in Griffin’s shifting understanding of bat navigation. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. I first analyze Griffin’s undergraduate 
education in Harvard’s physiologically oriented biology department, demonstrating how 
such a context influenced his approach to animal behavior. Next, I analyze several lines 
of research on Spallanzani’s “bat problem” in the early-twentieth century, which 
preceded Griffin’s and Galambos’s work. Finally, I explain the obstacle avoidance 
experiments that they conducted between 1938 and 1940, which ultimately solved the 
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problem of bat orientation. In the following chapter, I examine Griffin’s wartime research 
at Harvard, which helped to transform his conception of both bat echolocation and 
sensory physiology more generally after the war. Griffin’s postwar conception of 
echolocation and the corresponding research paths that he pursued illustrate how 
metaphorical reasoning—connecting the biological and technological spheres—shaped 
his scientific ideas. Thus I argue that the discovery of echolocation was not a singular 
moment or insight, nor was it the inevitable result of progressive experimentation in the 
field of sensory physiology. Rather, the “discovery” was actually a gradual process, 
transformed by elements external to routine experimentation and scientific practice, that 
took place over the course of several years. 
 
Donald Griffin and Harvard Biology in the 1930s 
 With a rather unorthodox academic mosaic in his pre-collegiate education, Griffin 
was nevertheless admitted in 1934 to Harvard, where he would spend most of the next 
three decades. As an undergraduate he focused intensely on biology and studied bat 
physiology in several research projects that complemented his coursework. His transcript 
attests to his father’s successful instruction, as Griffin performed well on the entrance 
exams. As he later recalled, a lack of high school science “did not seem a serious 
handicap except that it was quite late before I learned even the rudiments of chemistry 
and physics.”4 Griffin took courses mainly in biology, supplemented by four courses in 
chemistry, a physics course in his sophomore and junior years, and a psychology course 
                                                
4 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” in Leaders in the Study of Animal 
Behavior, ed. Donald Dewsbury, p. 120-142 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated Universities Press, 1985), p. 125. 
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taught by E.G. Boring his junior year.5 He passed the general examinations in biology in 
May of his senior year (1938), and performed well enough to be excused from taking the 
final examinations in biology and chemistry courses in his last semester.6 Receiving 
mostly A’s and B’s, Griffin was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in June of 1938 upon 
receiving his B.S. in biology.7 
 Griffin’s undergraduate career coincided with some important structural and 
intellectual transformations within Harvard’s biology department. Between the mid-
1920s and 1930s, the disciplines of general physiology, botany, and zoology were 
gradually consolidated into a unified department. Simultaneous to these changes, the 
character of Harvard biology began to lean more heavily toward experimental 
physiology. Physiology, traditionally located within the medical school, had only recently 
been established in 1924 as a department under the division of biology in the Faculty of 
Arts and Sciences.8 With the encouragement of zoology chair George Howard Parker—a 
physiological zoologist—and the newly hired chair William J. Crozier, the department 
flourished.9 But Parker had even grander changes in mind, and along with Harvard 
president A. Lawrence Lowell, he envisioned the reorganization of the biological 
disciplines at Harvard into a unified “Institute of Biology.” The Institute constituted both 
a physical space and an interdisciplinary ideal—it would not only house the zoological, 
                                                
5 E.G. Boring’s course was “Psychology I,” an introductory course that surveyed the history of psychology 
from the ancients to the present.   
6 E.S. Castle to Donald Griffin. May 12, 1938, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 57, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield 
Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
7 Harvard College [Unofficial Transcript], Series 1, Box 5, Folder 57, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield 
Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
8 For an institutional chronology of Harvard biology, see: Clark A. Elliott, “Chronological Overview of 
Harvard Science (1636-1945) [Appendix 2],” in Science at Harvard University, eds. Clark A. Elliott and 
Margaret W. Rossiter, p. 331-360 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1992). 
9 On Parker, see: Alfred Shermer Romer, “[Biographical Memoir of] George Howard Parker (1864-1955),” 
Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, Vol. 53 (1967): 357-390. 
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botanical, and physiological laboratories under the same roof, but would also create a 
research-oriented “nucleus” of cooperative biological work with the goal of discovering 
“new truth in the realm of organic nature.”10 Thanks to a $3 million contribution from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the massive, five-story laboratory complex was opened in 
1931.11 The final piece fell into place in 1934, when recently appointed Harvard president 
James Conant continued the work of his predecessor in consolidating the faculties of 
zoology, botany, and physiology into a unified department of biology, headed by a single 
chair.12 As a result, by the mid-1930s the biology department—with the exception of the 
Museum of Comparative Zoology, a separate but related institution—leaned heavily 
toward physiology. 
 In addition to institutional changes, the intellectual axis of Harvard biology was 
also shifting. In 1925 Parker hired William J. Crozier—a physiologically oriented 
zoologist with grand ideas about the “Loebian” future of biology. As Philip J. Pauly has 
shown, Crozier was adamant and aggressive in his belief that the functional studies of 
general physiology were the key to achieving Loeb’s vision of reformulating biology 
from a natural science to an engineering one.13 Loeb championed a mechanistic view of 
biology in general, and of animal behavior in particular, and Crozier’s hiring signaled the 
beginning of a decade-long trend toward creating a physiologically oriented biology 
                                                
10 George H. Parker, “The New Harvard Biological Laboratories,” Science, Vol. 76, No. 1964 (Aug. 1932): 
160. 
11 The building itself was more commonly referred to simply as the “Biological Laboratories.” 
12 Conant’s predecessor, A. Lawrence Lowell, had worked with George Howard Parker and William 
Crozier in the 1920s to establish a new “Institute of Biology,” funded mainly by the Rockefeller 
Foundation. 
13 Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 183-185, 199. 
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faculty.14 Along with Parker and Lowell, Crozier also oversaw the construction of the 
Institute of Biology, making certain “that general physiology shared space on an equal 
footing with the long-established departments of zoology and botany.”15 In addition to 
these changes, the biology faculty became academically inbred in the 1930s, thus 
shielding its physiological bent from external influence. According to historians Morton 
and Phyllis Keller, between 1930 and 1938 only home-grown Harvard PhDs received 
permanent appointments in the department.16  
 Donald Griffin’s uncle Alfred Redfield served as the first chair of the new 
department in 1934. A comparative physiologist who migrated from the Medical School, 
Redfield summarily resigned after only one year, citing his frustration over academic 
politics—specifically with Harvard president James Conant’s meddling in departmental 
affairs.17 Redfield’s chairmanship was followed in 1935 by that of another physiologist, 
Alden B. Dawson, who specialized in cell biology and morphological physiology. After 
Dawson resigned in 1940, Edward S. Castle, a botanist and associate professor of 
physiology became chair, despite earlier efforts by Conant to deny him a permanent 
professorship in 1939.18 Other faculty during this period included the aforementioned 
George Howard Parker (sensory physiology), William “Cap” Weston (mycology), John 
H. Welsh (invertebrate physiology), Theodore James Blanchard Stier (metabolic 
physiology), Ralph Wetmore (botany), George Wald (sensory physiology), Jeffries 
                                                
14 Behaviorist psychologist B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) conducted his doctoral work under Crozier’s 
guidance at Harvard between 1928 and 1931. 
15 Philip Pauly, Controlling Life, p. 185. 
16 Morton Keller and Phyllis Keller, Making Harvard Modern: The Rise of America’s University (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 99. 
17 Keller and Keller, Making Harvard Modern, p. 99. 
18 Keller and Keller, Making Harvard Modern, p. 100. Conant’s exact reasoning is unclear in Keller and 
Keller, but it is implied that Conant was generally unimpressed by much of the biology faculty, and had 
hoped to bring in some more prestigious names while simultaneously quashing the department’s tendency 
to promote from within.  
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Wyman (physical chemistry, physiology), Charles Thomas Brues (entomology), Leigh 
Hoadley (embryology), and Alfred Romer (evolutionary biology, paleontology).19 
Hallowell Davis (sensory physiology) and Alexander Forbes (sensory physiology), 
professors at Harvard’s medical school, also collaborated frequently with the biology 
department and occasionally advised doctoral research. 
 By the mid-1930s, then, as Griffin recalled, “physiology was the order of the day, 
and animal behavior was considered too vague for serious scientists.”20 As an 
undergraduate, therefore, he learned to modify his approach to studying animals from a 
naturalist’s perspective—observing, collecting, and recording their movements in the 
wild—to a physiological one. Despite Conant’s efforts to limit the Harvard tutorial plan 
so that professors could focus more on their own research, the biology department still 
took tutoring seriously. Griffin’s instructor was physical chemist Jeffries Wyman. Along 
with Griffin’s uncle Alfred Redfield, Wyman shepherded Griffin through his transition to 
Harvard and taught him to think more like a physiologist when it came to zoological 
inquiry. As Griffin described it, physiology at Harvard was understood as an essentially 
comparative field, “one subject and not readily divisible along phylogenetic lines.”21 In 
order to understand the migratory behavior of bats, for example, one must know much 
more than the structure, speed, and timing of annual migrations from their hibernating 
caves to summer breeding haunts. To address such a problem, a Harvard biology student 
                                                
19 Hoadley and Lashley each taught one half of “Biology 20” in 1939-40. Alfred Romer was appointed in 
the MCZ but was closely affiliated with the biology department. 
20 Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of Neuroscience in Autobiography, Vol. 2, ed. 
Larry Squire, p. 68-93 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), p. 73. Among the few that took animal behavior 
seriously was director of the Museum of Comparative Zoology (MCZ), Glover Allen—also a bat expert 
and a friendly mentor to Griffin from the time before he enrolled at Harvard. The MCZ was not officially 
divorced administratively from the biology department until 1939, although the institutions were effectively 
separate before then. Keller and Keller, Making Harvard Modern, p. 99-102. 
21 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” in Leaders in the Study of Animal 
Behavior, ed. Donald Dewsbury, p. 120-142 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated Universities Press, 1985), p. 134. 
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in the 1930s ought to study the comparative physiology of mammals, including 
physiological mechanisms that controlled diurnal periodicity.22  
Under these influences, Griffin explained, “physiology came to seem to me and 
most of my fellow students the substantial science of the future. Bat banding, mammalian 
systematics, or similar things were old-fashioned natural history, we were led to 
recognize—suitable for amateur dilettantes, perhaps, but not serious science suitable for 
one aspiring to a professional academic career.”23 Another biology undergraduate during 
the mid-1930s, Vincent Dethier, was overtly critical of the character of the department 
when recalling his time there. Although he too would later become a distinguished 
sensory physiologist, Dethier’s early experiences in the biology department made him 
queasy: “the inexhaustible vocabulary of technical terms that riddle biology […], the 
welter of details to the exclusion, or subordination, of principles and generalizations […] 
To one whose prior experience had been with living organisms and who was attracted to 
nature by the behavior of organisms and the beauty and mystery of the living world, these 
were bitter pills to swallow.”24 
 Amid this intellectual environment Griffin learned to examine animal behavior 
through a mechanistic framework. The long shadow of Loeb’s mechanistic epistemology 
pushed biological inquiry toward what historian Philip J. Pauly has described as 
                                                
22 These would later be termed “circadian rhythms” and then generalized to the “biological clock.” 
23 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 126. Griffin’s graduate courses 
included Biology 25 (embryology); Biology 11a (genetics); Biology 18 (phylogeny of flowering plants); 
Biology 29 (invertebrate zoology), Biology 31 (cell physiology); Psychology 111 (survey); Psychology 10a 
(quantitative methods) and Psychology 6a (physiological psychology). In order to graduate, Griffin was 
also required to qualify in comparative psychology “with special reference to studies of behavior.” O.E. 
Sandusky to Donald Griffin, 9 June 1939, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 57, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield 
Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
24 Emphasis in original. Vincent G. Dethier, “Curiosity, Milieu, and Era,” in Studying Animal Behavior: 
Autobiographies of the Founders, ed. Donald Dewsbury, p. 42-67 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989), p. 46. Dethier stayed at Harvard for his PhD, which he received in 1939. 
 30 
explaining “the visible by imagining mechanical processes occurring on a more 
microscopic level.”25 Animals were assumed to be machine-like, and their behavior was 
understood with reference to the specific physiological mechanisms that were triggered 
by corresponding environmental stimuli. With respect to the study of animal behavior in 
general, this biological outlook was easily compatible with and reinforced the behaviorist 
paradigm in American comparative psychology. Griffin thus came to consider himself 
not merely a zoologist but “primarily a physiologist,” focused on “mechanistic 
explanations of animal behavior.”26 Recalling his graduate work on bird migration, for 
example, Griffin explained that his generation of young biologists at Harvard became 
convinced that nearly all homing behavior “could be accounted for without assuming that 
birds had any ability to choose the correct homeward direction when released in 
unfamiliar territory.” This conclusion, “which in retrospect seems so narrowly 
overconservative, was very much in keeping with the basic ideas on which I had been 
brought up in the biology and psychology department at Harvard in the 1930s. 
Everything that animals did must be explained on the sort of very simple basis 
characteristic of Jacques Loeb’s theories of tropisms.”27 Although he would later 
forswear that perspective, Griffin’s intellectual development in his years at Harvard was 
shaped by the methodological assumption that animal behavior ought to be understood 
mechanistically and through the rubric of behavioristic explanations.  
 One of his undergraduate research projects illustrates how this perspective shaped 
the kinds of questions Griffin would pose about animal behavior, as well as the sort of 
conclusions he considered appropriate. In his junior year under professor John H. 
                                                
25 Philip Pauly, Controlling Life, p. 146. 
26 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 137. 
27 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 135.  
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Welsh—supervisor of undergraduate laboratory work—Griffin undertook the study of 
endogenous activity rhythms in several invertebrates, before moving up the phylogenetic 
scale to examine the circadian rhythms in little brown bats (Myotis lucifugus).28 On the 
basis of Loebian mechanisms, it was thought, explanations of insect behavior should not 
differ in kind from those of the “higher” mammals; one needed simply to isolate the 
appropriate environmental stimulus and its physiological correlate in the response 
mechanism.29 In these experiments we see the first explicit signs of Griffin’s transition 
from a natural historical to a physiological approach in the study of animals. 
 Returning to Harvard in the fall of 1936, Griffin brought with him three little 
brown bats—along with experiential knowledge of their natural behavior—that were 
captured at the end of his banding activities that summer. Curious as to how bats 
hibernating in deep caves coordinated their activity according to diurnal periodicity, 
Griffin and Welsh found that when the bats were exposed to constant darkness in the 
laboratory, their activity rhythms nevertheless remained “in phase” with the day-night 
cycle outside. This was interesting, since it seemed to imply that some internal, 
clockwork mechanism was more important for regulating behavior than an external 
stimulus such as sunlight. While the bats therefore showed a form of endogenous activity 
rhythm, Griffin and Welsh also discovered that feeding times could influence that natural 
cycle—one bat, for example, began its 24-hour cycles according to when Griffin 
administered by hand its daily provision of mealworms.30 Curiously, the cycles of the 
                                                
28 John Welsh was heavily influenced by the eminent Harvard physiologist George Howard Parker, who 
championed Loeb’s mechanistic vision of biology. 
29 They published these results in Griffin’s preferred bulletin, the Journal of Mammalogy. Donald Griffin 
and John Welsh, “Activity Rhythms in Bats under Constant External Conditions,” Journal of Mammalogy, 
Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug. 1937): 337-342. 
30 Bats are notoriously difficult to keep adequately nourished while in captivity, and here Griffin explained 
that he was forced to hand-feed them live mealworms in order to coax them into eating. 
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other two bats remained in phase with the day-night cycle regardless of when they were 
fed. Griffin and Welsh concluded that this activity coordination entailed a “cyclic internal 
process—involving perhaps the nervous or endocrine systems or both.” Functioning as an 
auxiliary to the senses, this process could be further “emphasized by the experience of 
darkness and daylight.”31  
While they were unsure of the details, Griffin and Welsh were nevertheless 
convinced that they had found evidence of a clockwork physiological mechanism that 
was subject to external influence. Such a mechanism—what we today refer to as the 
biological clock—was seemingly at odds with the stimulus-response explanations 
demanded by Loebian tropisms. Nevertheless, it was still assumed to be mechanistic in 
nature, even if the typical framework of stimulus-response was incapable of resolving its 
complexity. Perhaps Griffin would have pursued this line of inquiry into endogenous 
activity rhythms further had he not made an even more surprising discovery a few months 
later. 
 
Spallanzani’s Bat Problem: Obstacle Avoidance in Bats 
Spallanzani’s so-called “bat problem” dated to the late-eighteenth century, and a 
solution had been intriguingly hinted at several times over the course of its 150 year 
history. In the 1790s Spallanzani and subsequently the Swiss naturalist Louis Jurine 
performed a series of experiments with deaf and blind bats that suggested that hearing—
or some other function performed by the inner ears—was necessary for obstacle 
                                                
31 Donald Griffin and John Welsh, “Activity Rhythms in Bats under Constant External Conditions,” p. 341. 
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avoidance in flight.32 However, because bats flew in nearly complete silence, many 
naturalists remained uncertain as to what auditory or physical cues might be involved. 
During most of the nineteenth century, the auditory solution suggested by Spallanzani 
and Jurine was rejected in favor of Cuvier’s tactile hypothesis, which held that bats 
sensed obstacles in flight via an extremely sensitive membrane that covered their wings. 
Cuvier’s hypothesis, despite being widely accepted, was never demonstrated 
experimentally. Further study by several naturalists and physiologists in the early-
twentieth century once again suggested that the ears of bats played the crucial role in 
obstacle avoidance. The sensory basis of obstacle avoidance remained an open question 
by the late-1930s, but one that was ripe for study within the expanding field of sensory 
physiology. 
In early 1938, Griffin was urged by a few colleagues to meet with the 
distinguished professor of physics George Washington Pierce, who had invented a unique 
apparatus that could detect, produce, and analyze what were then known as “supersonic” 
sounds—that is, sounds with frequencies above the upper limit of human hearing 
(approximately 20,000 cycles per second, or 20kHz).33 This sophisticated device, 
                                                
32 Although Jurine based his experiments on Spallanzani’s, their research was independent, not 
collaborative. 
33 Griffin recalled that two colleagues in particular encouraged him to visit Pierce. One was James Fisk, a 
Harvard Society Fellow who had just received his PhD in quantum physics from MIT. At the time Fisk was 
beginning what would become a distinguished career in radar research. In 1940 he was hired to improve 
radar technology by Bell Labs, where he eventually served as president from 1959-1973. The other was 
Talbot Waterman, a Harvard graduate student researching the sensory physiology and neurobiology of 
crustaceans. Waterman, also a member of the Society of Fellows, would go on to apply “his wartime 
experience with polarizing gunsights to make an underwater hand-held polarizer that could be used to 
measure underwater polarization patterns” necessary for arthropod orientation. On Waterman’s career, see: 
T. W. Cronin, J. Marshall and M. F. Wehling, “Talbot H. Waterman,” Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B, Vol. 366, No. 1565 (Mar. 2011): 617-618. 
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conceived and built by Pierce, also translated high-frequency tones into audible sound.34 
A naturalist at heart, during his summer vacations Pierce had become interested in 
applying his expertise in physical acoustics to the analysis of insect songs in his gardens. 
He and his research assistant Vincent Dethier—a biology graduate student with a budding 
interest in sensory physiology—brought these studies into the laboratory, where they had 
been using the instrument to study the high-frequency noises produced by grasshoppers 
and other insects.35  
After some initial hesitation, Griffin brought a cage of bats into Pierce’s office as 
an exploratory measure.36 Both Griffin and Pierce were almost certainly aware of some 
previous experimental work on obstacle avoidance in bats, including that of naturalist 
Walter Louis Hahn. In a series of experiments performed in 1907, Hahn had shown that 
neither vision, tactile membranes on the skin, nor the external ear anatomy were 
necessary for bats to avoid obstacles in flight.37 Like Spallanzani before him, Hahn 
suspected that the inner ear played a crucial role in obstacle avoidance. However, because 
bats were almost entirely silent in flight, Hahn concluded that they avoided obstacles not 
                                                
34 For a description of Pierce’s device, see: Atherton Noyes, Jr. and G.W. Pierce, “Apparatus for Acoustic 
Research in the Supersonic Frequency Range,” Journal of the Acoustic Society of America, Vol. 9 (Jan. 
1938): 205-211.  
35 The fact that Pierce, a professor of physics, was working with Dethier, a biology graduate student, is a 
testament to the spirit of interdisciplinarity encouraged by the biology department in the 1930s.  
36 In a memoir Griffin explained that it “took a considerable effort during the winter of 1936-37 [sic] to 
bring myself to call on the distinguished physics professor,” due to his poor performance (C+) in 
Oldenberg’s atomic physics course. Once he did, he found “Pierce a jolly fellow who was delighted to find 
someone who knew one end of a bat from the other.” Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental 
Naturalist,” p. 127. There is some confusion as to whether Griffin first approached Pierce in the winter of 
1936-37, or 1937-38. I believe Griffin is mistaken in his autobiographical memoir, and that he actually 
visited Pierce in the winter of 1937-38.  Their findings were published in November of 1938, and Griffin 
has described elsewhere their experiments were performed within a few months of that initial meeting. 
Donald Griffin, Listening in the Dark: The Acoustic Orientation of Bats and Men (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1958), p. 66-69; Donald Griffin, Echoes of Bats and Men (Garden City: Anchor Books, 
1959), p. 29; Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of Neuroscience in Autobiography, 
Vol. 2, ed. Larry Squire, p. 68-93 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), p. 74.  
37 Walter Louis Hahn, “Some Habits and Sensory Adaptations of Cave-Inhabiting Bats II,” Biological 
Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Sep. 1908): 165-193.  
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by virtue of acoustic orientation, but through the mechanical sensation of atmospheric 
compression by a specialized organ in the inner ear. 
Hahn’s 1907 experiments drew on Spallanzani’s much earlier work, but in his 
newer experiments he tested four explanations of the sensory basis of obstacle avoidance 
using quantitative metrics, evaluating the performance of bats under controlled 
experimental conditions.38 In his experimental design, Hahn divided a large room in half 
by tightly stringing iron wires (black in color, about one millimeter in diameter) from the 
rafters to floor, spaced unevenly, but on average about eleven inches apart. He then 
sorted his 47 bats into four experimental groups and calculated how frequently the bats in 
each group were successful in avoiding the wires as they flew from one side of the room 
to the other.39 Hahn observed each bat perform 50 trials, which consisted of passing 
through the wires from one side of the room to the other, or nearly approaching a wire 
before dodging it.  In 2,350 total trials, normal bats struck wires about 25% of the time on 
average, although the ability varied substantially by individual.  
In order to isolate the senses, Hahn employed four kinds of “mutilation.” To rule-
out vision, he covered the eyes of 12 bats with lampblack (soot) and glue, taking care that 
it had hardened enough so that they were unable to remove it with their claws—a 
difficulty that Griffin and Galambos would also have to contend with in their 
experiments. In 600 trials these ‘blinded’ bats hit the wires only 21.7% of the time. 
Curiously, the same group had struck the wires 23.6% of the time under normal 
                                                
38 Spallanzani’s analysis was more qualitative, providing descriptive accounts of his results rather than 
quantifying the effects of sensory mutilations on bat flight. Also, Spallanzani gravely injured his bats by 
cutting out their eyes and by using a hot wire to blind them, which disrupted in general their ability to fly 
normally because of injury. 
39 Hahn used a mixture of Easter pipistrelles (Perimyotis subflavus), Western small-footed bats (Myotis 
subulatus), and little brown bats (Myotis lucifugus). 
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conditions—thus, they actually performed better when blinded.40 In a second group 
consisting of 11 bats, Hahn surgically removed the external ear anatomy and tragi—small 
flaps that project posteriorly over the ear canal—in order to determine if they played a 
role in obstacle avoidance. These bats struck the wires in 31.7% of their trials, versus a 
24.4% hit-rate before the amputations.41 However, the 7% increase in collisions was 
largely due to the poor performance of a single bat that was injured on the operating 
table. Excluding the injured bat brought the hit-rate down to 23.2%, thus demonstrating 
that the presence of the external ear anatomy was not crucial for obstacle avoidance. In a 
third group, Hahn isolated the role of the inner ear. When the external auditory meatus 
(ear canal) was blocked by plaster of Paris, 16 of Hahn’s bats showed a substantial 
impairment in their ability to avoid collisions. The hit-rate of these bats increased from 
25.2% to 66%. Hahn interpreted the results as showing that the plaster had prevented 
atmospheric vibrations from reaching “the sensory cells of the internal ear.” He therefore 
concluded that the perception of the wires by normal bats was most probably due to “the 
condensation of the air between the flying bat and the solid body that it is approaching,” 
and that it was “not so difficult to imagine that condensation of the air so slight as to be 
imperceptible to the human ear will arouse sensations on the auditory end organs of the 
bat.”42 With the fourth group, Hahn set out to test Cuvier’s so-called “tactile theory,” 
                                                
40 When Griffin and Galambos modified and repeated these experiments in 1939, their “blind” bats 
similarly performed better than they had under normal conditions. Griffin was never able to explain this 
curious fact. 
41 In the amputated ears group, Hahn used a mix of five little brown bats (Myotis lucifugus) and six eastern 
pipistrelles (Perimyotis subflavus).  
42 As part of this discussion, Hahn warned against drawing conclusions about what cognitive implications 
that obstacle avoidance via hearing had for the mental life of bats. “It is necessary to bear in mind in 
discussing the senses of the lower animals that it is impossible to form any adequate conception of the 
sensations and mental life of the lower animals on the basis of our own. If a piano recital is 
incomprehensible to a Hottentot, or a snake dance to a cultured Caucasian, how much less can either hope 
to understand the perceptions aroused in the brain of a hound that scents a fox, or the mental processes of a 
 37 
which held that obstacle avoidance was due to the perception of atmospheric changes by 
tiny hairs on the wing membranes. To rule this out, Hahn slathered the bats with a thick 
coat of vaseline, which he assumed would render the hairs “less sensitive to slight 
stimulation.”43 The hit-rate for this final group also increased from 26.1% under normal 
conditions to 36.1% with the vaseline coatings, which seemed to lend some credence to 
the tactile theory. However, Hahn inferred that the layer of vaseline had made flying 
significantly more difficult for the bats, and he therefore concluded that although the 
“organs of touch” were valuable in obstacle avoidance, they were not nearly as valuable 
as the “auditory organs.”44 
A few months later in the summer of 1907, Hahn decided to test whether different 
sensory mutilations made bats more or less likely to collide directly with obstacles 
(“hits”) or merely to brush them with their wings (“touches”). To determine this, he 
performed additional experiments using a modified setup, with slightly larger (15 
millimeters) white cotton strips that were evenly spaced as opposed to the irregularly 
spaced wires. He found that even bats with unobstructed ear canals frequently had 
difficulty avoiding objects entirely, but they were much less likely to strike an object 
directly than they were to brush it with their wings. He next tested the ability of bats to 
form what animal psychologists termed “associations,” thinking that these might aid bats 
more generally in obstacle avoidance. Hahn found that bats readily formed auditory 
associations (between specific sounds and feeding times for example), but failed to form 
                                                                                                                                            
bat as he circles among the tree tops in pursuit of insects.” Walter Hahn, “Sensory Adaptations of Bats,” p. 
173.  
43 Walter Hahn, “Sensory Adaptations of Bats,” p. 173. 
44 Walter Hahn, “Sensory Adaptations of Bats,” p. 174. 
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visual, tactile, and gustatory associations. Thus he concluded that the auditory organs 
played the most important role in the ability of bats to avoid obstacles. 
The fact that the inner ear seemed crucial to obstacle avoidance, coupled with the 
near absence of sound in their flight, led Hahn to suggest that bats probably perceived 
obstacles through a sensory organ in the internal ear that detected “the condensation of 
the atmosphere between the moving animal and the object it is approaching.”45 Hahn had 
evidently identified pressure waves as key to obstacle avoidance, but he conceived the 
bats’ ability to perceive them as more of a mechanical than an acoustic sense. Thus the 
sensory function was not synonymous with hearing: “bats do perceive objects that they 
are approaching by senses other than sight or hearing as usually understood. The most 
important sense organs for the perception of objects are in the internal ear.”46 
Nevertheless, the evidence for acoustic associations was strongly suggestive of the 
important role that hearing played in bat behavior. He therefore concluded that these 
associations also aided bats in obstacle avoidance, and suggested that bats possessed a 
“sixth sense, that of direction,” which was based on acoustic information and was further 
strengthened by the associative memory of the bat’s surroundings. 
Griffin probably first learned of Hahn’s analysis from Glover M. Allen (1879-
1942), a bat expert and curator of mammals at Harvard’s Museum of Comparative 
Zoology.47 In his magnum opus, Bats (1939), Allen dedicated a few pages to the 
                                                
45 Walter Hahn, “Sensory Adaptations of Bats,” p. 188-191. 
46 Walter Hahn, “Sensory Adaptations of Bats,” p. 176. 
47 I have found no direct evidence indicating when Allen learned about Hahn’s work. However, given the 
fact that Allen studied and wrote about bats throughout his career (publishing on them as early as 1922), 
and the fact that Hahn’s work was published by a major journal (Biological Bulletin) in 1908, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Allen probably learned about it within a few years of its publication. Certainly 
by the 1930s Allen would have been familiar with it, as he began constructing his magnum opus, Bats 
(published in 1939). Griffin was also interested in bats from a young age and had corresponded with Allen 
 39 
discussion of obstacle avoidance.48 While he mostly accepted Hahn’s explanation of the 
problem, Allen was more definitive in stating what he thought constituted the true 
sensory basis of obstacle avoidance: “Evidently the internal ear, with its acute sense of 
hearing, is a main factor, not only in helping bats to avoid obstacles, but also in aiding 
them to hear the hum of a passing insect. No doubt it is the echo of vibrations set in 
motion by air currents that they really perceive.”49 Thus unlike Hahn, Allen thought that 
the sensory function was acoustic, not merely mechanical; that is, rather than sensing 
atmospheric compression via its mechanical effects on a specialized sensory organ, bats 
actually heard—in the traditional sense—atmospheric vibrations. He further disagreed 
with Hahn in claiming that it was the echoes of those atmospheric vibrations that bats 
perceived. However, Allen failed to address the heart of the matter—if bats used the 
reflection of sounds to avoid collisions, as he assumed, why were their flights 
unaccompanied by audible sound?50 
It is important to emphasize that Hahn and Allen understood this sensory function 
as a fairly simple and limited ability, regardless of whether it entailed acoustic (hearing) 
or mechanical (pressure/tactile) sensations in the inner ear. They both considered obstacle 
avoidance to be a kind of crude collision warning system, rather than a general mode of 
                                                                                                                                            
a few years before he became a Harvard undergraduate. He may have known about Hahn’s work before 
even coming to Harvard, but he did not become interested in obstacle avoidance until about 1938.  
48 Glover Allen, Bats (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939; reprinted by Dover, 2004). 
49 Glover Allen, Bats, p. 134-136. Although not published until 1939, Allen’s expansive monograph was 
evidently the result of several years of work. I am not sure when he came to the conclusion that bats 
avoided obstacles due to the perception of echoes, but that idea was first proposed in 1920 by British 
physiologist Hamilton Hartridge. Allen, however, does not cite Hartridge’s work. 
50 Although his book was published in 1939, his section on obstacle avoidance had probably not been 
updated since at least 1938. If it had, Allen surely would have mentioned Griffin’s and Pierce’s discovery 
in early 1938 that bats emitted sounds above the range of human hearing. However, because Griffin and 
Pierce concluded that these calls were probably not used for orientation, perhaps Allen purposefully 
omitted them in his discussion. Nevertheless, Allen was certainly aware that Griffin was working on the 
problem around the time his book would have gone to press, and so it seems a curious omission, even if the 
results were negative. 
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perception such as vision. This is much different from what we understand echolocation 
to be today.  
The fact that obstacle avoidance was considered to be simple and mechanistic 
facilitated the development of technological analogs with these biological phenomena. 
When Allen considered the unknown function of small “wattles” on the faces of some 
bats, for example, he suggested that they might “act as receptors for air vibrations set up 
by passing insects or reflected from near-by objects.”51 He grounded this speculation in 
Sir Hiram Maxim’s 1912 proposal of a nautical technology that could detect obstacles in 
a ship’s path by sending out low-frequency tones and recording their echoes via “delicate 
membranes on board.”52 In fact, when Maxim first proposed this crude form of sonar in 
the wake of the HMS Titanic disaster (1912), he explicitly pointed to the role played by 
these membranes in the supposed “sixth sense” of bats.53 For Maxim, bats offered a 
biological solution to a technological problem. Although he did not cite Hahn’s 1907-08 
work, Maxim was probably drawing from it when he explained that bats possessed a 
sixth sense that detected the reflections of atmospheric vibrations, or “extremely low 
notes” produced by their flapping wings.54 Like Hahn, Maxim did not think that bats 
heard the notes, in the traditional sense, for they were thought to be below the threshold 
of hearing. Instead, he thought the bats’ inner ear organs perceived and analyzed the 
                                                
51 Glover Allen, Bats, p. 135. 
52 Glover Allen, Bats, p. 137. Allen also briefly noted the conceptual similarity between Maxim’s device 
and other depth-sounding technologies that had been more recently developed to probe the ocean floor. 
Interestingly, Allen noted the functional similarities between Maxim’s proposed technology and the bat 
“wattles,” but he did not point out its similarities to the auditory basis of obstacle avoidance. 
53 Hiram Maxim, “The Sixth Sense of the Bat: Sir Hiram Maxim’s Contention. The Possible Prevention of 
Sea Collisions,” Scientific American Supplement, Vol. 74 (Sep. 7, 1912): 148-150.  
54 Hiram Maxim, “The Sixth Sense of the Bat,” p. 148. In fact, Hahn meant something slightly different by 
“sixth sense,” which for him meant a sense of direction that was based on associative memories whose 
construction was aided by the sensory organs of the internal ear. It is possible that Maxim was unaware of 
Hahn’s work entirely, in which case he probably had Spallanzani’s much earlier explanation of the “sixth 
sense” of bats in mind. 
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reflected vibrations “exactly as light waves would be by our eyes under similar 
conditions.” It was thus a certainty, Maxim concluded, that “the bat obtains its knowledge 
of surrounding objects by sending out certain atmospheric vibrations and receiving back, 
in a fraction of a second later, the reflected and modified vibrations.”55 In this basic 
sensory function, Maxim saw the potential for a useful technology—an onboard collision 
warning system for ships at sea. He proposed a system with three components: a siren 
driven by a steam-powered electric motor to produce notes of a long wavelength; an 
“artificial ear” consisting of a drum-shaped cylinder that vibrates and rings a bell in the 
presence of certain wavelengths; and a similar cylindrical device connected to a 
mechanism that draws a diagram indicating the amplitude of the reflected wavelengths, 
providing information about the distance and size of the detected objects.56 
Maxim and Allen were not alone in recognizing the technological implications of 
obstacle avoidance in bats. Although he did not cite it in his text, Allen’s analysis of 
obstacle avoidance was probably informed by the more recent work of British sensory 
physiologist Hamilton Hartridge. In 1920 Hartridge was the first to propose that bats 
avoided collisions by virtue of emitting high-frequency sounds that reflected off objects 
in their vicinities, providing the bat with “information concerning its surroundings.”57 In 
his analysis, Hartridge also likened obstacle avoidance in bats to a technological analog.  
Like Hahn, Hartridge devised a series of experiments that allowed him to gauge 
the ability of bats to avoid obstacles in different sensory conditions. Cruder in their 
                                                
55 Hiram Maxim, “The Sixth Sense of the Bat,” p. 148. 
56 Interestingly, Maxim did not know that the siren had an analog in bat physiology, because he did not 
think that bats actively produced the sounds whose reflections they perceived. Rather, he thought that they 
perceived echoes of incidental sounds produced by their wings—mere byproducts of flight. As Griffin and 
Galambos would later discover, bats in fact emit ultrasonic sounds for the purpose of orientation, 
functioning analogously to the siren in Maxim’s early version of sonar.  
57 Hamilton Hartridge, “The Avoidance of Objects by Bats in their Flight,” Journal of Physiology, Vol. 54, 
No. 1-2 (Aug. 1920): 54-57. 
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design than Hahn’s experiments, Hartridge’s analysis also lacked Hahn’s quantitative 
rigor. In fact, it seems likely that he was wholly unaware of Hahn’s work. Hartridge 
chose a natural setting for his experimental setup, taking advantage of a building near 
Cambridge University where a few hundred bats roosted during the summers. Each 
evening, the bats—he was unsure of the species—were forced to pass between two rooms 
as they exited the building to hunt insects. Hartridge installed thick shutters and curtains 
to ensure that these rooms were completely dark. As the bats passed in large numbers 
through a doorway from one room to the next, he observed that their flight was 
unaffected by switching on electric lights, which brightened the rooms. Lighting the room 
left the bats “quite unconcerned,” and they continued their swift flight just as they had in 
the dark. Next, Hartridge manipulated the passageway between the two rooms by 
gradually closing the intervening door. In both light and dark conditions, he observed that 
the bats were adept at passing through the opening, but when the gap was reduced to six 
inches, they passed through only after some hesitation and fluttering. When it was further 
reduced to four inches, the bats would “as it were come up and look and then fly off 
without attempting to pass.”58  
Hartridge next strung a series of threads across the room, all of which terminated 
through a tiny hole inside a cardboard box on the floor. The threads had small weights 
attached to their ends, and from inside the cardboard box Hartridge used a flashlight to 
carefully observe the weights, which were designed to bob up and down if a bat collided 
with a thread.59 In both light and dark conditions, the bats never struck threads. He 
therefore concluded that “bats in full flight and in what appeared to be absolute darkness 
                                                
58 Hamilton Hartridge, “The Avoidance of Objects by Bats,” p. 54-55. 
59 Hartridge did this from within the cardboard box, obviously, to prevent his flashlight from adding light to 
the room. 
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can not only steer round a room and avoid one another, but that they can also avoid 
obstacles such as threads.”60 He dismissed Cuvier’s tactile hypothesis straight away, 
explaining that it seemed “impossible that a bat should be able to fly at an object until it 
touched it and to then avoid hitting it.” Presumably, Hartridge explained, the sense 
involved in obstacle avoidance should be able to detect obstacles that were still “a 
considerable distance away.” If vision and touch were not involved, did bats possess 
“some sixth sense not found in the case of man?”61  
Hartridge was unwilling to accept the existence of a sixth sense until further tests 
were performed on the ability of bats to detect obstacles using hearing. He cited the work 
of British naturalist Arthur Whitaker, who in 1906 had found in accordance with 
Spallanzani’s experiments that blinded bats avoid obstacles successfully, but did so 
poorly when their ear canals were blocked.62 Although Whitaker noted that the bat’s 
sense of hearing was greatly adapted to “sounds of a much higher pitch than our own,” he 
concluded that hearing was not responsible for obstacle avoidance.63  
Hartridge, however, did think that Whitaker’s observations concerning the bat’s 
sensitivity to high-pitch sound were key to solving the problem. Although he did not 
perform any experiments demonstrating that bats used their highly developed sense of 
hearing to avoid obstacles, Hartridge explained the biophysical principles that he believed 
made it both possible and likely that they did. Sounds of very short wavelength (high-
frequency), he explained, were capable of being reflected off objects with a high degree 
of fidelity (undergoing minimal diffraction). Furthermore, when these sounds struck 
                                                
60 Hamilton Hartridge, “The Avoidance of Objects by Bats,” p. 56. 
61 Hamilton Hartridge, “The Avoidance of Objects by Bats,” p. 56. 
62 Arthur Whitaker, “The Development of the Senses in Bats,” The Naturalist (May 1906): 145-151. 
63 Arthur Whitaker, “The Development of the Senses in Bats,” p. 147. 
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objects, they cast “sound shadows” analogous to those produced by visible light. He 
therefore put forth an acoustic hypothesis of obstacle avoidance: “I suggest then that bats 
during flight emit a short wave-length note and that this sound is reflected from objects in 
the vicinity. The reflected sound gives the bat information concerning its surroundings 
[…] If there are obstacles then these will reflect the sound and the bat will receive an 
audible warning.”64  
While he lacked experimental evidence to support this claim, Hartridge did have 
evidence of a technological analog that was based on the same physical principles. 
Developed during the First World War, “sound ranging” devices perfected by the British 
military had “shown that the sense of direction in man can be made use of for estimating 
the position in space of objects emitting sound waves.”65 During the war, these devices 
served to augment the human senses, allowing soldiers to locate and determine the 
precise distance of enemy weapons based on the acoustic properties of gunshots.66 Sound 
ranging involved an array of microphones attuned to the frequency spectrum of gunshots, 
whose locations could be triangulated by analyzing the differences in time that it took the 
sound to hit multiple microphones within the array. While sound ranging required large 
distances between the array itself and the guns in order to generate useful readings, 
Hartridge explained that if bats emitted sounds of a sufficiently higher frequency than 
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gunshots, it was physically possible for them to sense objects at much shorter distances. 
Likening obstacle avoidance to this military technology, he concluded that “it is highly 
probable therefore that if a bat made use of short wave-length sound it would be able to 
estimate the position in space of an object ahead of it with considerable accuracy.”67 In 
fact, he suggested, this specialized sense of hearing might be capable of forming “sound 
pictures.”68 However, Hartridge had no evidence that bats produced sounds with 
frequencies at or higher than the upper threshold of human hearing. 
 
The Ultrasonic Method of Obstacle Avoidance: A Collaborative Discovery 
When Donald Griffin turned his attention in 1938 to the problem of obstacle 
avoidance in bats, he focused on the work of Hahn and Hartridge. It is unclear whether he 
knew about Maxim’s crude form of bat-based sonar, although it is possible that Glover 
Allen had made him aware of it by that point. Nevertheless, despite Hartridge’s intriguing 
use of the term “sound pictures,” the ability of bats to orient themselves while flying 
blind was still filtered through the simpler framework of obstacle avoidance. Rather than 
a general mode of perception such as vision, obstacle avoidance was still assumed to be 
the result of a simple physiological feedback system, wherein an auditory stimulus 
elicited an automatically triggered behavioral response. In other words, it was a collision 
avoidance mechanism. 
It was with this mechanistic framework that Griffin approached the distinguished 
professor of physics George Washington Pierce (1872-1956) in the winter of 1937-38. 
The director of Harvard’s Cruft Laboratory of Physics since 1914, he had for much of his 
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career been interested in ultrasonic sound and the propagation of electromagnetic 
radiation.69 Beginning in July of 1917—just after the U.S. entered World War I—Pierce 
was among several American physicists and engineers called to work at the Naval 
Experimental Station in New London, Connecticut. Prompted by the success of German 
submarine strikes on the Allies, they were tasked with developing technologies that could 
detect the underwater sound generated by U-boats. Pierce’s research group focused on 
perfecting underwater receivers—“hydrophones”—which were attached to the hulls of 
ships in order to locate the sources of underwater sound generated by submarines.70  
Evidently Pierce made a name for himself as a scientific asset for the military: 
between the first and second world wars, the Navy annually sent him a group of officers 
eager to learn from an expert about the principles of underwater sound signaling and 
electrical communication.71 One of Pierce’s longtime friends and fishing buddies, 
physicist Harvey C. Hayes, also worked on the problem of submarine detection during 
the First World War. Interestingly, Hayes was partially responsible for achieving Hiram 
Maxim’s earlier vision of an onboard collision avoidance technology, since the 
submarine detection devices that he helped to develop during the war were also capable 
of detecting icebergs and other large obstacles via sonic echoes.72 A physicist at the 
Naval Research Laboratory, in the 1920s-30s Hayes was a central figure in the 
                                                
69 Frederick A. Saunders and Frederick V. Hunt, “[Biographical Memoir of] George Washington Pierce,” 
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development of “underwater echo ranging”—what came to be called sonar during World 
War Two.73 As the head of the Sound Division at the Naval Research Laboratory, on 
May 6, 1936, Hayes was also one of a handful of witnesses to the first successful 
demonstrations of radar at the Naval Research Laboratory.74 Hayes and his good friend 
Pierce undoubtedly had much to discuss on their fishing trips. 
Back in Pierce’s office in January of 1938, Griffin and Pierce pointed the 
parabolic receiving cone of Pierce’s ultrasonic detector at a cage full of bats. They 
instantly heard a barrage of buzzing and clicking as the instrument translated ultrasonic 
into audible sound.75 The highly sensitive device necessitated that Griffin take special 
care to ensure that the sounds it received were in fact produced by the bats’ vocal cords 
and not by other sources, such as their claws scratching the metallic cage. To eliminate 
this variable, Griffin gently cradled the bats in his hands while Pierce aimed and 
monitored the device. After meticulous testing, Griffin and Pierce had obtained 
unassailable proof that bats indeed produced ultrasonic sounds. The precise physical 
nature of these sounds (duration, frequency, modulation), however, in addition to their 
exact function, remained uncertain.  
In March of 1938, Griffin and Pierce performed some additional experiments in 
the Cruft physics laboratory at Harvard. They were joined by James Fisk, a Harvard 
Junior Fellow and physicist who would in a few short months begin a distinguished 
career in radar research at Bell Laboratories, where he eventually served as President 
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from 1959 to 1973. Despite several attempts, Griffin, Pierce, and Fisk were only 
occasionally able to detect the emission of ultrasonic notes while the bats were in flight. 
Instead their experiments showed that the bats typically emitted these cries while 
crawling and just as they took flight. Once in mid-flight, however, the noises apparently 
ceased. Furthermore, Griffin and Pierce were unable to determine conclusively that bats 
actually heard the sounds that they produced. They were therefore “appropriately 
cautious about concluding that these sounds were used for orientation,” and instead 
suggested that the bats more likely produced the sounds as a call or alarm signal.76 
By the fall of 1938 Griffin and Pierce had concluded that the ultrasonic notes of 
bats were not used for obstacle avoidance, and so Griffin turned his attention to the 
equally vexing problem of bird navigation. A few months later, however, he learned that 
fellow graduate student Robert Galambos was working on a recently developed 
electrophysiological method to study hearing in mammals. Beginning in the spring of 
1939, Griffin and Galambos—“far more of a physiologist” than Griffin—began 
collaborating on the ultrasonic perception in bats.77 They eventually demonstrated 
conclusively that bats avoided obstacles by hearing the reflections of their high-frequency 
vocalizations—a mode of perception that Griffin would later term “echolocation.” With 
these experiments, Spallanzani’s “bat problem” was resolved according to the 
physiological standards of the day. 
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Griffin’s uncle Alfred Redfield oversaw Galambos’s doctoral research, which was 
conducted with professor of physiology Hallowell Davis at the Harvard Medical School. 
Based on the pioneering electrophysiological work of physiologist Alexander Forbes, 
Davis had become an expert on the subject of “cochlear potentials.” In 1927 Forbes had 
found that when sound strikes the inner ear, an electrical or “cochlear potential” is 
generated, indicating that the organ is adapted to perceive sound of that frequency.78 
Galambos’s research was on guinea pigs, but when Griffin came to him inquiring about 
the possibility of studying cochlear potentials in bats, he jumped at the chance. Within a 
few weeks Galambos had shown that bats could indeed detect ultrasonic sound in the 
same frequency range as their cries.79  
Even more exciting was their subsequent discovery through careful testing that 
bats indeed produced ultrasonic sound almost continuously while flying, thus lending 
credence to Hartridge’s auditory theory of obstacle avoidance. Pierce and Griffin had 
failed to detect this before because they had not realized that the bat’s ultrasonic emission 
was highly directional, and could therefore only be detected if the parabolic receiver was 
pointed directly in the plane of the bat’s forward facing mouth. Thus in the spring of 
1939 Griffin and Galambos commenced what would eventually total about three years of 
collaborative research on obstacle avoidance in bats. Although they decided from the 
beginning that their work would be the subject of Galambos’s doctoral thesis, Griffin’s 
interest in obstacle avoidance was reinvigorated by the discovery of cochlear potentials. 
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A few months later during the summer of 1939, Griffin was a research fellow at 
the Huyck Preserve in Rensselaerville, New York, where he continued his own doctoral 
work on the problem of bird navigation. The question of bat orientation still weighed 
heavily on his mind, though. After he finished several bird navigation experiments at the 
beginning of the summer, he decided to spend the remainder of his fellowship banding 
bats and repeating Hahn’s 1907 obstacle avoidance experiments for himself. With the 
recently acquired knowledge that bats produced and heard ultrasonic sounds while flying, 
perhaps he would notice something that Hahn had missed. Akin to his research on birds, 
these experiments were designed to isolate specific sensory capabilities in order to test 
their effects on obstacle avoidance.   
At the Huyck Preserve, Griffin adapted a small horse-stall—nine feet square and 
seven feet tall—to perform some preliminary experiments. For these tests, he captured 
twenty-eight bats in total (mostly Myotis lucifugus—little brown bats), testing each on the 
same day it was captured or the following day. Like Hahn, he divided the room in half 
using an array of metal wires, one millimeter in diameter. Whereas Hahn’s wires were 
unevenly spaced, Griffin suspended them from the ceiling at intervals of thirty 
centimeters—just large enough for the bats to pass through with their wings fully spread. 
He also only counted “trials” when bats crossed from one side of the room to the other—
if a bat approached the wire and turned back, or if it struck a wire but did not cross to the 
other side of the room, he did not include the result. He reasoned that only counting trials 
in which the bats crossed the room would yield data that were more comparable given the 
different experimental conditions. “Hits” were easily detectable by the vibration of the 
taught wires and the sound they produced when struck by a bat. A low percentage of hits 
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thus constituted “good avoidance, and a high score [indicated] little or no ability to dodge 
the wires.”80 No bats were able to dodge the wires perfectly, but a comparison of normal, 
blinded, and deafened bats nevertheless confirmed that obstacle avoidance depended on 
the sense of hearing. 
It was important to Griffin that the sensory impairments he employed were 
reversible, unlike those of his predecessors. For example, to blind his bats Spallazani had 
surgically excised their eyeballs, slicing their optic nerves in the process. Griffin, 
however, applied a “dark blue collodion mimeograph correction fluid” that dried in a few 
minutes, rendering the bats completely (but only temporarily) blind. After the tests were 
performed, it was easily removed with a solution of ether. This was not only more 
palatable to Griffin, who cared for the animals and did not wish to do them harm, but it 
had experimental value. Reversible impairments meant that obstacle avoidance could be 
measured in normal conditions both before and after the experimental conditions, thus 
yielding data that could account for the possible fatigue that bats experienced while 
undergoing numerous trials. To deafen his bats, Griffin cleverly inserted small glass tubes 
into their ear canals and plugged them with thread dipped in collodion fluid. This 
decision too had a certain logic. By removing the threaded plugs, the bat’s hearing was 
restored, but the potentially uncomfortable tubes remained in place. Thus Griffin could 
account for the possible effect that the discomfort had on the bat’s ability to avoid 
obstacles. After this, the tubes were removed, restoring the bat to its earlier condition. 
Back at Harvard between September of 1939 and the spring of 1940, Galambos 
joined Griffin in laboriously extending the experiments in a more controlled 
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environment—a 180-square-foot soundproof chamber in the Cruft Laboratory.81 
Including Griffin’s experiments at the Huyck Preserve, in total they tested the obstacle 
avoidance of 144 bats in normal conditions, and 48 under various experimental sensory 
conditions. While these experiments were generally similar to Hahn’s, Griffin and 
Galambos introduced modifications with the express intention of testing an ultrasonic 
hypothesis of obstacle avoidance. For example, during the sensory impairment trials they 
used Pierce’s parabolic receiver to monitor carefully the bats’ emission of supersonic 
sounds as they approached the wires. Additionally, Harold E. Edgerton, a photographic 
engineer from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, took high-speed pictures of 
bats as they passed through the wire barricade, allowing Griffin and Galambos to study 
how the bats maneuvered their bodies in flight while avoiding the wires. They also tested 
obstacle avoidance in bats whose mouths were tied shut, thus rendered incapable of 
emitting sound. The results of their experiments were published in the spring of 1941. 
About a year later, they published a comprehensive analysis of bats’ ultrasonic cries, 
followed by Galambos’s paper on cochlear potentials in bats.82 Together, these three 
papers represent the published core of their discovery. 
In total, they tested obstacle avoidance under normal conditions (no sensory 
impairments) in 144 bats. The Huyck Preserve experiments were performed during the 
summer, and thus Griffin was able to use bats caught in their nearby roosts. For the 
experiments in the fall, however, he had to catch bats hibernating in their New England 
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caves. These were kept in cold storage until they were needed for experiments, as they 
awoke a few minutes after being brought to room temperature. Like Hahn, Griffin and 
Galambos found much variation in the ability of normal bats to avoid collisions, but on 
average the 144 bats struck wires in 34% of their trials.83 In order to ensure that their 
experiments accurately captured the effects of sensory impairments on obstacle 
avoidance, Griffin and Galambos selected the most successful flyers for use in the 
experimental groups. “Otherwise a treatment which interfered with the ability might not 
have been recognized as such because the bat’s skill was impaired even in the control 
series.”84 Hence, bats in the experimental groups but with their senses still intact 
frequently outperformed the average of normal bats.  
Of the 28 blind bats that Griffin and Galambos tested, none showed any 
difference in its ability to avoid obstacles under normal conditions. Like Hahn, they 
found that bats curiously performed slightly better when blind—in 3,021 total trials, 28 
bats struck wires 30% of the time with their vision intact, versus a hit-rate of 24% in 
2,016 trials when blinded. To deafen the bats, Griffin and Galambos employed two 
methods. As described earlier, one method involved inserting glass tubes into the ear 
canals. The other entailed tightly filling the ear canals with cotton and folding the outer 
ear structure (the pinna) over the cotton, sewing its edges together so that the cotton was 
held firmly in place, totally obstructing the ear canal. Noting that the pinnae contain few 
blood vessels, Griffin explained that bats “did not even seem to resent this sewing 
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process any more than they resented merely being held in the hand.”85 In all cases the 
deaf bat’s flight “became strikingly abnormal and its ability to avoid obstacles was 
drastically impaired.”86 The hit-rate of 29 bats in this group increased from 31% under 
normal conditions to 66% when deafened. Griffin and Galambos used a Fisher chi square 
to determine the statistical significance of their results, which they found to be greater 
than 99%.87 Obstacle avoidance seemed very clearly to depend on hearing. 
As Hahn had also found, deafened bats were very reluctant to leave the ground, 
and so Griffin frequently had to drop them from high in the air in order to coax them into 
flight. He and Galambos analyzed the nature of collisions using high-speed photography, 
finding that as the deafened bats approached the wires, as well as the walls, they rarely 
changed their flight patterns as they did in normal conditions while approaching 
obstacles. Even after striking a wall, the bats frequently continued their forward flying 
motion, bumping the wall continuously as they gradually fell to the ground: “it seemed as 
though the bat continued to fly forward as long as it heard no warning sound reflection 
even though its nose had already bumped the wall.”88 Bats tested at the Huyck Preserve 
did not show this same tendency, a phenomenon Griffin explained on the physical 
properties of sound absorption. The wooden walls of the horse-stall, he thought, 
“reflected enough of the sound emitted by the bat to penetrate the less efficient ear plugs 
used in those earlier experiments.”89 Using better ear plugs and mostly soundproof walls, 
the experiments at the Cruft Laboratory yielded deafened bats that were even more 
helpless.  
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Griffin’s and Galambos’s experiments also entailed a few extra controls that Hahn 
had not used, since their working hypothesis was Hartridge’s auditory theory and they 
specifically wanted to isolate the role of hearing as accurately as possible. For example, 
because blind bats flew slightly better than normal bats, they also blinded bats that were 
already deafened, finding that it had no effect on obstacle avoidance. They also tested 
bats with glass tubes in their ears, but unplugged by thread so that their hearing remained 
normal. Despite any degree of discomfort generated by the presence of the tubes in the 
inner ear, they did not significantly impair obstacle avoidance, just as Griffin and 
Galambos expected. Bats with only one ear impaired were also tested, and they found 
that these bats struck obstacles almost as frequently as they did when completely deaf. 
These “one ear” bats, however, did not bump into walls as they had when completely 
deafened, indicating that perhaps “one ear is sufficient to inform the animals of the 
general proximity of a large obstacle.”90 Interestingly, this evidence seemed to contradict 
the accepted biophysical explanation of sound localization—namely, that localization 
depended on differences in phase and intensity between two ears, separated in space. 
Griffin and Galambos explained that “the chief difference between ‘one ear’ bats and 
deaf ones is that the former turn away from obstacles and land normally on walls. These 
bats may be warned of the obstacle simply by the fact that the reflected sound, although 
heard with only one ear, nevertheless becomes louder as the bat flies forwards.”91 
Galambos had the brilliant idea to also test bats that were prevented from emitting 
sounds. According to their hypothesis, this should impair obstacle avoidance in the 
“gagged” bats in much the same way as in deaf bats. They gagged the bats by tying 
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thread around the snouts and sealing the lips shut with collodion, taking care to leave the 
nostrils open for breathing. Griffin and Galambos pointed the ultrasonic detector at the 
gagged bats as they flew in order to confirm that the seal was tight. “Gagged bats flew in 
the same clumsy, hesitant, and bewildered manner as deaf bats.”92 The hit-rate of six bats 
increased from 38% to 65% when they were gagged. This increase was “just as serious as 
that which results from covering the ears,” and similarly yielded a 99% probability of 
statistical significance.93  
Like Hahn, they also calculated the probability that objects roughly the size of 
bats would collide with wires if randomly projected across the room. This analysis was 
aided by Edgerton’s high-speed photography, which made it possible for Griffin and 
Galambos to determine the variable and average wingspans of bats as they flew between 
the wires. Using some fairly complex mathematics, they determined that bats should 
strike wires in 76% of trials if they were totally unaware of them. Using cues besides 
reflected sound, bats could reduce their hit-rates only to 65%: “this evidence supports the 
hypothesis that other senses than hearing play a very minor role, if any, in obstacle 
avoidance by flying bats.”94 
Griffin and Galambos also conducted a few smaller-scale tests to further eliminate 
non-auditory explanations. One such test evaluated the tactile theory of obstacle 
avoidance via membranes in the wing, even though they accepted that Hahn had 
conclusively invalidated Cuvier’s long-accepted hypothesis. They covered one bat’s 
wings with collodion, comparing its obstacle avoidance in both normal and deaf 
conditions, finding that it made no difference. Another test was designed to determine 
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what role, if any, was played by spatial memory. Griffin assumed that “bats might have a 
well-developed sense of the direction of their motion and acceleration, arising from [the 
inner-ear labyrinth]. They could then fly by a sort of dead reckoning when thoroughly 
familiar with a cave, making certain turns at definite intervals which they remember from 
countless previous flights.”95 The bats they tested, however, showed no signs of 
“learning” the layout of the room. In fact, a few of the experiments employed bats that 
were already blind when first released into the room, and they performed similarly to 
normal and blind bats that had first encountered the room with their senses intact. This 
made it “obvious that dead reckoning by means of labyrinth memory could not account in 
any important degree for the flying skill of sightless bats.”96  
It seems curious that Griffin and Galambos did not perform these tests as 
rigorously as they did, for example, those with deaf and blind bats. In fact the chi square 
could not even be used since they performed so few trials. This can be explained by the 
fact that their tests were designed with a specific working hypothesis in mind, and thus it 
was most important for them to demonstrate that deafened and gagged bats had 
significant difficulties avoiding obstacles. Other experiments, like those on spatial 
memory that were described qualitatively, seemed to anticipate possible objections to 
their conclusions, and thus functioned more as additional controls that demanded less 
serious consideration.  
Nevertheless, Griffin and Galambos were confident that their results confirmed 
via inferential reasoning the validity of Hartridge’s auditory theory, with a few 
modifications. Flying bats avoided obstacles by emitting ultrasonic notes that reflected 
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off obstacles and were heard by bats. The reflected sound was localized “binaurally by 
some auditory mechanism, similar in principle to that used by other mammals for sounds 
of ordinary frequencies.”97 While these experiments seemed to represent the final act in a 
150-year drama that opened with Spallanzani alone onstage, Griffin and Galambos saw 
the need for two more scenes.  
The first of these final components, although it was in fact published second, was 
Galambos’s doctoral work on the auditory physiology of bats.98 Between 1939 and 1941, 
Galambos showed that supersonic sounds elicited cochlear potentials in bats. That alone 
was not enough to prove that bats actually heard the sounds, though. According to the 
physiological standards of the day, proof of hearing required that Galambos show that 
cochlear potentials stimulated the contraction of the intra-aural muscles, which in turn 
vibrated the bones of the inner-ear. Over the course of several months, Galambos was 
eventually able to show that according to this physiological definition of hearing, bats 
indeed responded to ultrasonic sounds up to at least 55,000 cycles per second (55 kHz).  
Of more importance was the analysis of the cries of bats. If bats used supersonic 
sounds in the manner claimed, Griffin and Galambos reasoned that they ought to show 
firm evidence that bats indeed emitted them for the purpose of obstacle avoidance during 
flight. They should also analyze the nature of these sounds, so as to acquire a better 
understanding of how bats actually utilized echoes to avoid obstacles. They wanted to 
show, for example, whether the frequency of ultrasonic sounds varied in the detection of 
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thin wires versus large walls. Furthermore, they wondered if changes in the rate of 
emission were detectable during obstacle avoidance.  
Griffin and Galambos mostly omitted analysis of ultrasonic sound in their 1941 
paper on obstacle avoidance. However, while performing these experiments they used 
Pierce’s ultrasonic detector to record the properties of bat sounds made during the trials. 
They coded the detected sound according to the results of individual trials, recording 
whether the bat missed the wire, lightly brushed it, struck it while flying through, or hit it 
directly. This data allowed them to analyze the nature of bat cries that accompanied 
various levels of success in obstacle avoidance. They found that bats actually produced 
sounds of three general types: shrill, audible cries analogous to the “vocal cries of other 
animals”; faint clicks or buzzing sounds while in flight; and a spectrum of ultrasonic 
sounds produced by bats preparing to take flight and land, and by caged bats “seeking 
escape.”99 Whereas audible cries were never emitted during flight, the ultrasonic cries 
were always accompanied by the faint clicks. Like their ability to avoid obstacles in 
normal conditions, the intensity of ultrasonic cries was highly variable in different 
species and in individual bats. 
Because of their supposed role in obstacle avoidance, analysis of ultrasonic notes 
was crucial. Griffin and Galambos found that bat sounds were emitted in “short bursts” 
lasting no more than two-hundredths of a second. The rate of ultrasonic bursts, however, 
could vary from as few as five per second to as many as sixty, depending on 
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circumstances.100 While the loudness, frequency, and duration of ultrasonic bursts 
apparently remained constant while in flight, the “number of cries emitted each second 
[…] depends on where the bat is and what it is doing.”101 While resting, bats emitted 
bursts at a rate of about five to ten per second. When they began to fly, however, this 
increased to twenty or thirty per second. Moreover, obstacle avoidance data from several 
trials of blind bats showed that as the bats approached the wires, their emission rates 
increased from about 30 to 50 bursts per second. Just as the bats were successfully 
passing through the wires, their ultrasonics dropped back down to 30 per second—the 
average rate of bats flying in “unobstructed space.”102 As Griffin and Galambos 
explained, this transition “was abrupt and unmistakable in 87% of the recorded 
misses.”103 Bats that did collide with the wires, however, only changed their ultrasonic 
emission rates 20% of the time. Deafened bats maintained constant emission rates in 
nearly all of the trials, regardless of whether or not they struck or missed the wires. Thus 
the emission rates “seem to be correlated with the position of the bat with respect to 
obstacles.”104  
Once again, Griffin and Galambos concluded that these facts strongly indicated 
that obstacle avoidance was an “auditory phenomenon” and that the ultrasonic sounds 
emitted by bats were “essential for normal obstacle avoidance.”105 Having provided 
evidence that bats produced and heard ultrasonic sounds, and that the ability to produce 
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mechanism”—mechanical or muscular—that made possible the “extraordinarily high rate of emission of 
the supersonic cries.” Robert Galambos and Donald Griffin, “The Cries of Bats,” p. 487. 
101 Robert Galambos and Donald Griffin, “The Cries of Bats,” p. 481. 
102 Robert Galambos and Donald Griffin, “The Cries of Bats,” p. 481-482. 
103 Robert Galambos and Donald Griffin, “The Cries of Bats,” p. 482. 
104 Robert Galambos and Donald Griffin, “The Cries of Bats,” p. 487. 
105 Robert Galambos and Donald Griffin, “The Cries of Bats,” p. 489-90. 
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and hear these sounds strongly correlated to their ability to avoid obstacles, Griffin and 
Galambos felt confident that they had finally resolved “Spallanzani’s bat problem.”  
 
Conclusion 
As Robert Galambos observed decades after these discoveries, he and Griffin 
were fortunate to be at Harvard in the late-1930s. The discovery that bats produced 
ultrasonic sounds depended not only on the existence of Pierce’s detector, but on the fact 
that he—a distinguished physicist—kept his door open to a curious biology 
undergraduate who was acting on a hunch. Similarly, Hallowell Davis was in the 
department of physiology across the Charles River at the Harvard Medical School. That 
he was willing to work with Galambos, a biology graduate student, is a testament to both 
the physiological and interdisciplinary character of Harvard biology in the late-1930s. 
The particular workshop culture of interdisciplinary science at Harvard in the 1930s and 
1940s thus played a crucial role in facilitating this important discovery.106 As Galambos 
fondly recalled, “at the moment we were united with our Professors there was only one 
place in the world where two graduate students could demonstrate that flying bats emit 
sounds we cannot hear, and that the animals hear and act upon the echoes - and we 
happened to be there.”107 
But what exactly had Griffin and Galambos discovered? Their obstacle avoidance 
experiments surely improved upon those of Spallanzani and Hahn, who had already 
developed the foundation for the auditory hypothesis. Moreover, Griffin and Galambos 
                                                
106 Historian Joel Isaac has shown the importance of this brand of interdisciplinarity in the development of 
the human sciences in the same period. Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from 
Parsons to Kuhn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
107 Robert Galambos, “The 1939-40 Bat Experiments that Validated Jurine’s Claim,” p. 25. 
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were not even the first to propose the ultrasonic revision of those earlier experiments. By 
the time Griffin met Galambos, the ultrasonic theory was more than twenty years old, the 
product of an older British physiologist, Hamilton Hartridge. Although he lacked the 
experimental evidence that Griffin and Galambos produced, surely scientific priority 
belonged to Hartridge. Griffin and Pierce certainly deserve credit for first detecting the 
wide range of ultrasonic sounds that bats produced, but they had initially concluded 
(erroneously) that these sounds were not used for orientation. Moreover, did Galambos’s 
work on cochlear potentials actually prove that bats could “hear” the sounds they 
produced? Perhaps physiologically, they did. But “hearing” was a conceptual can-of-
worms at the time, as the psychologists and physiologists had their own definitions and 
standards of evidence for what constituted hearing. Was hearing not by its very nature a 
subjective phenomenon, especially when considered in animals other than ourselves? 
Finally, was the sensory phenomenon that they discovered best described by the term 
“obstacle avoidance”? Did their experiments really show that bats merely used sound to 
avoid obstacles, or was there something more fundamental lying below the surface?  
It is worth noting that in their discussion of bat ultrasonics Galambos and Griffin 
stated that the “ability to vary the rate of production [of supersonics] is apparently 
completely under the control of the animal,” depending on its location with respect to a 
detected obstacle.108 While this might intriguingly appear to be the kernel of a mentalistic 
explanation of bat orientation behavior, it must be kept in mind that their understanding 
of obstacle avoidance was entirely mechanistic. Whatever control the bat may have had 
over its emission was understood as the product of entirely automatic and unconscious 
physiological mechanisms. The fact that they still thought of these experiments in terms 
                                                
108 Robert Galambos and Donald Griffin, “The Cries of Bats,” p. 479. 
 63 
of obstacle avoidance, or as “collision warning system,” is a testament to how deeply a 
mechanistic view of animals was engrained in their thinking.109 The ability was not 
thought to be either interactive nor very sophisticated, but instead was thought of as a 
physiological servo-mechanism, or stimulus response relationship. Griffin and Galambos 
apparently never considered whether bats might use their sense of hearing to acquire 
other information about objects within their environments, analogous to how most 
vertebrates employ vision, for example. 
The most important aspect of this discovery did not materialize until December of 
1944. It was then that Griffin, heavily engaged in wartime research, published a short 
article in Science, in which he proposed the term “echolocation” to describe the method 
by which bats orient themselves.110 In so doing, Griffin subsumed the sensory ability of 
bats under the same conceptual umbrella as “facial vision” used by blind humans, and 
more importantly, its technological analogs—radar and sonar used by the military. The 
fact that radar and sonar were heralded for their role in the struggle to defeat fascism in 
Europe sanctified these technologies even further in the eyes of technocratic scientists 
heavily engaged in wartime research. Not only that, linking the organic sensory systems 
of bats to these military technologies seemingly guaranteed that Griffin’s name would be 
remembered in the history of science at the expense of Lazzaro Spallanzani, Walter Louis 
Hahn, Hamilton Hartridge, and even Griffin’s co-discoverer, Robert Galambos. 
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In my next chapter, I explore the contours of this discovery more fully, showing 








 This chapter focuses on the transformation of Donald Griffin’s understanding of 
the physiological basis of bat orientation from an obstacle avoidance mechanism to the 
more general method of echolocation. Over several years following his initial 
experiments, Griffin came to understand the sensory physiology of bats to entail more 
than a mere collision warning system based on ultrasonic echoes. In fact, it was three 
years later in late-1944, well after he ceased doing experimental work on bat orientation, 
that he coined the term “echolocation.” At that time he had been deeply engaged in 
wartime research for several years, and bats remained firmly on the backburner. Griffin 
conceptualized echolocation as an active process by which bats acquired information via 
the perception of echoes generated by their ultrasonic signals. As opposed to obstacle 
avoidance, understood as a simple and automatic mechanism that served a specific 
function in flight, echolocation was a general mode of perception that allowed bats to 
acquire information about the structures of their environments and the objects that they 
encountered within them. Echolocation was thus more general than its precursor, and it 
implied that bats actively utilized this physiological tool for a wider range of behaviors 
and interactions with their environments. In the years following the war, the study of 
echolocation and its role in the bat’s life would gradually yield insights into several new 
problems. These included echolocation’s inherently limited range, difficulties in target 
discrimination, its use in hunting prey, its susceptibility to jamming by other bats’ 
ultrasonic signals, and even jamming by certain species of moth that bats hunted. 
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Most scholarship on Griffin erroneously points to his collaboration with Robert 
Galambos between 1938 and 1940 as the experimentum crucis of echolocation’s 
discovery.1 As important as those experiments were, however, they in fact proved no 
such thing. Rather, that experimental work showed that bats produced ultrasonic sounds 
and that they were capable of obstacle avoidance by hearing the echoes of those cues—
thus proving Hartridge’s auditory hypothesis. Galambos’s electrophysiological work on 
bat cochlear microphonics further demonstrated that bats indeed could perceive sounds in 
the ultrasonic range. Through those experiments, Griffin and Galambos discovered a 
mechanistically construed behavior; that is, the bat’s ability to avoid obstacles via hearing 
echoes of sounds they emitted was a simple and automatic sensory function, confined to a 
specific aspect of flight.  
By 1941, Griffin had largely abandoned work on bat orientation, and focused 
almost exclusively on his doctoral thesis, which concerned the problem of bird 
navigation—another perplexing topic in the behavioral wheelhouse of sensory 
physiology. After finishing his thesis in the spring of 1942, he spent several years in 
various Harvard laboratories working on wartime projects for the military. What 
prompted Griffin in December 1944, nearly three years after he ceased major 
experimental work on bats, to publish a brief article in which he insisted that a new 
concept and term were necessary to describe their mode of physiological perception and 
orientation? The extant scholarship on Griffin fails to address this important question. 
                                                
1 See, for instance: Eileen Crist, “Griffin, Donald Redfield,” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography, 
Vol. 21 (Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2008), p. 177-186; Carolyn Ristau, “Donald Redfield Griffin,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 149 (Sep. 2005): 399-411; Charles Gross, “Donald R. 
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Education, Vol. 10 (Feb. 2005): 20-32. Galambos did not participate in the 1938 experiments on the bat’s 
production of ultrasonic sound, but was Griffin’s equal partner in their subsequent work on obstacle 
avoidance between 1939 and 1941. These experiments are explained in my previous chapter. 
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Eileen Crist, for example, makes no mention of that wartime work, and refers to Griffin 
and Galambos as co-discoverers of echolocation, citing their 1941 paper on obstacle 
avoidance.2 Similarly, Charles Gross points to Griffin’s graduate work with Galambos as 
the key moment in the discovery of echolocation. Gross only briefly alludes to Griffin’s 
wartime experience, and fails to show how it affected his view of echolocation or his 
broader approach to sensory physiology.3 Ethologist Carolyn Ristau’s important account 
of her former advisor’s life also elides his graduate and wartime work, recognizing 
Griffin “for that initial discovery of bat echolocation with Robert Galambos (1938) and 
for subsequent years of study.”4 The conflation of obstacle avoidance with echolocation 
obscures the significant influence of the wartime context in an important scientific 
discovery. To explain the nearly three-year gap between Griffin’s discovery of obstacle 
avoidance and his development of the concept of echolocation, we must look at his 
military research and toward Harvard’s wartime research complex more broadly.  
 Although it was not directly related to the sensory physiology of bats, Griffin’s 
wartime research profoundly shaped how he conceived of bats and their use of 
echolocation. These projects included research on communications and sound 
transmission at Harvard’s Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory (PAL), where physiologists and 
psychologists studied problems of language, signal transmission, and information 
processing, all of which were crucial for enhancing military communications 
technologies. Griffin also spent part of the war at Harvard’s Fatigue Laboratory, where he 
researched the effects of extreme cold on human physiology. Like his work on 
                                                
2 Eileen Crist, “Griffin, Donald Redfield,” p. 178. Crist makes no mention of Griffin’s wartime work or his 
coining of “echolocation” in 1944. Raghuram and Marimuthu similarly conflate the discovery of obstacle 
avoidance with echolocation.  
3 Charles Gross, “Donald R. Griffin,” p. 3. 
4 Carolyn Ristau, “Donald Redfield Griffin,” p. 400. 
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psychoacoustics, this research also sought technical solutions to problems fundamentally 
rooted in physiology and its relationship to perception. He concluded his wartime 
research with work on human vision and infrared technologies to enhance night-vision 
equipment for the military. But aside from his own research, Griffin’s scientific thought 
was also profoundly shaped by a growing awareness of the significant capabilities of 
remote sensing technologies such as sonar and radar, which, like obstacle avoidance, 
were initially developed and deployed for simple tasks such as detecting and avoiding 
obstacles during marine navigation. In early 1942, the Radio Research Laboratory, whose 
charge was to develop both offensive and defensive radar countermeasures, moved into 
Harvard’s Biological Laboratories. Elsewhere on campus, F.V. Hunt’s Underwater Sound 
Laboratory furiously worked on developing military applications of sonar technology for 
navigation and weapons guidance systems. Griffin’s personal and professional network 
included several key figures working in these areas. As excitement about radar and sonar 
swirled around Harvard’s campus, he began to consider the sensory physiology of bats as 
fundamentally analogous to these increasingly sophisticated military technologies. 
Historian Joel Isaac has emphasized the significance of interdisciplinary research 
within the “Harvard complex” in the development of the human sciences during the 
1930s-1950s. He argues that hubs of interdisciplinary exchange such as the Society of 
Fellows and the Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory led to a reformulation in the way scientific 
knowledge was understood as the negotiated product of practices, rather than of 
ideological commitments to objectivity. Although Isaac points to the importance of 
Harvard’s unique workshop culture in the development of the human sciences and hybrid 
fields such as cybernetics and cognitive linguistics, this collaborative atmosphere also 
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played an important role in the biological sciences.5 As the case of Griffin shows, 
scientific problems relating to animal behavior greatly benefited by interdisciplinary 
exchanges between physicists, biologists, and engineers. Griffin’s investigation of bats 
relied on intellectual and technical contributions from physicist George Washington 
Pierce, physicist and Society Fellow James Fisk, Harvard medicine’s Hallowell Davis, 
sonar pioneer F.V. Hunt, and many others. This open-door culture, which encouraged 
interdisciplinary exchange, yielded unique applications of physical and engineering 
approaches to biological research. And this had a significant effect on Griffin’s technical 
approach to behavioral problems, and to his understanding of echolocation as a 
physiological analog to the military technologies of remote sensing, sonar and radar. 
Once Griffin reimagined bat echolocation as a biophysical manifestation of a 
more general phenomenon, the conceptual parallels between the biological and the 
technological spheres generated new questions about the abilities of bats. Rather than 
being merely a collision warning system—a technology perhaps worthy of admiration in 
the First World War, but certainly not in light of developments brought on by the 
technical sophistication of the Second World War—bat echolocation was a complex 
mode of perception. Like radar operators, bats used echolocation to locate and to 
discriminate amongst objects of relative importance with great accuracy. Did bats deploy 
their biological sonar to hunt prey, as naval officers used sonar and Army Air Force pilots 
                                                
5 Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn (Cambridge: Harvard 
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used radar? Was echolocation, as its technological cousins, subject to “jamming” by other 
signals? These questions only became valid once Griffin started thinking about 
echolocation as a general method that was analogous to these technologies. As he later 
explained, “echolocation of stationary objects had seemed remarkable enough, but our 
scientific imaginations had simply failed to consider, even speculatively, this other 
possibility”—that bats used echolocation to hunt their prey—“with such far-reaching 
ramifications.”6 Indeed, Griffin’s wartime experience at Harvard was crucially important 
in expanding what he referred to as his “scientific imagination.”   
 
Psychoacoustics, Physiology, and Perception: Donald Griffin’s Wartime Research 
After receiving his doctorate in the spring of 1942, Griffin suspended his Junior 
Fellowship (Society of Fellows) and spent the war years in several Harvard laboratories, 
where he pursued a variety of military research projects. His first major stint was in 
Harvard’s Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory (PAL), where he worked on the physiology and 
psychology of sound transmission and reception for military communications. In late-
1942 Griffin left PAL for the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, where he worked on problems 
concerning the physiology of soldiers in extreme conditions. After leaving the Fatigue 
Lab in May of 1944, Griffin worked briefly on human vision and infrared night-vision 
technology in Harvard’s Biological Laboratories. Griffin’s applied military projects do 
not constitute a diversion from a career otherwise dedicated to animal behavior and 
physiology. Rather, this research shares fundamental connections with his more general 
scientific interests. Moreover, his work calls attention to some of the understudied 
                                                
6 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” in Leaders in the Study of Animal 
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activities of wartime biologists and physiologists, whose contributions are often ignored 
in historical scholarship that focuses on the physical sciences in the service of the state 
during World War II and the Cold War. His first wartime stint was in Stanley Smith 
Stevens’s Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory, where Griffin found it “exhilarating to plunge 
directly into practical efforts to improve voice communication systems” for the military.7  
 In 1940 the U.S. Army Air Forces requested through the National Defense 
Research Committee (NDRC) the establishment of two laboratories, the Psycho-Acoustic 
Laboratory (PAL) and what would later be called the Electro-Acoustic Laboratory 
(EAL), whose joint-function was to study among other things, the effects of extreme 
noise in the modern warfare environment.8 NDRC leadership chose Harvard University 
as the institutional sponsor, and psychologist S.S. Stevens, pioneer of psychophysics, was 
selected to head PAL.9 In the fall of 1942 the NDRC was reorganized as one of several 
units under the much larger Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), the 
result of President Roosevelt’s and other military leaders’ realization that the war effort 
would require a much vaster research and development infrastructure in order to 
coordinate the work of scientists with industry and the military.10 PAL’s administrative 
and funding structure was thus officially subsumed under Division 17 of the NDRC (now 
a subunit of OSRD), which was composed of twenty-three divisions, panels, and 
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committees.11 Division 17, the “Physics” division, was broadly construed and “fell heir to 
a myriad of miscellaneous problems of a physical nature which, in themselves, were not 
often interrelated.”12 Consequently, three subdivisions were created to better coordinate 
its disparate activities. The “Acoustics” subdivision (17.3), chaired by physicist and 
sound expert Harvey Fletcher, was established specifically to incorporate ongoing PAL 
research related to the “shattering noise of modern war,” and the vast majority of the 
subdivision’s work was conducted in the two Harvard laboratories in coordination with 
industrial partners such as Bell Labs.13 In early 1942 Griffin joined the lab, which quickly 
expanded to over fifty investigators due to the intensity of wartime research.14 
PAL’s research was reported and internally circulated among scientists, military 
leadership, and engineers through hundreds of OSRD reports, which summarized various 
acoustical problems, technical solutions, and recommendations for the development of 
                                                
11 The NDRC initiated research projects at the request of the Army and Navy, or on behalf of American 
allies through the OSRD Liaison Office. After its reorganization was finalized in December 1942, the 
NDRC reviewed the projects proposed by the various divisions and panels, making recommendations to the 
office of the Director of the OSRD (Vannevar Bush, Director). The NDRC was chaired during the war by 
James B. Conant, who was supported by Army Representative Roger Adams, Navy Representative Frank 
B. Jewett, and Commissioner of Patents Karl T. Compton, in addition to several other scientists and 
military leaders. For a full administrative history of NDRC and OSRD, see especially chapters two through 
six in: Irving Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948).  
12 Charles Waring, preface to Transmission and Reception of Sounds Under Combat Conditions: Summary 
Technical Report of Division 17, Vol. 3, ed. Charles Waring (Washington DC: NDRC, 1946), ix. Accessed 
at the Library of Congress Division of Scientific and Technical Reports. During the war approximately $8.4 
million was authorized under Division 17, a relatively modest amount compared to larger divisions such as 
Division 14 (Radar), which spent about $120 million between January 1943 and June 1946. Physicist Paul 
E. Klopsteg served as chief of Division 17 until 1945, when MIT physicist George R. Harrison took over in 
March of that year. Irving Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research, p. 92-94. 
13 Charles Waring, preface to Transmission and Reception of Sounds Under Combat Conditions: Summary 
Technical Report of Division 17, Vol. 3, ed. Charles Waring (Washington DC: NDRC, 1946), ix. Accessed 
at the Library of Congress Division of Scientific and Technical Reports. Fletcher, a renowned expert on 
sound, was director of physical research at Bell Labs from 1935 until his retirement after the war. Stephen 
H. Fletcher, “Harvey Fletcher: A Biographical Memoir,” Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States (Washington DC: National Academies of Science Press, 1992). 
14 Griffin’s title was “Special Research Associate.”  
 73 
instrumentation that would facilitate communication in military engagements.15 As 
Stevens summarized the work generally, “The problems of reducing noise, protecting 
personnel, avoiding detection by the enemy or confusing his intelligence are issues that 
must be faced by a modern armed force […] To this state of affairs, the answer, of 
course, was research—scientific inquiry into the conditions of use, the causes of failure, 
the specifications for success.”16 Griffin participated in several projects at PAL and was 
listed as primary researcher or co-author on three OSRD reports.17 Analysis of these 
reports, all declassified in 1960, serves to characterize his wartime work on 
psychoacoustics.  
Circulated in August of 1942, “The Acoustic Design of Earphone Sockets for 
Helmets and Headsets” was the first published report detailing Griffin’s work at PAL.18 
A technical analysis of various designs of earphone cups, the report compared the noise-
insulating properties of several U.S., British, and German aircraft helmets. The main 
problem that Griffin and his colleagues confronted involved the noisy interior of aircrafts. 
The clamor was so intense that when radio and interphone (plane-to-plane) signals were 
amplified in order to cut through the ambient noise, the speech was made unintelligible 
and/or painful to the human ear: “In extremely noisy airplanes there is, figuratively 
speaking, no room for speech to be inserted between the noise level of the plane and the 
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upper limit that the ear can tolerate.”19 This was a problem of both physiology and 
psychology: the carrier signal had to be amplified such that it was loud enough to cut 
through the ambient noise of the aircraft while remaining intelligible to the listener, but 
not so loud that it caused pain or damage to the ear. The solution was technical, as Griffin 
and his colleagues determined that it was necessary to reduce the level of ambient noise 
through effective insulation of the earcup. Rather than attempting to insulate the aircraft 
itself to external noise, Griffin’s team explained that the best designed helmets and 
earcups, like those possessed by the German Luftwaffe, were better able to improve the 
acoustic environment for effective wartime communication.20 Griffin’s team employed 
speech articulation tests to compare various helmet and earcup designs, taking into 
account not only the acoustic insulating properties of each model, but also factors 
including the helmet’s comfort and size, the variability of human ear anatomy, the 
volume of air between the earphone and the ear canal, the effect of changes in air 
pressure at different altitudes, and the adaptability of standard-issue helmets to include 
the installation of altered earcups. This research led to the development of a new earcup 
and helmet design, which the report recommended for adoption by the Army Air Forces.  
Other research centered more firmly on perception and information processing in 
human auditory physiology and psychology.21 In an expansive eighty-page report, Griffin 
and his colleagues documented “the outcome of an experimental program designed to test 
and evaluate the instruments of communication employed in the Services, and to develop 
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methods for improving the transmission and reproduction of speech by interphone and 
radio.”22 Essentially a summary of the major problems of wartime communication, the 
report detailed the methods of testing word articulation, the long-term effects of wartime 
acoustics on human physiology, analysis of the general architecture of the 
communication systems of the Army and Navy, tests of military equipment such as 
microphones, amplifiers, interphones and earphones, and the factors that introduced 
interference into these communication systems. The most relevant aspect of the report to 
Griffin’s work is its explication of PAL’s speech articulation tests, which entailed 
research and methods evenly divided between physiology and psychology. 
PAL researchers and test subjects participated in thousands of articulation tests 
conducted in a large sound chamber in the basement of Harvard’s Memorial Hall, in 
which loudspeakers blasted synthetic noises in order to recreate the variable acoustic 
environments of battlefields and military vehicles. A team of trained announcers, 
including Griffin (whose initials “DG” appear throughout speech articulation charts), 
would read carefully designed word-lists in order to gauge the articulation score—that is, 
the percentage of words that subjects heard correctly, given the constraints of the 
experiments.23 The announcer’s ability to convey messages successfully was also scored, 
and incidentally Griffin performed below the mean due to the “consistently hoarse quality 
in his voice.”24  
                                                
22 OSRD No. 901, p.1. Accessed at the Library of Congress Division of Scientific and Technical Reports. 
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Even though variables not directly related to electrical apparatus (such as the 
timbre of the announcer’s voice) affected the outcomes of the experiments, articulation 
scores were interpreted as measuring the quality of communication equipment. As 
historian Paul Edwards has emphasized, this tendency to view the human factor as 
embedded in vast chains of information processing units had important consequences for 
PAL’s psychologists.25 Edwards argues that PAL’s work, especially that of George A. 
Miller, directly contributed to the eventual cognitive turn away from the behaviorist 
paradigm in American psychology: “The PAL played a crucial role in the genesis of 
postwar information processing psychologies,” and a significant number of PAL 
psychologists made their careers in the emerging field of anti-behaviorist, cognitive 
approaches.26 Thus in attempting to account for the “human element” amid a vast system 
of computing and communications electronics, PAL psychologists began to understand 
the human role as a crucial cog in a vast “information processing” network. PAL director 
S.S. Stevens observed, “It was quickly recognized that the human factor in 
communication is crucial. What clues must the human ear have to hear a spoken message, 
and what is the nature of the human voice itself?”27 In order to tackle problems related to 
the human element, approaches in electrical and acoustical engineering needed to be 
complemented by laboratory investigations of human perception and psycholinguistics: 
“War noise thus helped to constitute communication as a psychological and a 
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Summary Technical Report of Division 17, Vol. 3, ed. Charles Waring, p. 1-5 (Washington DC: NDRC, 
1946), p. 1. Accessed at the Library of Congress Division of Scientific and Technical Reports. 
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psychophysical problem.”28 Physiologists, biologists, and engineers worked seamlessly 
with PAL’s psychologists, thus creating opportunities for scientists such as Griffin to 
approach problems of perception and information processing from multiple disciplinary 
perspectives.29 
PAL’s speech articulation tests were designed to account for factors that included 
the acoustic environments of the sending and receiving parties, electrical components in 
the instruments, the effects of learning as subjects (and announcers) became more 
familiar with common words and sentences, linguistic theories of language acquisition 
and learning, and the effects of fatigue on perception and articulation.30 As a result of this 
work, Griffin and his colleagues recommended that a wider frequency range be used in 
military electronic communication systems, and that measures be taken to increase the 
ratio of speech to ambient noise. Furthermore, the report led PAL and Bell Labs to co-
develop technical solutions in the form of “magnetic and dynamic earphones” that could 
convey speech effectively at a much higher frequency than existing devices.31 The tests 
also led PAL to revise the military vocabulary and phonetic alphabet in order to increase 
the intelligibility and efficiency of military communications.32 Thus their solutions were 
                                                
28 Paul Edwards, The Closed World, p. 214. 
29 As a field of study, information theory was still in its infancy. Claude Shannon’s seminal article, “A 
Mathematical Theory of Communication,” would not appear until 1948. However, several figures who 
would later make important contributions to information theory worked alongside Griffin at PAL, including 
S.S. Stevens, George Miller, and Griffin’s friend and colleague, J.C.R. Licklider. Claude Shannon, “A 
Mathematical Theory of Communication,” The Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 27 (1948): 379-423. 
30 OSRD Report No. 901, p. 10. Accessed at the Library of Congress Division of Scientific and Technical 
Reports. 
31 F.M. Wiener and George Miller, “The Interphone,” in Transmission and Reception of Sounds Under 
Combat Conditions: Summary Technical Report of Division 17, Vol. 3, ed. Charles Waring, p. 119-141 
(Washington DC: NDRC, 1946), p. 136. Accessed at the Library of Congress Division of Scientific and 
Technical Reports. The Army Air Forces (AAF) later adopted these earphones. 
32 George Miller, “Intelligibility of Speech: Special Vocabularies,” in Transmission and Reception of 
Sounds Under Combat Conditions: Summary Technical Report of Division 17, Vol. 3, ed. Charles Waring, 
p. 81-85 (Washington DC: NDRC, 1946). Accessed at the Library of Congress Division of Scientific and 
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as much technical and physiological as they were psychological. As psychologist George 
A. Miller explained in the Summary Technical Report of PAL’s wartime research, the 
aforementioned “improvements in articulation which [resulted] from increased gain and 
power constitute very real advantages to bomber personnel to whom the interphone 
represents the key to teamwork necessary for the successful completion of a mission.”33 
Griffin’s earlier research on the sensory physiology of bats no doubt contributed 
to his special interest in the nature of high-frequency sound. Moreover, a self-described 
“gadget man,” he had a facility with manipulating electronic devices and experimental 
design in order to serve the needs of his research questions.34 His wartime investigations 
into the intelligibility of speech—further documented in OSRD Report 1572 (circulated 
July 9, 1943)—involved tests designed to detect the “high- and low-frequency cutoffs” of 
speech in noisy environments. Equipment that raised the low-frequency cutoff or lowered 
the high-frequency cutoff (which diminished the intelligibility of sound below or above 
those boundaries, respectively) made speech less intelligible, especially in unfavorable 
noise conditions. Griffin and his team reported that “the more difficult the conditions the 
wider should be the band of frequencies,” and they subsequently recommended that 
interphone equipment (including earphones) ought to have a low-frequency cutoff no 
lower than 4,000 cycles per second.35 These investigators thus proved through “laborious 
tests in a variety of noise fields” what years later would seem obvious: that one “really 
could hear better in noise with a broad-band system.”36 
                                                
33 F.M. Wiener and George Miller, “The Interphone,” p. 141. 
34 For example, Griffin’s research on bat echolocation required a special experimental setup to account for 
the highly directional nature of the bat’s ultrasonic pulses, which are difficult to capture unless the 
microphone is pointed directly at the bat’s mouth as it emits the pulse. 
35 F.M. Wiener and George Miller, “The Interphone,” p. 9. 
36 Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of Neuroscience in Autobiography, Vol. 2, ed. 
Larry Squire, p. 68-93 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), p. 76. 
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Griffin left PAL in December of 1942, and although his time there was relatively 
brief, his psychoacoustic work forever affected his approach to sensory physiology. 
Several years later, for example, he came to view bat echolocation as a phenomenon 
rooted in language and information—that is, he wondered if echolocation was in a 
fundamental sense the bat’s way of communicating with its environment in order to 
extract information from it. In his 1959 book, Echoes of Bats and Men, Griffin devoted a 
chapter to the “language of echoes,” in which he described the role of orientation sound 
in echolocation as a “most important message carrier.”37 For Griffin, echoes came to be 
understood as “a special language of their own,” and he wondered, “what is it in a bat’s 
tiny brain that permits understanding of this language and unlocks this library of useful 
information? No one yet knows the answer.”38 Later in his career, he pursued that line of 
inquiry more vigorously, explaining that “echolocation is essentially a solipsistic form of 
communication as far as we know. The animal emits an orientation sound, hears the 
echoes, and alters its behavior in an appropriate fashion based upon the information 
conveyed by these echoes […] Animals thus endowed might find the analytical 
requirements of an advanced communication system already at their disposal.”39 The 
culmination of these ideas would eventually come in the late-1970s, when Griffin 
described echolocation as a metaphorical form of communication in his analysis of 
animal consciousness.40 Although he did not consider this linguistic interpretation of 
                                                
37 Donald Griffin, Echoes of Bats and Men (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 83. 
38 Donald Griffin, Echoes of Bats and Men, p. 104-105. 
39 Donald Griffin, “Echolocation and its Relevance to Communication Behavior,” in Animal 
Communication, ed. Thomas Sebeok, p. 154-164 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p.154-
156. 
40 In my final chapter, I analyze Griffin’s work on animal consciousness in greater detail.  
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echolocation until many years after the war, some crucial seeds were no doubt planted 
during his time at PAL. 
In December of 1942, Griffin left PAL and moved to Harvard’s Fatigue 
Laboratory, where he would spend the next eighteen months working on problems 
ranging from physiological thermodynamics to the bends.41 The Fatigue Lab, unlike PAL 
and EAL, was not created specifically to serve the scientific needs of the state.42 
Established in 1927, the lab was a highly interdisciplinary institution that “represented a 
concept unique in biological research—that the systems and organs which comprise a 
biological organism are interrelated and need to be studied in that context if its biological 
and social functioning is to be fully understood.”43 In the twenty years of its existence, 
psychologists, physiologists, biochemists and other specialists working together at the 
Fatigue Lab researched a wide range of topics that included metabolism, nutrition, aging, 
the physiochemical properties of blood, and climatic stress.44 During the war, one of the 
lab’s major undertakings was to measure the physiological effects of extreme 
environments on soldiers. Griffin worked there from January 1943 until June 1944, and 
his research was largely technical in nature. He spent most of his time testing and 
developing cold weather clothing; this apparently left him somewhat unsatisfied, as he 
complained to his doctoral advisor Karl Lashley: “There have also been some 
opportunities for research of a broader interest on high altitude decompression sickness 
                                                
41 Donald Griffin, S. Robinson, H.S. Belding, R.C. Darling, and E.S. Turrell, “The Effects of Cold and Rate 
of Ascent on Aero-Embolism,” Aviation Medicine, Vol. 17 (Feb. 1946): 56-66. 
42 For a general history of the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, see: Steven M. Horvath and Elizabeth C. 
Horvath, The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory: Its History and Contributions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, 1973). Chapter seven concerns the lab’s wartime work, although Griffin is only mentioned briefly. 
43 Steven Horvath and Elizabeth Horvath, The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, p. 3. 
44 The Fatigue Lab was dissolved due to administrative and funding problems during its transition to 
peacetime research. For a representative discussion of its scientific contributions, see: Steven Horvath and 
Elizabeth Horvath, The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, p. 87-180. G. Edgar Folk, who worked at the lab 
during the war, has also noted that Harvard president James Conant was never a strong supporter of the lab.  
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and on what I call the ‘physiological thermodynamics’ of clothing […] However, it is 
very difficult to put in much time on even as basic questions as these due to the pressure 
of specific garments to be tried and criticized.”45 
Sources that concern Griffin’s work at the Fatigue Lab are scarce, but his 
longtime colleague, physiologist G. Edgar Folk, documented his experience there, which 
included a substantial amount of collaborative work with Griffin.46 In addition, Griffin’s 
archival papers contain an unpublished report summarizing his major lines of research 
there.47 In one extended experiment on the effect of cold weather on metabolism, for 
example, Griffin had Folk remain in the lab’s -40˚F cold room for twelve straight hours. 
In order to gauge the effects of the freezing European winter on the physiology of allied 
soldiers, Griffin measured Folk’s metabolism by recording the amount of oxygen 
consumed in each inhalation. After establishing the feasibility and safety of the 
experiment, Folk was joined in the cold room by two soldiers in tests designed by Griffin 
to determine how fast troops should run to maintain a safe body temperature in the 
extreme cold. Having read about military barracks catching fire in wintry environments, 
Griffin and Folk studied the balance of heat loss and gain during cold exercise in order to 
determine as well what emergency garb was reasonable to wear when escaping such a 
danger. They found that the effects of cold weather could be offset by jogging at seven 
                                                
45 Donald Griffin to Karl Lashley, 7 March 1944, Series 1, Box 6, Folder 73, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield 
Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
46 G. Edgar Folk, “The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory: Contributions to World War II,” Advances in 
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47 Donald Griffin, “Projects under Consideration – Electrically Heated Clothing” [Unpublished report], 
Series 1.5, Box 12, Folder 112, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University 
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miles per hour wearing just woolen underwear, and documented their findings in a report 
to the Quartermaster General and the Army Air Forces. 
Other wartime research at the Fatigue Lab concerned the optimal distribution of 
heat in the electrically insulated suits worn by the crews in B-17 bombers. Griffin—“the 
most imaginative researcher at the Fatigue Laboratory,” according to Folk—designed an 
experiment and a special piece of electrical equipment that allowed him to adjust the 
temperature in different parts of an electric suit using a row of rheostats.48 Their goal was 
to determine how quickly cold conditions led to discomfort in different regions of the 
body, and how best to distribute external sources of heat to offset the negative 
physiological effects of extremely cold temperatures (the loss of manual dexterity, for 
example). One of the major problems of heated clothing involved the uneven distribution 
of heat throughout the body, which kept the test subjects from reaching “thermal 
equilibrium.” Griffin and Folk were only able to measure the loss of stored heat 
approximately and generally, since heat loss varied greatly depending on which part of 
the body was measured. Griffin took a technical approach to this problem, designing a 
special suit that could control the flow of electric heat to different parts of the body 
independently, thus keeping the subject in a total equilibrium.49 Once again from the cold 
room, Folk donned the special suit and reported where his body felt too cold or too hot, 
while Griffin raised and lowered the temperature in the various compartments of the suit. 
The tests relied not only on thermo-physiological measurements, but subjective feedback 
as well, for the cold-room subjects informed the researchers where they felt most 
                                                
48 G. Edgar Folk, “Harvard Fatigue Laboratory,” p. 121-122. 
49 Donald Griffin, “Projects under Consideration – Electrically Heated Clothing” [Unpublished report], 
Series 1.5, Box 12, Folder 112, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University 
Archives, RAC. 
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uncomfortable given a range of different activities. The psychological and physiological 
effects of cold were also quantified objectively via tests that measured factors such as 
mental fatigue and mechanical dexterity. Folk and Griffin reported their findings to the 
Quartermaster’s office and to engineers at General Electric, who designed new suits 
using Griffin’s specifications. According to Folk, “we felt inspired by the knowledge that 
our aviators would be wearing suits like these, heated to the temperatures determined by 
us, in their life-and-death missions in the war.”50  
Another exciting new area of sensory perception technology involved infrared 
night vision, which Griffin worked on toward the end of the war. Beginning in mid-1944, 
he worked on this technology with physiologist George Wald and biochemist Ruth 
Hubbard back at Harvard’s Biological Laboratories. The team addressed an important 
problem concerning top-secret night vision devices, which converted infrared light into 
visible images for American soldiers hunting their enemies in darkness. A major problem 
stemmed from the goggles’ emission of an infrared “searchlight”—presumably invisible 
to the human eye—that was supposed to illuminate the enemy surreptitiously. However, 
it was quickly discovered that the searchlight produced a faint red glow that was ever so 
slightly detectable to the naked eye, and thus blew its cover (and that of the American 
soldier) amid the darkness of night. Back in the biology labs building, Griffin and his 
team conscripted and tested various filters designed by engineers at the EAL, leading to 
the redesign of goggles that lacked this security breach.51 Although this highly classified 
research was not circulated in an OSRD report, Griffin’s team did publish aspects of their 
findings just after the war. In a short article, they documented the spectral sensitivity of 
                                                
50 G. Edgar Folk, “Harvard Fatigue Laboratory,” p. 121. 
51 Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of Neuroscience in Autobiography, Vol. 2, ed. 
Larry Squire, p. 68-93 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), p. 76. 
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human vision to low levels of infrared radiation, demonstrating for the first time that the 
human eye was capable of observing a narrow range of the infrared spectrum.52 Not 
surprisingly, their report made no mention of the top-secret military technology that had 
precipitated this discovery.  
While these wartime investigations seem to have only tenuous connections to 
Griffin’s work on bat orientation, it is important to consider that the bulk of his research 
concerned fundamental problems of subjectivity, such as the relationship between 
sensation (sensory physiology) and perception (psychology). This line of inquiry also 
entailed approaching the transmission of sound, radio signals, and communication in 
general as a form of information processing. PAL’s articulation tests showed that 
communication was not simply a matter of coupling an adequate stimulus with a sensory 
mechanism, but rather a complex web of factors that included the intelligibility of certain 
linguistic elements, the role of attention and fatigue in auditory perception and signal 
processing, and the role of learning as subjects became more familiar with auditory cues. 
In cases where the physical stimulus and the sensory physiology of the listener remained 
identical, for example, auditory perception improved over the course of repeated testing. 
PAL’s psychophysical research therefore served as a challenge to mechanistic 
understandings of perception and information processing, and championed the 
importance of the “human element” (attention, awareness, learning) in perception.  
Griffin’s wartime work exposed him to a variety of different scientific and 
practical problems. Additionally, the steady influx of new technologies must have been 
truly exciting for Griffin, a “gadget man,” who took advantage of such developments in 
                                                
52 Donald Griffin, Ruth Hubbard, and George Wald, “The Sensitivity of the Human Eye to Infra-red 
Radiation,” Journal of the Optical Society of America, Vol. 37, No. 7 (July 1947): 546-554. 
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his research and experimental design. His experience at the Fatigue Lab, for example, 
further cultivated Griffin’s ability to approach problems of sensory physiology from a 
technical standpoint. Moreover, the fact that he was free to design his own experiments 
and to develop or modify existing technologies in the process yielded important 
experiences for developing an experimentalist mindset early in his career.  
Working with scientists at PAL and EAL, Griffin also learned a great deal about 
the physical properties of sound waves and transmission, in addition to its information-
carrying capacity, the use of electronics to visualize sound, and technologies that 
converted sound waves into electromagnetic radiation both for the purposes of scientific 
study. Griffin’s exposure to newly developed and technically sophisticated audio 
equipment also provided him with new insights into the physical properties of sound and 
high-frequency signaling. As his wartime research wound down, Griffin hit the ground 
running on more in-depth research into the physical properties of bat sounds and the 
physiology of bat vocalizations themselves. He was subsequently able to resume his 
Junior Fellowship and “apply to bats what I had learned about acoustics” from his 
colleagues and research experiences at PAL and EAL.53 But before we return to bats, it is 
necessary to highlight one more important area of wartime research that shaped how 





                                                
53 Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of Neuroscience in Autobiography, Vol. 2, ed. 
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Radar in the Air 
 
In November of 1944, Griffin wrote a brief letter to physicist Frederic V. Hunt 
(1905-1972), an expert on sonar, and director of Harvard’s Underwater Sound Laboratory 
(HUSL).54 In the decades surrounding World War II, Hunt was one of the most widely 
recognized authorities on underwater sound, and probably the single most influential 
American scientist working on sonar technology.55 Griffin explained to Hunt, “in 
discussing how bats guide their flight I have felt the need for a single word to describe 
their method.” “Echo sounding” was inadequate, as it was already widely in use to 
describe the specific function of fathometers measuring the depth of the underwater floor. 
Griffin desired a new term that could broadly encompass a wider range of phenomena, of 
which bat echolocation constituted a particular biophysical instance. He further 
explained, “To describe the bats’ method of orientation I have therefore coined the word 
‘echolocation,’ defined simply as the locating of obstacles by means of echoes. The 
purpose of the enclosed note is to point out that this concept can equally well be applied 
to a wide range of diverse phenomena from a blind man’s cane tapping to underwater 
sound devices or radar.”56 Hunt was less enthusiastic and recommended against coining 
such a term, which he felt lacked “euphony,” but Griffin nevertheless persisted in 
popularizing the neologism. His former collaborator Robert Galambos did not share 
Hunt’s reservations, urging Griffin to publish the term and to pursue the ideas that it 
embodied: “The echolocation paper is a very good idea. I’ve asked some people about it 
                                                
54 Hunt coined the term SONAR for its phonetic similarity to the term RADAR (RAdio Detection And 
Ranging). Thus SONAR essentially meant “sound radar,” and applied to a wide range of technologies and 
methods for underwater detection. After it became widely adopted by the Navy, the acronym was 
retroactively held to stand for “SOund Navigation And Ranging.” 
55 John V. Bouyoucos, “Frederick V. Hunt [Obituary],” Physics Today, Vol. 25, No. 7 (Jul. 1972): 69-70. 
56 Donald Griffin to F.V. Hunt, 11 November 1944, Series 1, Box 4, Folder [Correspondence - Hoc-Hut], 
RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
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and while none are tremendously enthusiastic, I am, and I congratulate you on the 
concept and urge you to go thru with it.”57 When Griffin suggested that he include 
Galambos as a co-author, his colleague demurred, “I really think you should take 
echolocation for your own […] after all it is solely your concept, [and] my contribution, 
as you must admit, is absolutely nil.”58 In December of 1944, Griffin published his term 
in an article in Science.59  
In his echolocation article, Griffin briefly recapitulated the history of Hartridge’s 
auditory theory of bat orientation and the experiments that he and Galambos had 
performed in confirming it via the detection of ultrasonic echoes. He then surveyed 
several instances of echolocation that utilized “the same fundamental process,” two of 
which were physiological (facial vision in blind persons, and bat orientation), and the 
remainder technological (fog-horns, fathometers, altimeters, sonar, and radar).60 Sonar 
and radar, of course, were still secretive military technologies, but the basic features of 
radar had recently been disclosed to the public in the spring of 1943.61 In fact it had 
occasionally been referred to publicly before that, especially in Europe, where radar was 
celebrated for its pivotal role in the early-warning detection system that alerted the R.A.F. 
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to incoming Luftwaffe attacks during the Battle of Britain.62 Aware of its scientific and 
cultural significance, Griffin explained that “it would be presumptuous for a biologist to 
discuss radar in detail,” but he nevertheless thought it was important to frame its basic 
principles in terms of their resemblance to the physiological basis of bat navigation.63 
Without naming it directly, he also hinted at the use of sonar in submarine detection, an 
even more clandestine technology that had not yet been made public “for obvious 
reasons.”64  
As Griffin later explained, one motivation for coining the term was to combat 
resistance to the very idea that bats were capable of such a complex and strange way of 
life. He recalled that at the 1940 American Society of Zoologists annual meeting, the 
acclaimed sensory physiologist Selig Hecht, upon hearing that bats navigated their flights 
via ultrasonic echoes, apparently grabbed Galambos by the shoulders and shook him, 
“complaining that we could not possibly mean such an outrageous suggestion.”65 Because 
the bat’s way of life was so utterly strange and different to that of humans, Griffin 
thought that by calling attention to the fundamental similarities of echolocation in bats 
                                                
62 For instance, as early as 1941 in the New York Times the Navy took out an advertisement specifically 
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and radar in his 1944 article, skeptics such as Hecht would be more willing to accept the 
validity of their discovery. The real significance of the term lay in its potential for 
guiding future research: “Unsuspected forms of echolocation may be found in nature or 
developed by human technology, and the use of a single unifying term can help clarify 
our ideas and stimulate such future developments.”66 Thus, not only were these 
similarities interesting in and of themselves, but Griffin thought that subsuming the 
technological and physiological phenomena under a more generalized conceptual 
framework would yield new discoveries. As it turns out, this supposition was correct, for 
in the years following the war Griffin’s research on bat echolocation revealed startling 
new features, many of which were shared by its technological analogs.  
Griffin’s coining of the term echolocation also served two other, perhaps less 
significant, functions. First, it essentially guaranteed that moving forward, the discovery 
of ultrasonic bat orientation would be mainly attributed to him.67 As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, it was actually Hamilton Hartridge’s auditory hypothesis that Griffin 
and Galambos had confirmed via their obstacle avoidance experiments (which were 
based on the earlier work of Walter Louis Hahn). While Hartridge was unaware in 1920 
that bats produced ultrasonic echoes, he nevertheless suspected that they might and had 
suggested so. Moreover, just a few years after Griffin’s and Galambos’s work, the Dutch 
physiologist Sven Dijkgraaf independently suggested in 1943 that bats oriented 
themselves via the echoes of their faintly audible clicking noises.68 Dijkgraaf, who was 
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isolated in the German-occupied Netherlands during the war, was unaware that bats 
produced ultrasonic sounds, but demonstrated via experiments quite similar to Griffin and 
Galambos that the bats’ clicking sounds correlated with their ability to avoid obstacles. 
Dijkgraaf theorized that the echoes of these clicks helped bats guide their flights. Despite 
the important contributions of these other twentieth-century scientists, and the fact that 
Spallanzani and Jurine had suggested a form of the auditory hypothesis nearly 150 years 
before, by coining the term “echolocation” Griffin attached his name to the permanent 
solution to the “bat problem” for posterity.  
Finally, the term “echolocation” served a pragmatic function, since it described 
“an important and general process for which one otherwise requires long phrases or 
whole sentences.”69 Throughout his several publications between 1938 and 1942, Griffin 
had never landed firmly on an adequate term or phrase that could succinctly capture the 
phenomenon or its significance. While he most often characterized the ultrasonic basis of 
bat orientation with the passively constructed and nebulous phrase, ‘obstacle avoidance,’ 
he also fumbled around with other terms such as the ‘auditory hypothesis,’ ‘Hartridge’s 
hypothesis,’ the ‘ultrasonic hypothesis,’ ‘echo-sounding,’ and so on. He also occasionally 
referred to it as the ‘supersonic’ or “SS” hypothesis, but dropped that in 1946, when the 
term supersonic came to designate the speed of new aircrafts that were capable of 
breaking the sound barrier.70 In echolocation then, Griffin had crafted a succinct and 
                                                                                                                                            
showed that the clicks were merely ancillary audible components of the bat’s orientation cries. The more 
intense and higher frequency sounds—which were almost always accompanied by the audible click—were 
the cues actually used for orientation. Dijkgraaf evidently had a better sense of hearing than Griffin, who 
was never able to hear the audible components of orientation cries. 
69 Donald Griffin, “Echolocation by Blind Men, Bats, and Radar,” Science, Vol. 100, No. 2609 (Dec. 
1944): 589. 
70 After this point, sound above the audible frequency range of humans became known as “ultrasonic.” 
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powerful metaphor, capable of serving multiple functions and merging different clouds of 
associations related to both the military and sensory physiology. 
Echolocation, insofar as it came to be conceived of as an interactive mode of 
perception by which bats acquired information about various features of their 
environments, was in fact a far cry from obstacle avoidance. As Griffin initially 
understood bats, avoidance behavior was the product of a specific and automatic 
physiological mechanism. Echolocation, on the other hand, was construed as a more 
general method, or tool, that bats had evolved to negotiate a wider range of tasks in their 
daily lives. In fact the phrases themselves delimit separate levels of inquiry: whereas 
obstacle avoidance refers specifically to the ability of bats to avoid airborne collisions, 
echolocation describes a general physiological process, or mode of perception, applicable 
to a wider and undefined range of behaviors and activities.  
Consider Griffin’s description of his early work on obstacle avoidance in a letter 
to James Brown Fisk, the physicist and Harvard Junior Fellow who, along with G.W. 
Pierce, had participated in the initial orientation experiments in 1938. Those experiments 
revealed that bats emitted ultrasonic sounds, although apparently not for the purpose of 
aerial orientation. In 1940, after Fisk had moved from Harvard to Bell Labs to work on 
increasing the range and accuracy of military radar systems, Griffin brought him up to 
speed on additional orientation experiments.71 “Apparently we jumped to conclusions 
two years ago as far as the relation of the supersonic chirps to obstacles was 
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concerned.”72 Those overly conservative conclusions were revised in light of Griffin’s 
and Galambos’s more thorough study of obstacle avoidance: “under these circumstances 
the bats keep up their high frequency notes while flying about, and seem to emit a 
specially loud and rapid volley of chirps just as they approach the wires […] The general 
conclusion is that hearing of sound reflected or scattered from the wires is an important 
mechanism enabling the bat to avoid them.”73 Bearing in mind that by the time he wrote 
those words, Griffin had ceased most of his experimental work on bats, it is interesting to 
contrast that description of bat biophysics to one written just a few years later in 1944, 
after he had coined the term echolocation.74 Regarding the bat’s use of echolocation 
while in flight, Griffin explained: “The bat is essentially locating objects in space by 
means of echoes…In its echolocation of obstacles the bat must do more than merely 
measure the distance to the obstacle; he must also localize the direction from which the 
echo is returning.”75 Griffin further explained that other abilities based on echolocation 
were likely to be discovered, including “the ability of bats to find the relatively small 
entrances to caves in the midst of dense woods.”76  
Conceptually and linguistically, echolocation was construed as a more general 
perceptual ability, used interactively by the bat to investigate its environment, as opposed 
to the restricted mechanism of obstacle avoidance. By 1946, Griffin’s understanding of 
echolocation had further evolved: “This remarkable method of perception takes the place 
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of vision for the bat […] this process is the chief mode of perception available to bats, 
and in this way they obtain most of their information about their surroundings. The 
process is so distinct from other types of perception that I have called it ‘echolocation,’ or 
the location of objects by means of their echoes.”77 Thus by the end of the war, 
echolocation had been generalized to indicate a complex form of interactive perception, 
which served a greater range of needs for bats both in orientation and in extracting 
information from objects within their environments.  
Griffin wasted little time putting his new term to work, publishing a more 
technical article in the American Journal of Physics at the behest of its editor, Duane 
Roller.78 Therein Griffin emphasized aspects of echolocation that would be most 
interesting to physicists, such as the acoustic properties of bat signals (frequency, 
duration, length).79 He did well to show its relevance to physicists, whose help he would 
indeed come to rely on for understanding the biophysics of bat sounds. In fact, earlier he 
had worried that his rudimentary understanding of physical acoustics would engender 
skepticism among physicists who learned about this work. In a 1941 letter to his friend 
and colleague Harold Hitchcock, for example, he pondered:  
In general, our idea is that the bats emit sounds above our frequency range 
(maximum intensity usually at 50 kilocycles) and that some of this sound comes 
back from the wires to them, is heard, and the source of the reflected sound, i.e. 
the obstacle is localized by the same sort of localization method whcih [sic] is 
used by other mammals for sounds of frequencies audible to them […] The 
physicists will probably jump down your throat if you talk about reflection from 
wires 1 mm. in diameter of a sound with a wave-length of 6 or 7 mm. Perhaps 
scattering is the better word. I have been after several physicists to advise me 
about the theory of this, but they all get very vague. As far as I can see, sound 
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waves being a longitudinal vibration (molecules moving in the direction of the 
propagation of the wave) should not be bothered particularly by the reflecting 
object being smaller than the wave-length as light waves are. If any of your 
physicists are really interested in this I’d be glad to send them all the dope we 
have in hopes that they might have some ideas illuminating to a poor ignorant 
biologist.80 
 
The physical properties of sound (e.g., wavelength, scattering versus reflection) were thus 
crucial elements of echolocation, determining how and for what purposes bats might use 
it. However, before Griffin’s wartime research, he had little exposure to physical 
acoustics. The ‘all hands on deck’ mentality of the war thus yielded crucial opportunities 
for biologists such as Griffin to increase their knowledge of physics and acoustical 
engineering. 
Griffin took the connection between bats and radar seriously. While bat brains 
obviously did not contain exact equivalents of the electronic apparatuses involved in 
radar, they did “possess physiological mechanisms which guide their flight in much the 
same way.”81 The ability of bats to navigate in total darkness, he explained, “is achieved 
by using the working equivalents of such modern electronic devices as echo sounders, 
absolute altimeters and radar.” Despite their physical differences, the signals are in fact 
employed in a similar capacity. While bat auditory physiology handles the binaural 
localization of sound (via differences in phase and intensity between echoes received by 
two ears separated in space), triangulated radar stations similarly localize the sources of 
radar reflections via temporal and energy differences. Griffin concluded the article by 
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observing that bats were thus capable of achieving “results which I think any radar 
engineer might envy.”82  
Surprisingly, he was not the first to observe the now-ubiquitous parallels between 
radar and bats. That honor goes to the biologist Rachel Carson, at the time a budding 
science writer who would later become famous for warning against overuse of pesticides 
in her book Silent Spring (1962).83 In November of 1944 she scooped Griffin in a short 
article for Collier’s Weekly, “The Bat Knew it First.”84 Although she did not coin a new 
term to connect the related phenomena, Carson emphasized the important parallels 
between radar and bats: “As everyone knows, radar detects approaching planes or other 
objects in the sky by filling the air with a series of high-frequency radio waves, then 
receiving the echo that bounces back from anything in the path of the signals. The bat’s 
method is very similar. Instead of radio waves, he sends out a staccato series of high-
pitched cries.”85 At the time, radar was quickly seeping into the public consciousness, 
especially for the noteworthy role that it had played in aiding the British defense during 
the Battle of Britain in 1940.86 Carson summarized Griffin’s and Galambos’s obstacle 
avoidance experiments, and then speculated on the evolutionary origins of the bat’s 
counterpart of radar. While radar technology was indeed a modern marvel, Carson noted 
that bats had “perfected and used the counterpart of radar millions of years before man 
laboriously developed it.”87  
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While Carson correctly observed that by late-1944 public knowledge of radar was 
ubiquitous, that was certainly not the case when the U.S. entered the war. At Harvard and 
MIT in the early-1940s, however, excitement about radar and sonar was widespread, as 
scientists and engineers worked on various wartime projects to develop and improve the 
technology. F.V. Hunt’s Underwater Sound Laboratory, for example, worked on the 
application of sonar to military weapons and navigation, while down the road at MIT, the 
Radiation Laboratory became the nerve center for America’s burgeoning radar super-
organism. Between January 1943 and June 1946 alone the OSRD doled out contracts in 
excess of $120 million for radar-related projects.88 In addition to the Rad Lab, dozens of 
smaller teams worked on projects indirectly related to radar. Researchers at the Psycho-
Acoustic Laboratory, for example, tackled problems that explicitly dealt with improving 
military communications concerning the dissemination of radar-based information, and 
integrating that data into the chain-of-command. At PAL, Griffin certainly would have 
gained a basic familiarity with radar and its principles, although he was probably already 
aware of it based on conversations with his colleagues G.W. Pierce, James Fisk, and 
Harold Edgerton, among others, all of whom worked on radar and/or sonar related 
research at the time.89  
While the basic principles of radar would have circulated amongst scientists and 
engineers on Harvard’s campus before it was made public, specifics about the technology 
and new areas of development were no doubt shrouded in secrecy. Moreover, before 
entering the war American radar technology was to a degree still in its infancy, relying on 
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the relatively weak radio-wave based signals in devices such as the Navy’s CXAM and 
the Army’s SCR-270.90 These radars, like the British “chain home” (CH) system, were 
essentially early-warning systems: their limited range (about 150 miles) and accuracy 
meant that they were good at detecting the presence of incoming enemies or obstacles on 
the horizon, but not for much else.91 For example, with poor angular resolution, a 
squadron of dozens of incoming airplanes would appear as a single fuzzy blip on the 
oscilloscope screen. Two planes that were within six kilometers of one another would 
similarly appear as a single blip.92 Similarly, radar navigation systems to help guide 
planes to remote targets were just being developed. The several pieces of equipment 
required by radar were also large, heavy, and thus confined to ground-based stations or 
large ships—airborne radars were also in the early stages. Thus, one of the major efforts 
in the early-1940s was to develop smaller airborne radars, and to increase the precision of 
radar by converting their signals to a more powerful microwave system.93  
By this time most operational U.S. radars were still relatively low-powered and 
effective at relatively short ranges, relying on radio-wave signals with meter-long 
wavelengths. American engineers knew that radar signals utilizing quick bursts of short-
wave, high-frequency microwaves would yield greater target resolution, but they simply 
lacked instruments capable of generating these high energy levels. This was a crucial 
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problem, because the amount of reflected energy that returns to a radar receiver falls off 
by a factor of four. Hence doubling the range of the radar reduces its signal power by a 
factor of 16, yielding poor target resolution.94 In fact it was not until September of 1940, 
when British science and military ambassadors came to the U.S. in the famous Tizard 
Mission, that the Americans learned how to effectively generate these high-powered, 
shortwave signals. Although the British CH radar system was less sophisticated than 
some American radars, the Brits had invented cavity magnetrons that were capable of 
generating powerful microwave bursts: the crucial missing piece for newer microwave 
radars. Also known as centimetric radar, given that their signals relied on microwaves 
with a wavelength of 10 centimeters or less, these devices were made possible by the 
infusion of British intelligence. The Tizard Mission took place over the course of three 
months in the fall of 1940, with meetings at offices in Washington DC, MIT, and Bell 
Labs, where British scientists showcased the latest in radar capabilities, and similarly 
were made privy to some, but not all, American developments. Immediately thereafter, 
MIT’s Radiation Laboratory was set up in order to produce the cavity magnetrons and 
integrate them into new microwave radar designs. Over the course of the war, radar 
technology was constantly improved, as the Americans mass-produced microwave 
radars, developed new Plan Position Indicators (PPI) that displayed radar data on 
electronic maps, and developed “tunable” magnetrons that were able to adjust the 
frequency of radar signals in order to circumvent jamming by the enemy.95  
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Excitement about radar at Harvard—especially for biologists—increased 
tremendously in July of 1942, when the Radio Research Laboratory (RRL) under the 
direction of Frederick Terman was moved from MIT to the top floor of Harvard’s 
Biological Laboratories building.96 Of the $24,500,000 spent on radar countermeasures 
during the war, two-thirds—$16,000,000—went to the RRL, whose main task was to 
develop both offensive devices and methods to jam enemy radars, and defensive 
measures to circumvent enemy jamming.97 Initially employing 110 people, Terman’s 
group added a rooftop annex as it expanded to 205 employees by October of 1942. By 
August of 1944 it had grown to 810 people, adding yet another annex behind the biology 
building.98 Among the dozens of countermeasure devices and techniques developed by 
the RRL during the war, the most significant was the airborne electronic jamming method 
designated “Carpet,” which played a crucial role in disrupting German Würzburg 
radars.99 Since the returning echoes of radar signals were relatively weak, scientists and 
engineers found that they could effectively jam them by sending out stronger signals that 
overshadowed these echoes. Moreover, by developing airborne jammers that could be 
tuned the same frequency of enemy radars, jamming was highly effective and 
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increasingly precise, and could be adjusted on the fly in case enemy radars were tuned to 
a different frequency.100 Thus enemy signals were unable to cut through the noise of 
Carpet jammers, rendering their radars incapable of generating any form of useful 
information.101  
This research was highly classified, and scientists such as Griffin who did not 
work in the RRL would not have known much detail. Nevertheless, rumors must have 
swirled amongst Harvard’s biology department as the clandestine RRL group gradually 
colonized the Biology Laboratories building. Moreover, Griffin did have at least one 
friend who worked in the Radio Research Laboratory during the war. In early 1945, this 
unnamed individual helped Griffin analyze the finer properties of bat sounds using RRL 
equipment: “Photographing these bat cries was quite difficult, but with the help of a 
friend in the Radio Research Laboratory I borrowed a very bright cathode ray tube and a 
very fast film and lens. Pictures were taken at random when the bat was ‘talking,’” and 
Griffin used them to examine the bat’s signal in greater detail than he had before.102 
Evidently he became familiar with the RRL’s equipment, for just after the Pacific 
campaign ended, he sought to acquire several electronic devices to aid him further in the 
analysis of bat cries.103 Thus, although the connections between bat echolocation and 
radar were not yet paying obvious conceptual dividends, they were certainly beginning to 
show important practical parallels vis-à-vis the devices required to analyze their signals. 
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It might be tempting to surmise that Griffin’s work on bat echolocation had direct 
lines of influence on radar research, despite the fact that high-energy microwave signals 
are fundamentally different—from the standpoint of physics—from mechanical sound 
(pressure) waves. There is no evidence, however, that the “radar people” looked to bats 
for technological inspiration, but that fact did not keep certain individuals from 
suggesting so. Thomas Barbour (1884-1946), a distinguished naturalist and director of 
Harvard’s Museum of Comparative Zoology from 1927 until his death in 1946, would 
claim just that. In 1945 Barbour wrote a short article about bats for The Atlantic, in which 
he claimed that Griffin’s and Galambos’s work had shown that “in other words, the bat is 
a miniature, individual radar installation which has provided many a valuable hint to the 
geniuses who have been working on supersonic direction and perception during the last 
year or two. This is a clear illustration that no one can ever tell where the study of natural 
phenomena, however improbable it may appear from a utilitarian point of view, may 
end.”104 Amusingly, Griffin wrote to Barbour explaining that his batty work contributed 
little to wartime research on radar: “The final item is the implication that radar owes part 
or all of its development to our work with bats. We must disclaim any such credit, 
however; at the time that we were still accumulating data on bats, the British were 
already shooting down Goering’s bombers with the aid of highly perfected radar 
installations.”105 Griffin’s rebuke notwithstanding, Barbour stubbornly reiterated his 
claim, explaining to his younger colleague, “I have been told so often how much your 
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work aided in the elaboration and development of the progress in radar that I am not in 
the least inclined to withdraw any of that.”106  
Those facts notwithstanding, Griffin firmly believed that radar researchers did 
have much to learn from bats, and it frustrated him that none had taken the connection 
seriously. In March of 1944 he groused to his doctoral advisor Karl Lashley:  
This in turn leads into the question I have often asked myself about the bats’ echo 
sounding; why haven’t the radar people really studied the bats’ signal (which has 
a very peculiar time pattern - very sharp, short bursts repeated as fast as 50 per 
second)? Since the bats have had 50,000,000 years to evolve an acoustic radar, it 
would seem likely that some good features might be discovered from a thorough 
analysis of their methods. As far as I can learn this hasn’t been attempted. […] I 
have had no time free from earphone sockets or electrically heated gloves to do 
more than speculate along these lines.107  
 
For Griffin, echolocation was an interactive metaphor: one could learn about bats by 
thinking of them in terms of biological radar or sonar, and similarly, one could improve 
radar by learning how bats employed their physiological analogs. And in fact the power 
of the metaphor to illuminate new lines of inquiry was one of Griffin’s motivations for 
coining the term in the first place. 
As to the influence of sonar, that research was even more clandestine than radar, 
and Griffin’s ties to Harvard’s Underwater Sound Laboratory were more tenuous. During 
the war, F.V. Hunt’s lab was focused mainly on the development of weapons such as 
sonar-guided torpedoes and sonar-based weapons detection systems, so in addition to 
being more secretive, the work was not as directly appealing to Griffin.108 Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that he sought the advice of sonar researchers including Hunt, and at 
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one point Griffin visited the HUSL in order to test the ability of one of its hydrophones to 
discriminate the finer properties of bat sounds.109 HUSL’s hydrophone, however, was not 
sensitive enough for Griffin’s purposes, and so he returned to G.W. Pierce’s Cruft lab 
looking for better equipment.110 Pierce himself was also well aware of sonar research, as 
his good friend and fishing buddy was none other than sonar pioneer Harvey C. Hayes, 
superintendent of the Naval Research Laboratory’s sound division during the war.111  
Griffin was also friends with Harold Edgerton, who had helped Griffin and 
Galambos take high-speed photographs and films during their obstacle avoidance 
experiments before the war. Edgerton was a pioneer in stroboscopic technology at MIT, 
and during the war he developed tools and methods for high-speed nighttime 
reconnaissance photography for the military. Edgerton also worked on sonar, and after 
the war he developed techniques for using “side-scan sonar” to photograph underwater 
geographic features that were of interest to the military.112 Griffin called on him a few 
times for assistance in taking high-speed photographs of bat sounds displayed on Pierce’s 
ultrasonic receiver and oscilloscope setup.113  
Griffin’s personal and professional network thus included several key individuals 
working on radar, sonar, and other military technologies. If he had questions about the 
basics of sonar, he was certainly in a position to have them answered, and the fact that he 
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included references to it in his initial echolocation article attests to that fact. For his war 
years at Harvard, radar was in the air just as much as sonar was in the water, and after the 
war, Griffin applied what he had learned to bats. 
Radar and sonar forever changed the way that Griffin understood bats. In several 
articles and book chapters written after the war, he discussed and compared echolocation 
in bats to its technological cousins. The comparison to radar also conferred a certain 
“wow” factor onto bats, since they were seemingly capable of feats achievable by the 
most sophisticated technologies of the day. In a 1946 article on bats for National 
Geographic, for example, Griffin invoked radar in order to underscore just how 
extraordinary the bat’s way of life was: “The most spectacular example of echolocation is 
the modern miracle of radar, which sends out radio waves and measures the distance and 
direction of aircraft or other objects by the echoes of these waves.” As a method of 
remote sensing, echolocation similarly afforded bats the ability to “see with their ears.”114  
In a later article, just as he was beginning to explore the possibility that bats 
hunted via echolocation, Griffin once again emphasized their fundamental connections to 
sonar and radar.115 As he explained, “some say [bats] possess radar, and this is 
surprisingly close to the truth.”116 Although sonar, since it also employed sonic echoes, 
was a better comparison from the standpoint of physics, Griffin explained the importance 
of these parallels: “There are startling similarities between the bat’s method and radar, 
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not only in basic principles but even in some of the less obvious details.”117 Along with 
sonar, all three forms of echolocation employ “bursts of energy…in order to detect 
distant objects by means of echoes,” and used shortwave, high-frequency signals to 
“permit the detection of smaller objects.” Furthermore, they all utilize suppressing 
mechanisms in their receivers (in the case of bats, muscles that constrict in the inner-ear) 
to prevent damage from the intense outgoing signals. Finally, all three systems utilize 
energetic signals concentrated in time (short bursts or pulses) and in space (highly 
directional beams). These three forms of echolocation were therefore remarkably similar, 
and Griffin concluded the article by wondering, “had biologists understood a few decades 
earlier the methods by which bats orient themselves, might not the invention of radar and 
sonar have come sooner?”118 
 
Hunting, Jamming, and Target Discrimination: Applying the War to Bats 
 Wartime research—especially involving psychoacoustics and radar—had 
important consequences for the elaboration of echolocation studies. Griffin would 
eventually ask new questions about echolocation in bats: do they use it for hunting 
insects? How effective is the bat’s target discrimination? And is the bat’s signal, like its 
radar analog, susceptible to jamming? These sorts of questions did not surface 
immediately or simultaneously. Instead, his wartime experience slowly influenced Griffin 
by inspiring a set of new ideas and questions via the echolocation metaphor, and a 
technical way of approaching bats as analogs to military technologies.  
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118 Donald Griffin, “The Navigation of Bats,” p. 54-55. 
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As his wartime research wound down, Griffin immediately returned to bats and 
the physical properties of their echolocation signals. The decision to return to bats—and 
to the nature of their signals specifically—was by no means random. His research on the 
properties of high-frequency sound and information processing at the Psycho-Acoustic 
Laboratory, as well as conversations with scientists working on other signal processing 
technologies for the military, led him to a new understanding about the information 
carrying capacity of sound waves. The physical properties of the echolocation signal, as 
radar and sonar showed, precisely determined the type and amount of information that 
could be acquired. Using methods that mirrored the analysis of radar signals on cathode 
ray oscilloscopes, Griffin set up equipment to visualize and analyze the finer details of 
bat sounds (spectrographs). His colleague and friend Francis Wiener (of the Electro-
Acoustic Laboratory) assisted Griffin with the research and the equipment setup, which 
consisted of a condenser microphone, a cathode vacuum tube, and a volt amplifier to 
allow the sound waves to be viewed on an oscilloscope. One key piece of equipment, a 
DuMont model 247 oscilloscope, was purchased from the Radio Research Laboratory.119 
Through careful analysis, Griffin determined that bat signals consisted of a series of short 
pulses, and “rather than being broadband noise bursts, they were frequency modulated 
chirps sweeping downward by an octave during 1 or 2 msec.”120  
Griffin’s postwar work surprisingly revealed that bats—or at least the Myotis 
lucifugus that he studied—emitted a frequency-modulated pulse that swept down a full 
octave over its duration. That is, the beginning of each pulse consisted of sound waves 
                                                
119 Donald Griffin, “The Supersonic Cries of Bats,” Nature, Vol. 158 (July 13, 1946): 46-48. Some of the 
equipment was purchased through the Elisabeth Thompson Science Fund, and other pieces were on loan 
from the Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory. 
120 Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of Neuroscience in Autobiography, Vol. 2, ed. 
Larry Squire, p. 68-93 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), p. 77. 
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whose frequency was much higher than those at the end of the pulse. Griffin was unsure 
of the reason for the sweep, but by analyzing the envelope form, its average pressure, and 
its duration, he would be able to get a better sense of the ‘shape’ of the bat’s pulse.121 
This information was crucial for determining several aspects of echolocation, such as its 
effective range and the possibility that it could be used to discriminate the shape and 
texture of targets. He found that each burst of sound began at a frequency of 50,000 
cycles per second and swept down to 20,000 cycles per second.122 By visualizing the 
sound on an oscilloscope he found that the average intensity of each pulse was 
approximately 50 dynes/cm2, which was indeed a very intense sound.123 Similarly, he 
found that the bulk of the pulse’s energy was emitted within a millisecond, and the entire 
pulse lasted slightly less than two milliseconds.124 A pulse of such duration and intensity 
should theoretically allow a bat to echolocate objects at a distances no shorter than one 
foot, given the fact that it would take each pulse approximately 2 milliseconds to hit the 
target and return to the bat’s ears as an echo. Objects closer than one foot away would 
return echoes that interrupted the emitted pulse before it had fully left the bat’s larynx, 
and therefore echolocation at such distances would be ineffective.  
                                                
121 The envelope form is determined by tracing the peaks of each sound wave in the bat’s pulse through 
time.  
122 The fact that the pulses never dipped below 20,000 cycles per second meant that no portion of the pulse 
was audible; the click sounds that Dijkgraaf had identified as orientation signals were therefore some 
ancillary byproduct of the orientation cries that resulted from the rapid nature of the pulse’s production. 
Any acoustic energy below 20,000 cps created by this process was therefore unrelated to orientation 
activities. Donald Griffin, “The Supersonic Cries of Bats,” p. 46-48. 
123 In a later article Griffin revised this estimate to 60 dynes, and offered helpful comparisons to 
demonstrate the intensity of bat signals: elevated trains produce sound at 10 dynes per centimeter squared, 
and the inside of combat planes averaged 100 dynes per centimeter squared. Griffin would have known this 
latter figure because of his work at PAL. Donald Griffin, “Measurements of the Ultrasonic Cries of Bats,” 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 22 (Mar. 1950): 247-257. 
124 Griffin and Galambos had initially determined in 1940 that the bat’s pulse was about a tenth of a second; 
these later studies revealed that it was indeed much shorter than that. 
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 It is unclear from whom and when Griffin learned that there existed an important 
correlation between the wavelength of echolocation signals and the size of objects that 
they could detect. Perhaps this was intuitively obvious despite his limited training in 
physics. It is also very likely that G.W. Pierce or James Fisk, both experts on physical 
acoustics, explained this to him in the late-1930s. At the very least Griffin was still 
worried about that problem in early 1941, when he wondered to his friend Harold 
Hitchcock how a physicist would react upon learning that bats detected wires 1mm in 
diameter via the reflection or scattering of sound waves that were 6-7mm long.125 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the wavelength and the target size was a central 
feature and problem in radar and sonar development, and so during the war, Griffin 
certainly would have had the opportunity to ponder this question. 
A few years later Griffin published an even “more complete analysis” of bat 
signals, which led to some minor revisions of his earlier measurements.126 He also 
detailed all of his methods and equipment—and offered tips for handling the bats in 
captivity—so that other interested scientists could replicate his experiments. Griffin 
emphasized the frequency sweeps, explaining that they were “one of the most important 
acoustical properties of these unusual sounds.”127 Although he was uncertain as to the 
role that the sweeps played in echolocation, Griffin drew on his knowledge of their role 
in radar, which employed frequency sweeps in order to avoid jamming their own echoes 
via outgoing signals: “It is tempting to speculate about the significance of this frequency 
modulation in the process of echolocation, especially in view of the use of frequency 
                                                
125 Donald Griffin to Harold Hitchcock, 23 February 1941, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 61, RG 450G875 
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
126 Donald Griffin, “Measurements of the Ultrasonic Cries of Bats,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of 
America, Vol. 22 (Mar. 1950): 247-257. 
127 Donald Griffin, “Measurements of the Ultrasonic Cries of Bats,” p. 251. 
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modulation in certain radar systems.”128 Also, Dijkgraaf had shown experimentally that 
bats could detect food as close as 5 cm away, which was seemingly too short a distance 
given the average wavelength of the bat’s signal. Therefore Griffin supposed that the 
frequency drop probably facilitated close-range echolocation, since the waves at the 
beginning of the outgoing pulse would not overlap with the same frequency range of the 
returning echoes: “at close range the perception of any object by echolocation must 
involve discrimination between mixtures of original pulses and their returning echoes,” 
and frequency sweeps would reduce the amount of noise generated by such overlaps in 
the bat’s signal.129 Thus Griffin applied the knowledge of acoustics and remote sensing 
that he had acquired during the war to bats, and in doing so he was able to gain a fuller 
understanding of echolocation. This new line of analysis was necessary to determine with 
greater precision just what kinds of information bats were able to acquire, in addition to 
the kinds of behaviors that could be based on echolocation. Further analysis of 
echolocation in bats would eventually lead Griffin into surprising new areas. To conclude 
this chapter, I will briefly highlight two of these, both of which show important 
connections to the military technologies of remote sensing: hunting and jamming.130 
It is perhaps curious that it was not until 1950 that Griffin seriously pursued the 
question of whether bats hunted via echolocation. At least a decade before then he had 
read about Spallanzani’s experiments on the auditory basis of bat orientation, which 
revealed that bats with plugged ears were incapable of filling their bellies with insects. 
                                                
128 Donald Griffin, “Measurements of the Ultrasonic Cries of Bats,” p. 252. On radars and jamming, see: 
Mark Denny, Blip, Ping, & Buzz, p. 48-55. 
129 Donald Griffin, “Measurements of the Ultrasonic Cries of Bats,” p. 252. 
130 There are other areas that also show salient connections, such as target discrimination and the use of 
echolocation in homing behavior. For the purposes of this chapter, I have limited my analysis to the two 
areas that seem most importantly connected. 
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Though hardly a smoking gun, those early accounts were at least suggestive that bats 
required their hearing for more than simply avoiding obstacles. But Griffin was a 
rigorous skeptic, and bats were not supposed to be capable of such complex behaviors. It 
was startling enough that they were capable of obstacle avoidance via auditory cues, and 
Griffin interpreted the results of his early experiments narrowly: obstacle avoidance was 
merely an automatic mechanism—a collision warning device. The metaphorical concept 
of echolocation, however, was a powerful key, capable of unlocking new doors that had 
previously been inaccessible or even invisible. The bat’s ability to use echolocation in 
hunting insect prey was one such door. 
In fact, Griffin came intriguingly close to entertaining that idea at least as early as 
1941. In a letter to his colleague Charles Duckman, he suggested the possibility that bats 
used their acute sense of hearing to detect insects while hunting:  
I doubt if anyone knows exactly how they find the moths and flies and other 
insects which the [sic] catch on the wing. They may simply swoop about with 
their mouths open where the insects are very abundant, but I think they probably 
use sounds made by the insects as well. This is really just a guess on my part, but 
bats are so skillful at avoiding wires by means of the sound reflected back to 
them, that it would seem reasonable to suppose they might locate their food in the 
same fashion.131  
 
This passage demonstrates how limited in scope Griffin conceived of obstacle avoidance 
at the time: the bat’s sense of hearing was so sensitive for the purpose of obstacle 
avoidance that it could possibly leverage that sensitivity—not to locate prey interactively 
via ultrasonic echoes—but by simply hearing the insect’s own sounds. At that time, of 
course, obstacle avoidance had not yet been generalized to echolocation, and thus Griffin 
had not begun to seriously consider the parallels between bats and radar.  
                                                
131 Donald Griffin to Charles Duckman, 22 February 1941, Series 1, Box 2, Folder [Corr – Di-Dy], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
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A few years after the war, however, Griffin returned to the question of hunting, 
this time with a more expansive understanding of echolocation as a general method of 
perception. He would later explain that overlooking the possibility of hunting via 
echolocation was simply a failure of imagination earlier in his career: “Echolocation of 
stationary objects had seemed remarkable enough, but our scientific imaginations had 
simply failed to consider, even speculatively, this other possibility with such far-reaching 
ramifications.”132 As this chapter shows, Griffin’s wartime experiences and the 
concomitant development of echolocation as a more generalized process went a long way 
toward expanding that imagination.  
One crucial function of metaphor in science is to validate new kinds of questions 
by drawing separate domains together under the same conceptual framework. Griffin 
posed one such question to himself in 1951, wondering if bats used echolocation to hunt 
insect prey. He mused, “It is certainly reasonable to assume that they do, since their 
avoidance of small, inanimate objects is so clearly based on this natural analogy to radar 
or sonar instruments.”133 Griffin thus validated his biological speculation by drawing on 
its connections to the technological realm. The speculation, of course, was not without an 
evidentiary base.  
As Griffin explained, the laboratory-based obstacle avoidance experiments were 
“not enough to bring this auditory mode of orientation into its complete biological 
perspective. For it does not reveal to what extent bats depend upon echolocation for their 
orientation under natural conditions, or how they locate and capture the flying insects that 
                                                
132 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 139. 
133 Donald Griffin, “At What Distance Can a Flying Bat Perceive Small Objects,” Journal of Mammalogy, 
Vol. 32 (1951): 487. 
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form virtually their sole source of food.”134 The hunting research was partially funded 
through the Office of Naval Research, with whom Griffin would collaborate on several 
contracts in the years following the war. Evidently, some individuals in the ONR had an 
“active interest” in Griffin’s analysis of bat echolocation.135 Preliminary observations of 
bats in the wild, conducted with a portable setup of the ultrasonic detector, indeed 
showed that bats emitted their echolocation pulses while flying through caves and while 
hunting insects: “Bats thus appear to search actively for their insect prey by the same 
process of ‘echolocation’ previously demonstrated to be the basis of obstacle 
avoidance.”136 Although it was difficult to get consistent readings due to the highly 
directional nature of the bat’s pulses (in the form of narrow beams), after a few months 
Griffin was able to obtain a substantial amount of data.  
As a lifelong observer of bats, he knew that they engaged in two main aerial 
styles: the first he termed “cruising flight,” which was relatively smooth and linear, and 
accompanied by the emission of a constant pulse rate. That style was punctuated by a 
second form, characterized by the sudden dives and twists necessary to capture flying 
insects. With a portable ultrasonic detector, Griffin found that the sounds that bats 
emitted during each flight pattern varied considerably. When bats changed from cruising 
to diving, their echolocation signals changed in three main ways: the length of each pulse 
shortened, the emission rate of pulses increased, and the degree of frequency modulation 
within each pulse also increased. After years of experience with remote sensing, both 
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biological and technological, the reason for these acoustical changes was immediately 
obvious to Griffin: “in all cases the changes were of a sort that might be expected to give 
the bat more information about small objects at close range.”137 This was indeed strong 
evidence that bats used echolocation for more than obstacle avoidance. As Griffin 
explained, on the basis of the acoustic changes alone he was “strongly inclined to 
conclude that these bats detect their insect prey by means of echolocation, and that they 
guide their pursuit on the basis of information perceived through multiple echoes from 
bursts of short duration.”138 
Those strong inclinations notwithstanding, Griffin was a rigorous skeptic, and so 
he considered the possibility that bats might use another sense—not the echolocation 
method—to hunt. Olfaction was unlikely, since in addition to being ineffective at 
distances greater than one meter, bats also dove at pebbles and other objects that smelled 
nothing like insects. Similarly, vision was ruled out, since obstacle avoidance 
experiments had shown that bats were helpless flyers when forced to rely on sight alone. 
Given the extreme sensitivity of the bat’s ear, normal hearing was certainly possible, but 
the hunted insects’ sounds did not register to human ears or on the ultrasonic detector. 
Furthermore, Griffin reasoned that if bats relied on hearing insect sounds, then they 
probably would not emit such intense noises while hunting. Moreover, there was 
suggestive evidence that certain species of moths were capable of hearing sounds in the 
ultrasonic range, and consequently echolocation cries would alert those insects to the 
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presence of hungry bats.139 A further reason to doubt the role of simple listening was due 
to “the eagerness with which they often pursued inert, artificial targets such as pebbles 
tossed gently into the air.”140 But what if bats captured pebbles simply by hearing the 
sounds produced by the projectiles as they cut through the air? To account for even this 
remote possibility, Griffin fashioned a blowgun from a piece of glass tubing and shot 
wads of wet cotton—“very silent missiles”—into the air. The bats were skilled at 
capturing these as well. All of this additional evidence and logical reasoning strongly 
suggested that echolocation was the primary method of capturing prey: “While many 
questions of detail remain unanswered, and more extensive quantitative studies of these 
phenomena remain desirable for the future, it seems clear that these bats employ the 
process of echolocation for more precise and complicated types of orientation than the 
mere avoidance of static obstacles.”141 
Although Galambos was not involved in these experiments, he wrote to Griffin 
upon learning the results, amusingly observing: “You are to be congratulated, again, and 
as usual, upon a very pretty piece of work. That train of 1 to 2 msec pips at a rate of 200 
per sec is as beautiful a record of a scientific endeavor as I know. You ask the question, 
nature provides the bat and the pebble, and a good many thousands of Navy dollars gives 
us the answer. Science is so simple.”142 But science was not so simple, and Griffin would 
go on to explore hunting via echolocation in greater detail, expanding his studies to 
include several other species. He also moved these investigations back into the 
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laboratory, where he was finally able to induce captive bats to hunt under artificial 
conditions. In experiments in the late-1950s he was joined by Frederic A. Webster, a 
psychologist and information theorist from the General Radio Company. These later 
experiments on hunting were better quantified than Griffin’s previous work, and the team 
was able to obtain more accurate spectrographs of the echolocation cries.143 The 
experiments strengthened Griffin’s original findings, showing conclusively that 
echolocation was indeed the primary means by which these bats located, tracked, and 
captured insect prey. 
Griffin incorporated these new findings into another popular essay comparing bats 
to radar and sonar.144 “Thanks to sonar,” he explained, “an insect-eating bat can get along 
perfectly well without eyesight.” Close analysis of hunting bats had shown that their 
frequency modulations were actually correlated to the average size of insect prey: as the 
frequency swept downward, the wave-length of the pulse lengthened from 6 to 12 
millimeters, which was the average size of their insect prey. Because the effective size of 
the insect changed as it maneuvered in the air, the frequency sweep thus helped the bat 
discriminate its moving targets. Griffin marveled, “the common impression is that it is 
merely a crude collision warning device. But the bats’ use of their system to hunt insects 
shows that it must be very sharp and precise...All in all, we can say that bats obtain a 
fairly detailed acoustic ‘picture’ of their surroundings by means of echolocation.”145 
But by 1958 their ability to hunt insects was no longer what interested Griffin 
most about bats. The most impressive feature of echolocation, he explained, was the bat’s 
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“ability to detect their targets in spite of loud ‘noise’ or jamming. They have a truly 
remarkable ‘discriminator,’ as a radio engineer would say.”146 The fact that bats so 
skillfully navigated caves in groups of hundreds or even thousands was a solid indicator 
that they possessed some kind of jamming avoidance ability. That is, the bat’s signal was 
somehow not jammed by the hundreds of other bats nearby, all of which emitted signals 
at about the same frequency. Metaphorical reasoning once again validated the 
investigation of this problem, since electronic jamming was such a major focus in sonar 
and radar research during and after the war. Furthermore, the incorporation of 
information theory into communications research in the 1950s had led to a major focus 
on problems of discriminating signal information from noise. Griffin once again appealed 
to the bat’s evolved system as a possible source of inspiration: perhaps those information 
theorists could “learn something from the bats, which have solved the problem with 
surprising success.”147  
Griffin had first begun to test the bat’s susceptibility to jamming in experiments in 
the mid-1950s, thanks once again to an ONR contract.148 With his graduate student Alan 
D. Grinnell, he set up an obstacle avoidance array inside a small room in Harvard’s 
biology laboratories. In experiments similar to those that Griffin and Galambos had 
carried out, they quantified the ability of bats to avoid wires in different noise 
conditions.149 Filling the room with “white” noise at 80-90 decibels—tuned to the same 
frequency of the bat’s echolocation signal—slightly increased the minimum size of wires 
that they could detect. Nevertheless, the bats avoided the wires between 80% and 90% of 
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the time, which was right at the average levels of avoidance in control conditions. Griffin 
and Grinnell concluded that the frequency sweep and the temporal delay between the 
emission of their pulses and the reception of those echoes probably prevented the bat 
signals from being jammed, but it would remain a problem for several decades. They 
would go on to study the problem of signal discrimination in the following years, in 
addition to researching the bat’s target discrimination of different kinds of objects.150 All 
the while Griffin hoped that knowledge generated by bat research would feed back into 
more general technological and scientific problems: “When I watch bats…employing 
their gift of echolocation in a vast variety of ways, I cannot escape the conviction that 
new and enlightening surprises still wait upon the appropriate experiments. It would be 
wise to learn as much as we possibly can from the long and successful experience of 
these little animals with problems so closely analogous to those that rightly command the 
urgent attention of physicists and engineers.”151  
 
Conclusion 
Griffin’s wartime experiences at Harvard profoundly shaped the way he 
approached the study of bats. As he later explained, by 1950 “whatever influences 
molded my scientific work and thinking had done their work,” for he had “come to 
realize that bat echolocation was a highly versatile mode of perception.”152 The military 
technologies of communications signal processing and remote sensing constitute an 
important factor in effecting that change. During the war these factors facilitated the 
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transmutation of Griffin’s understanding of bat orientation from a mechanistic conception 
of obstacle avoidance into an interactive and general mode of perception. For Griffin, the 
obstacle avoidance ability was construed primarily in terms of the mechanistic 
relationship between the acoustic signal and the navigational reaction of the bat in flight. 
Echolocation, however, was understood to be a general mode of perception, or sensory 
tool, applicable to a variety of behaviors. The expansion of this view would eventually 
play a crucial role in Griffin’s later work on animal consciousness, but the breakdown of 
mechanistic conceptions of animals was an important first step in that direction. 
Griffin’s conceptualization of echolocation as fundamentally similar to military 
technologies was deeply important in his biological thought, as it validated new questions 
and ideas about bats and their behavior. Metaphorically, “echolocation” joined the 
biological and technological spheres, generating new insights by considering the separate 
phenomena as resting on unified principles. Throughout his career, Griffin would often 
return to the study of echolocation, which he considered to be an unending “magic well” 
of scientific knowledge and inspiration.153  
That Griffin’s scientific development was shaped by new wartime technologies 
cannot be doubted. Moreover, the mediated use of technologies that extend or sharpen the 
human senses—such as sophisticated communications equipment, military radar, and 
infrared night vision—may have led Griffin to new insights about the interplay of 
consciousness and sensory systems in regulating animal behavior. In working with these 
technologies, Griffin was led to imagine how animals might be aware of their own 
behavior while utilizing complex sensory systems to accomplish various tasks. Later 
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chapters will explore these ideas in greater detail. In an autobiographical memoir, Griffin 
intriguingly hints at this idea. Several years after the war, he crudely assembled a 
digitally adapted radar in order to track migrating birds, obscured by the clouds, from an 
airplane. In recalling this experience, Griffin explained that while “operating this 
apparatus I felt I was a bat.”154  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Trouble with Bird Migration 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on another perplexing area of animal behavior that Griffin 
investigated using his experimental approach to sensory physiology: bird migration and 
orientation.1 As was the case with Spallanzani’s bats, the ability of birds to migrate 
hundreds or thousands of miles was a longstanding biological problem that had yet to be 
resolved by the mid-twentieth century. Advancements in electrophysiological techniques 
in the 1920s and 1930s yielded a deeper understanding of the sensory physiology of 
animals, and of the physical and chemical features of their environments that were 
mediated by those senses. But it took an experimental approach using whole organisms—
both in the wild and in the laboratory—to fully understand complex behavioral 
phenomena such as bird migration. By 1940 there were perhaps a dozen biologists 
seriously working on the problem, and most of these—such as Gustav Kramer, Werner 
Rüppell and Erwin Stresemann—came from the German ethological tradition. In 
England, the ornithologists Geoffrey V.T. Matthews and William Homan Thorpe led the 
way. And in North America, Griffin’s work was complemented by that of evolutionary 
biologist and ornithologist Ernst Mayr, Canadian ornithologist William Rowan, and 
physicist Henry L. Yeagley, who conducted classified work on pigeon homing for the 
Army Signal Corps. While much of this research was suspended during the war (aside 
                                                
1 Migration refers to the specific temporal and spatial movements that most birds perform during annual 
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 121 
from Yeagley’s), there was a resurgence of interest in the problem in the 1940s and 
1950s, and during this period Griffin became an authoritative figure in the field. 
In his doctoral research between 1938 and 1942, Griffin first approached the 
problem from within the mechanistic conception of animal behavior, which was thus in 
accordance with his concurrent work on obstacle avoidance in bats. This research 
extended the early-twentieth century experiments conducted by physiological 
psychologist Karl Lashley, and Lashley’s mentor at Johns Hopkins University, John B. 
Watson. For Griffin, the mechanistic approach consisted in identifying and describing 
both the sensory physiology that undergirded the behavior, and the environmental cues 
that were mediated by the senses. His doctoral work initially overlapped his bat research 
chronologically and thematically, for both entailed experimental programs that isolated 
sensory channels in order to make sense of more general behavioral phenomena. Unlike 
his work on bats, however, Griffin’s bird research did not yield satisfying and clear 
answers, for he was not able to explain from the mere analysis of sensory mechanisms 
how birds performed their impressive migratory feats. This led him to explain his results 
by developing an exploratory theory of orientation, which held that birds navigated by 
random searching until they came upon environmental cues that led them into familiar 
territory and oriented them homeward. The precise nature of these cues, and the 
mechanisms by which birds made sense of them, however, still eluded Griffin. The 
mechanistic approach, which would be so effective in leading to the discovery of 
ultrasonic bat navigation, failed to yield a similarly clear picture of bird migration.  
The second part of the chapter concerns a controversial orientation theory that 
challenged Griffin’s exploratory theory in the late 1940s. It was in 1947 that 
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Pennsylvania State College physicist Henry L. Yeagley (1899-1996) published his 
magnetic theory of orientation. While working with carrier pigeons for the Army Signal 
Corps during the war, Yeagley developed a speculative theory, which held that pigeons 
oriented themselves on a geophysical grid generated by the perception of terrestrial 
magnetism and the Coriolis effect. Yeagley’s publication of the theory in 1947 caused 
much excitement within the small but vocal community of American and British 
ornithologists and ecologists, but almost immediately several major problems with the 
work led scientists to reject his ideas and to question the soundness of his methods. 
Griffin was central to this critical response, as he and his colleagues privately organized 
several public rejoinders in a collaborative effort to discredit Yeagley’s work. In fact, by 
the time Griffin learned about Yeagley’s theory in the late 1940s, he had become 
increasingly skeptical of explanations based on simple stimulus-response mechanisms 
such as magnetic orientation theories. For Griffin, homing and migration were complex 
behaviors that could not be reduced to simplistic, Loebian mechanisms such as the 
magnetic theory held. Yeagley’s dubious methodology and conveniently simple 
explanation only deepened Griffin’s skepticism about magnetic orientation, of which he 
remained wary for the rest of his career. 
By focusing on Griffin’s approach to the problem of homing and migration, this 
chapter demonstrates how experimental methods in sensory physiology were used to 
understand more general questions about animal behavior. While grappling with these 
phenomena, Griffin’s mechanistic assumptions about the simplicity of animal behavior 
began to break down, as this framework was incapable of making sense of complex 
behavioral problems. Throughout his bird research in the 1940s, Griffin interpreted his 
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data according to the simplest possible explanation: birds navigated using random 
exploration and the known senses, and until firm evidence indicated otherwise, he 
continued to opt for the conservative interpretation.2 This hermeneutic proved useful in 
rejecting speculative or unwarranted theories such as Yeagley’s. But where it limited 
speculation, it also limited imagination. As I analyze in the fifth chapter, migration 
research in the 1950s would show that birds possessed a biological clock, and that they 
were able to draw on it in order to navigate by calculating the motion of the sun and stars.  
Griffin’s approach to the problem of bird migration yielded useful data, but his 
interpretations were overly conservative, and obscured some of the essential features of 
bird behavior. In the 1950s he continued his investigation of migration and homing, and 
came to realize that birds were even more complex than he had previously imagined. 
Before that realization took place, however, he would have to simplify the problem by 
developing new methods such as airplane tracking in artificial homing experiments. This 
work, which began with his doctoral research and continued after the war, took place 
alongside Griffin’s research on bats. Together, these investigations expanded Griffin’s 
view of animal behavior, and would eventually play an important role in leading him to 





                                                
2 Griffin would later describe this experimental philosophy as the application of “simplicity filters.” Like 
Ockham’s razor or “Morgan’s canon,” simplicity filters were intended to keep one’s imagination in check, 
and to demand overwhelming evidence for new ideas or complex explanations of behavioral phenomena. In 
effect, this epistemology judges the quality of scientific explanations according to their conceptual 
simplicity. 
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The Trouble with Bird Migration 
Upon completion of his B.S. in biology in 1938, Griffin had already decided to do 
his graduate work at Harvard, but he lacked a suitable research agenda. Further 
experiments on bats did not seem overly promising, since at that point he and G.W. 
Pierce had incorrectly concluded that ultrasonic sounds were not used for orientation. He 
strongly desired to research some topic in behavioral biology, but this apparently did not 
sit well with the physiologically oriented faculty at Harvard. Fortunately for him, Karl 
Lashley—a renowned physiological psychologist who was chiefly concerned with 
problems of animal behavior—had been jointly appointed to the psychology and biology 
departments in 1935.3 Although Griffin had little interaction with him prior to 1938, 
Lashley nevertheless agreed to supervise his research on bird migration, a topic of mutual 
and longstanding interest. Griffin’s decision to study birds was not a particularly curious 
one, for he had wondered since childhood how birds, bats, and other animals knew how 
to get from one place to another.4 Studying bird migration was thus a logical choice, but 
apparently not a popular one. Griffin later recalled, “Bird navigation had begun to 
fascinate me, but wiser heads emphasized that if I really wanted to be a serious scientist I 
should put aside such childish interests and turn to some important subject such as 
                                                
3 The psychology department had only recently split from philosophy (1934) as part of Harvard president 
James Conant’s university-wide academic reforms. Conant pushed hard to improve the psychology 
department’s reputation by seeking out several distinguished experimentalists, and landing the esteemed 
Karl Lashley was a major coup. See Morton Keller and Phyllis Keller, Making Harvard Modern: The Rise 
of America’s University (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 89-90. On Karl Lashley’s 
physiological psychology, see Nadine Weidman, Constructing Scientific Psychology: Karl Lashley’s Mind-
Brain Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
4 As an undergraduate, he extended those amateurish interests into formal studies on the annual migratory 
patterns of bats from winter caves to summer roosts in New England: Donald Griffin, “Marking Bats,” 
Journal of Mammalogy, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug. 1934): 202-207; Donald Griffin, “Bat Banding,” Journal of 
Mammalogy, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Aug. 1936): 235-239; Donald Griffin, “Bat Banding: A Request for 
Cooperation,” The Auk, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Apr. 1936): 253-254; Donald Griffin, “Wings without Feathers,” 
New England Naturalist, Vol. 3 (Sep. 1939): 11-13; Donald Griffin, “Bats Migrate Too,” New England 
Naturalist, Vol. 5 (Dec. 1939): 1-4. 
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physiology.”5 Nevertheless, he ignored his elders’ concerns and pushed forward with his 
doctoral plan. In order to investigate the problem, Griffin extended an experimental 
program conducted in the early-twentieth century by Lashley and John B. Watson. 
Watson worked on bird migration between 1907 and 1913, during which time he 
joined and later became chair of the psychology department at Johns Hopkins 
University.6 He conducted his first experiments on Bird Key in the Dry Tortugas, about 
eighty miles west of Key West in the Gulf of Mexico.7 At that point he had not yet 
articulated the brand of arch-behaviorism that would come to define his legacy in 
American psychology, although his work on bird behavior was certainly not mentalistic.8 
Bird migration is an inherently difficult topic to study, since the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of migrations are typically so vast that no individual observer can witness a 
single course in its entirety. Watson assumed that birds navigated toward proximate goals 
simply using their keen sense of vision, but distant orientation—toward unseen goals, as 
in the case of long migrations—was more problematic.  
                                                
5 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” in Leaders in the Study of Animal 
Behavior, ed. Donald Dewsbury, p. 120-142 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated Universities Press, 1985), p. 127. 
6 Watson joined the psychology faculty at Johns Hopkins in the fall of 1908. Shortly thereafter, chair James 
Mark Baldwin became embroiled in an infamous prostitution scandal, and was forced out of the university. 
Watson subsequently became chair in 1909. 
7 This and future work was funded by the Carnegie Institute of Washington, which had established an 
outpost of the Marine Biological Laboratory on Bird Key. John Watson, “The Behavior of Noddy and 
Sooty Terns,” Papers from the Department of Marine Biology, Carnegie Institution of Washington 
[Tortugas Laboratory Papers], Vol. 2, No. 103 (1908): 187-255; John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing 
and Related Activities of Birds,” Papers from the Department of Marine Biology, Carnegie Institution of 
Washington [Tortugas Laboratory Papers], Vol. 7, No. 211 (1915): 1-104; John Watson, “How Animals 
Find Their Way Home,” Harper’s Monthly Magazine, Vol. 119 (Oct. 1909): 685-689. 
8 On Watson’s life and work, see Kerry W. Buckley, Mechanical Man: John B. Watson and the Beginnings 
of Behaviorism (New York: The Guilford Press, 1989). On Lashley’s work with Watson, see: Nadine 
Weidman, Constructing Scientific Psychology, p. 32-47. 
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At the time, most theories that attempted to account for this ability were 
speculative, and often involved positing a special “sixth sense.”9 For example, the 
nineteenth-century French zoologist Camille Viguier (1850-1930) proposed a theory in 
1882, claiming that pigeons possessed a refined sense of terrestrial magnetism that 
enabled them to orient their long-distance flights.10 Gabriel Reynaud, an officer in the 
French Army’s homing pigeon service, similarly offered his “contrepied theory” of 
navigation, which held that when pigeons returned from great distances, they merely 
backtracked by retracing the steps of their outbound route.11 Also noteworthy was 
amateur naturalist Pierre Hachet-Souplet’s (1867-1947) visual landmark theory, which 
held that distant orientation was different from proximate orientation only in degree, not 
in kind.12 In short, he suggested that birds relied on a series of familiar visual landmarks 
to navigate, merely increasing their altitude in order to see more distant landmarks. Other 
theorists turned to the vague and protean concept of instinct, shrugging their shoulders 
and concluding that birds simply possessed a “homing instinct” that required no further 
explanation.  
Watson, however, was unconvinced. Viguier’s magnetic theory and Reynaud’s 
contrepied theory were too speculative, unsupported as they were by convincing 
experimental evidence. Furthermore, they were centered on the homing pigeon, a 
domesticated species that required careful breeding and intensive training in order to 
                                                
9 The five “Aristotelian senses” being vision, hearing, touch, olfaction, and taste. The invocation of a “sixth 
sense” is reminiscent of early-modern explanations of bat orientation by some mysterious ability. 
10 Camille Viguier, “Le sens de l'orientation et ses organes chez les animaux et chez l'homme,” Revue 
Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, Vol. 14 (1882): 1-36. Aside from a few publications, there is 
very little record of Viguier or his work. 
11 Gabriel Reynaud, “The Orientation of Birds” [Translated], Bird Lore, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Aug. 1900): 101-
108. 
12 Pierre Hachet-Souplet, “Quelques experiences nouvelles sur les pigeons voyageurs,” 6th Congrès 
International de Psychologie (1909): 663-673. 
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achieve such feats of navigation. Hachet-Souplet’s visual landmark theory was more 
credible, but it could not account for homing across vast distances where no landmarks 
were visible, such as journeys on the open ocean. A simple calculation revealed that due 
to the curvature of the earth, birds would have to fly to unattainable heights in order to 
see distant landmarks.  
To simplify the problem of studying migration, Watson designed a series of 
artificial homing experiments using two species of oceanic birds, noddy and sooty terns 
(Anous stolidus and Onychoprion fuscatus, respectively). Successful experiments would 
require a comprehensive understanding of the birds and their way of life, and so Watson 
spent May and June of 1907 in the Dry Tortugas meticulously studying the birds’ nesting 
and feeding “instincts.”13 In the early-twentieth century, the protean concept of instinct 
had become rather capacious after several decades of post-Darwinian biology and 
psychology. To some it meant the set of behaviors displayed by a particular species, and 
thus it was used phylogenetically. In the naturalist and British comparative psychology 
traditions, it typically meant those innate behaviors that animals were capable of 
exhibiting without learning. And for Watson, as for Jacques Loeb and other reductionist 
physiologists, it signified behavior that was seemingly impulsive or automatic, triggered 
by some external—or perhaps internal—stimulus.14  
Watson’s experiments, first conducted in 1907 on Bird Key, entailed removing 
birds from their nests and shipping them in covered crates to increasingly greater 
                                                
13 In studying the impulsivity of the terns’ feeding instinct, for example, Watson found that they ate only 
live minnows that skipped above the water. 
14 On the meanings of instinct, see: Robert Boakes, From Darwin to Behaviourism: Psychology and the 
Minds of Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 204-206. 
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distances in order to measure their ability to return home from unfamiliar territory.15 
Noddies and sooties were ideal experimental subjects for several reasons. For one, they 
spent most of the year along the shores of the Caribbean islands, gathering each May by 
the tens of thousands on Bird Key to mate, socialize, and rear offspring. Thus they 
existed in large numbers, and had the added benefit of being relatively easy to catch. 
Also, Bird Key lies at the northernmost point of their natural range. This meant that all of 
the territory north of the Tortugas was almost certainly unfamiliar to the birds—an ideal 
condition for homing experiments. Finally, they were strongly incentivized during 
brooding season to return as quickly as possible to their nests in order to protect their 
offspring; homing experiments could thus take advantage of this instinct. One potential 
setback, however, was their refusal to eat anything other than live minnows, to which 
they were instinctually adapted. Keeping the birds healthy in captivity was thus a difficult 
task and resulted in several failed experiments wherein birds died or could not fly due to 
their deteriorated condition.16  
Toward the end of his time on Bird Key, after weeks of painstaking work in the 
heat, Watson carried out his initial homing experiments. He first sent pairs of birds into 
territory that was assumed to be familiar to them (to the east and south of Bird Key). 
These birds had no trouble returning from distances of 20, 44, 66, and 108 miles, 
although their slow return times suggested that they did not fly home directly. Homing 
                                                
15 The crates were covered with canvass so that the birds could not see any details of the external 
environment.  
16 John Watson, “How Animals Find their Way Home,” Harpers Monthly Magazine, Vol. 119, No. 713 
(Oct. 1909): 685-689; John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 35-38. 
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from familiar territory, therefore, seemed relatively unproblematic. The crucial question 
was how they would fare in unfamiliar territory.17  
Since brooding season was coming to an end in mid-June, Watson was only able 
to conduct one of these critical experiments before he had return to Hopkins. He arranged 
to have five birds (two sooties and three noddies) shipped far up the Atlantic coast to a 
release point off the shore of North Carolina. A caretaker escorted the birds on their 72-
hour journey into unfamiliar territory near Cape Hatteras, approximately 850 miles 
northeast of Bird Key. Watson carefully observed their nests for the next several days 
until amazingly, three of the five returned to their nests.18 He assumed that due to their 
feeding and flying habits, which necessitated that they remain near the shore, the birds 
had followed the Atlantic coast south and rounded the southern tip of Florida, rather than 
flying directly overland. From the results Watson concluded, “there can be no doubt that 
my birds were carried into a wholly unknown territory, and since they returned, the 
question as to how they did it is the one which it is hoped future experiment will 
answer…It seems to me that the ‘visual landmark’ theory of distant orientation is forever 
exploded by these tests. What we shall put in place of it is difficult to decide.”19  
Watson took the next steps in these investigations when he returned to Bird Key 
in the summer of 1910, arranging additional releases from New York harbor, Galveston 
(Texas), and Mobile (Alabama).20 These experiments, however, were mostly disastrous. 
The twelve birds sent to New York were weakened due to shipping delays that extended 
their captivity; none were ever seen back in the Tortugas. Along the Galveston route, 
                                                
17 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 46-47. 
18 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 46-47. Both the sooties 
returned on the fifth day, and one noddy returned several days after that. 
19 John Watson, “How Animals Find Their Way Home,” p. 688. 
20 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 47-52. 
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eight birds (four noddies and four sooties) were released in May of 1910 from a point 
approximately 461 miles northwest of Bird Key.21 One died en route, and only two of the 
remaining seven apparently made it back to their nests. Of the thirteen noddies and 
sooties slated for release in Galveston harbor, two died en route, and the rest never made 
it back. The results were even worse in the Mobile group: none of the fourteen birds 
returned to Bird Key.22 Despite these seemingly negative results, Watson maintained that 
homing from unfamiliar territory was still possible. However, he realized that the 
experiments required much healthier birds than he was able to maintain for the extended 
trips. A few years later he would try again, hoping to solve the puzzle of bird migration 
once and for all.  
Watson had much better luck in the summer of 1913 when Karl Lashley, a 
graduate student in psychology at Hopkins, joined him on Bird Key.23 Lashley proved to 
be excellent in the field, conducting important research on the visual sense of birds, 
particularly when it came to nest recognition and proximate orientation. He found that the 
bird’s ability to locate its nest was much more complex than he or Watson had previously 
suspected, as the relationship between the visual stimulus and the behavioral response 
was more intricate than a simple one-to-one mechanism. If proximate orientation were 
thus more complex than the bird simply seeing its nest and flying toward it, how much 
more complex must distant orientation be, Lashley supposed. In addition, he was a 
meticulous observer and caretaker, and he became adept at monitoring and maintaining 
                                                
21 Noddies and sooties must be fed live minnows in order to keep them healthy in captivity. This caused 
occasional difficulties, particularly with a group that was released in New York harbor, already in a 
weakened state. Watson estimated that the weak birds would have had to travel 1000 miles in order to find 
live minnows, which explained why none returned to Bird Key. 
22 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 47-52. 
23 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 52-58. Lashley’s doctoral 
advisor was zoologist and geneticist Herbert Spencer Jennings, but he also worked extensively with Watson 
during his time at Hopkins. 
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the birds’ health during the captivity required by homing experiments. Thus with 
Lashley’s aid, Watson was finally able to conduct successful experiments.24 
Their work yielded exciting, though inconclusive, results. In May of 1913, 
Lashley escorted twenty-four terns aboard a steamship bound for Galveston.25 Although 
he had to force-feed several of the birds in order to keep them properly nourished, most 
were released in fair condition. From the nearest release point, 418 miles northwest of 
Bird Key, two terns never returned. However, eight of ten birds successfully returned 
from a point 585 miles away; two birds released from 720 miles both returned; and three 
of ten released from 855 miles away returned. All told, slightly more than half of the 
twenty-four birds found their way home from unfamiliar territory.26 Although the homing 
performance was not perfect, it was significant enough to convince both Watson and 
Lashley that these birds did possess a definite homing ability, despite the absence of 
visual landmarks. They interpreted their results as follows: “Our contributions are 
admitted to be negative in character. The difficulty of explaining homing by current 
theories is seen to be great, but, while admitting this, we do not suggest the assumption of 
some new and mysterious sense. The task of explaining distant orientation is an 
experimental one, which must yield positive results as soon as proper methods are at 
hand.”27 Future work, they concluded, should extend homing experiments to additional 
bird species and in greater numbers, paying particular attention to controlling aspects of 
the birds’ sensory physiology.  
                                                
24 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 52-58. 
25 A few weeks prior, Lashley oversaw a disastrous trip to Mobile, where shipping delays, storms, and the 
inability to find live minnows resulted in yet another set of unhealthy homing subjects. He learned quickly 
how to better care for the birds, and future experiments were more favorable.  
26 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 54-58. 
27 John Watson and Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds,” p. 60. 
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Lashley’s work on proximate orientation had also revealed an important clue. 
According to his experiments on nesting terns, the visual mechanism that led birds to 
their individual nests consisted in a type of pattern recognition, wherein birds noticed 
certain spatial relationships between their nests and other conspicuous objects in the 
surrounding areas.28 Experiments showed that replacing a bird’s nest with an artificial 
one, for example, did not hinder its ability to locate the nest. However, moving their nests 
sideways merely a few inches confused the birds, rendering them unable to locate them. 
Lashley assumed that this resulted from the bird perceiving more holistic visual qualities 
of the objects surrounding their nests (which included hundreds of other nests in the 
immediate area).  
Lashley also found, however, that navigation to the nest was machinelike, as it 
entailed a set of coordinated, muscular movements, which he termed kinaesthetic habits. 
Birds did not simply fly directly to their nests upon seeing them; rather, they performed a 
ritualistic approach, which could be disrupted by the slightest rearranging of aspects of 
the visual environment. They first flew to a specific “alighting place,” which was within 
visual range of and oriented them toward their individual nests. Next, “after orientation is 
gained the path to the nest is determined largely by motor habits irrespective of the 
immediate visual stimuli.”29 Thus the slightest change to the arrangements of objects 
surrounding the nest would lead the bird to forego this ritual, and it would instead fly off 
from the alighting place with no apparent knowledge of the nest’s location.30 Further 
                                                
28 Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds [Notes on the Nesting Activities of the Noddy 
and Sooty Terns],” p. 61-83. 
29 Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds [Notes on the Nesting Activities of the Noddy 
and Sooty Terns],” p. 72. 
30 A confused bird, whose nest area had been altered in some important way, would often return to the 
alighting place after its failure to locate the nest. Lashley thought that this was a process of “re-orientation.” 
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work on the recognition of the young solidified Lashley’s view that the nature of visual 
stimuli and memory in birds was intricate. Recognition of the young, like nest 
localization, was also “the result of a complex of many sensory-motor reactions, not 
merely of a single type of stimulus.”31 
This discovery had an important influence on Lashley’s future psychological 
work.32 Despite the behaviorist trajectory that Watson took shortly after their work in the 
Tortugas, Lashley in his career maintained a broader view of psychology, incorporating 
behaviorist methodologies alongside theoretical insights from schools such as the 
German gestalt psychologists.33 For a brief time, his work with Watson on the 
conditioned reflex in 1915 convinced Lashley that behavioristic approaches were the best 
path forward in an objective psychology. In the 1920s, however, Lashley began to 
distance himself from behaviorism, while nevertheless maintaining that the properties of 
mind could be reduced to its physical components.34 He thus remained committed to a 
physiological view of psychology, which attempted to correlate the physical and 
                                                
31 Karl Lashley, “Homing and Related Activities of Birds [Notes on the Nesting Activities of the Noddy 
and Sooty Terns],” p. 79. 
32 In her social constructivist interpretation of Lashley and his career, historian Nadine Weidman focuses 
mainly on Lashley’s role in debates about hereditarianism. Although she does not analyze his work on bird 
navigation, my analysis of Lashley’s definition of instinct is consistent with Weidman’s view that Lashley 
struggled to find a middle ground between reductionism and holism in his consideration of animal behavior 
and instinct.  
33 In an address to Columbia University in 1913, Watson delivered his famous “behaviorist manifesto,” in 
which he argued that the subject of psychology was behavior, not consciousness or minds, and that the 
proper experimental method was the analysis of external, quantifiable behavior within a stimulus-response 
framework. The goal of psychology, he explained, was the prediction and control of behavior, and 
subjective concepts such as consciousness, along with unreliable methods such as introspection and 
anecdotalism, ought to be forever banished from the science. John Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist 
Views It,” Psychological Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Mar. 1913): 158-177. On Watson’s life, career, and the 
origins of behaviorism, see Kerry W. Buckley, Mechanical Man: John Broadus Watson and the Beginnings 
of Behaviorism (New York: The Guilford Press, 1989), especially p. 73-111. 
34 Nadine Weidman, Constructing Scientific Psychology, p. 44-46. See also: Karl Lashley, “The 
Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness II,” The Psychological Review, Vol. 30, No. 5 (Sep. 1923):  
329-353. 
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chemical mechanisms in the brain with more general behavioral phenomena.35 And 
whereas Watson would reject the very concept of consciousness, which was seemingly 
impossible to study in an objective fashion, Lashley instead came to see consciousness as 
a viable concept that was amenable to investigation in terms of the physical process of 
the brain.36 
Thus while Watson and Lashley could not provide a comprehensive explanation 
of bird migration, their collaborative work did clarify many of the problems that it 
entailed. By successfully executing homing experiments, they were able to show that 
birds could indeed return from unfamiliar territory, despite the fact that they were unable 
to explain how these feats were accomplished physiologically. Furthermore, their 
experiments could serve as a model for future investigations, as in the case of Griffin’s 
later work. And for Lashley especially, the research served as a foray into both 
methodological and conceptual problems in the physiological analysis of animal 
behavior. It also challenged him to think seriously about the problem of instinct; in future 
work, Lashley would attempt to remove some of the confusion surrounding animal 
behavior by investigating the physiology of sensory mechanisms, which for him were 
more precise categories of analysis than broad concepts such as instinct. His work with 
Griffin should similarly be viewed as part of Lashley’s general effort to explain complex 
behavioral phenomena by identifying specific sensory mechanisms that undergird those 
patterns of behavior. By the time Lashley was called upon to advise Griffin’s doctoral 
work in 1938, several decades of research in other areas of psychology had prevented 
                                                
35 As Nadine Weidman has argued, Lashley’s balancing of external behavior with inner nervous processes 
reflected the dual focuses of his two advisors, Herbert Spencer Jennings (internal) and John Watson 
(external). Nadine Weidman, Constructing Scientific Psychology, p. 23-47.  
36 Karl Lashley, “Persistent Problems in the Evolution of Mind,” The Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol. 24, 
No. 1 (Mar. 1949): 28-42. 
 135 
him from returning to the problem of bird navigation, but his ideas about the complex 
nature of visual stimuli made themselves known in Griffin’s work. 
 
Griffin’s Work on Bird Navigation 
Despite Watson’s and Lashley’s success in experimentally defining the problem 
of homing by 1913, over the next twenty-five years little progress was made beyond that 
initial work. As evolutionary biologist and ornithologist Ernst Mayr explained in 1937, 
bird migration and homing remained “one of the greatest unsolved puzzles of modern 
biology.”37 In Mayr’s view, the three most likely physiological explanations were vision, 
kinaesthesia (or “retracing”), and magnetic sensitivity (the same three possibilities 
specified by Watson in his 1913 assessment). Each theory was problematic in its own 
way, especially the magnetic and retracing theories, since birds did not seem to possess 
organs sensitive to magnetism, and the retracing theory required a kinaesthetic memory 
that was much more precise than that which birds seemed to possess.38 Mayr in fact could 
point to only a few significant advances in the experimental analysis of homing since 
Watson and Lashley. An exception was German ornithologist Werner Rüppell’s work on 
starlings and swallows, which Mayr cited as the most important homing research in the 
previous twenty-five years.39 Similarly, Scottish ornithologist Arthur Landsborough 
Thomson’s (1890-1977) contemporary survey of migration studies listed only a handful 
                                                
37 Ernst Mayr, “The Homing of Birds,” Bird-Lore, Vol. 39 (Jan.-Feb. 1937): 5-13. 
38 Ernst Mayr, “The Homing of Birds,” p. 10-11. 
39 Werner Rüppell, “Heimfindeversuche mit Staren 1934,” Journal für Ornithologie, Vol. 83, No. 3 (1935): 
462-524; Werner Rüppell, “Heimfindeversuche mit Staren und Schwalben 1935,” Journal für 
Ornithologie, Vol. 84, No. 2 (1936): 180-198; Werner Rüppell, “Heimfindeversuche mit Staren, 
Rauchschwalben, Wendehälsen, Rotrückenwürgern und Habichten [1936],” Journal für Ornithologie, Vol. 
85, No. 1 (1937): 120-135. 
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of significant attempts to solve the problem of homing.40 Among the more important 
developments, according to Thomson, was Canadian ornithologist William Rowan’s 
work on seasonal directionality and induced migratory behavior.41 And like Mayr, 
Thomson identified Rüppell’s homing work as particularly important, despite the fact that 
his efforts had not led to a full resolution of the problem.42  
Rüppell’s experiments in the mid-1930s showed that starlings and swallows had a 
definite homing ability, but his results were difficult to explain using a visual theory of 
orientation because of the relationship between the distance of displacements and the 
speed of the birds’ returns.43 The visual exploration theory necessitated that the amount 
of unfamiliar territory that birds would have to explore should increase according to the 
square of the distance between the release points and their home nests: tripling the 
straight-line distance, for example, would increase the area of unfamiliar territory by a 
factor of nine. Thus if one assumed that birds flew at relatively constant speeds while 
exploring unfamiliar territory, then the time it should take them to return should increase 
exponentially as well. Rüppell’s data showed, however, that the return time increased 
arithmetically.44 The results seemed to imply that birds possessed some other mechanism 
than visual exploration that provided them with a sense of the home direction or location: 
                                                
40 A. Landsborough Thomson, “Recent Progress in the Study of Bird-Migration: A Review of the 
Literature, 1926-1935,” Ibis, Vol. 27 (1936): 472-530. Most of Thomson’s review concerns the general 
studies of migration that apparently flourished during the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in Germany. These, 
however, mainly concerned features other than homing or the mechanism of orientation, such as migration 
routes, seasonal periodicity, comparative studies of migratory species, and more general behavioral 
characteristics of migratory birds. In a brief section on homing research, Thomson additionally cites the 
work of a few other zoologists as well, but Rüppell’s was the most extensive. 
41 A. Landsborough Thomson, “Recent Progress in Bird-Migration,” p. 506-508.  
42 A. Landsborough Thomson, “Recent Progress in Bird-Migration,” p. 516-517. 
43 Werner Rüppell, “Heimfindeversuche mit Staren, Rauchschwalben, Wendehälsen, Rotrückenwürgern 
und Habichten [1936],” Journal für Ornithologie, Vol. 85, No. 1 (1937): 120-135. 
44 Mayr, “The Homing of Birds,” p. 10-11. 
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“eine Sinnes-Empfindung für die Lage der Heimat,” according to Rüppell.45 He therefore 
concluded that more experimental work on the physiology of homing 
(“Heimfindeversuche”) was thus necessary to determine the precise nature of the sense of 
direction that enabled birds to navigate from unfamiliar territory.  
Thus when Griffin approached the problem in 1938, there were several suggestive 
lines of inquiry about the mechanism of homing, but few definite answers. And although 
he retrospectively characterized his decision to take up the problem of migration as an 
unpopular one within Harvard’s biology department, it was clearly a promising and 
legitimate research question with which other scientists were grappling. Biologists such 
as Mayr clearly saw value in taking up the problem: “The study of homing is a promising 
field for the enthusiastic bird student.”46 And so with Lashley as his advisor, Griffin 
began working on the problem of migration and homing as a graduate student in the 
spring of 1938.  
Like Rüppell and Mayr, Griffin was primarily interested in the natural behavior of 
birds—migrations in particular—but he took Watson’s and Lashley’s lead in using 
artificial homing experiments as a way to simplify the problem. His approach was strictly 
confined to questions of sensory physiology: ignoring the problematic concept of 
“instinct,” he focused on the sensory mechanisms and environmental cues that were 
necessary for homing.47 Griffin’s initial experiments with Leach’s petrels took place in 
the summer of 1938 off the shore of the Bowdoin Scientific Station on Kent’s Island 
                                                
45 Werner Rüppell, “Heimfindeversuche mit Staren, Rauchschwalben, Wendehälsen, Rotrückenwürgern 
und Habichten [1936],” p. 135. 
46 Ernst Mayr, “The Homing of Birds,” p. 5. 
47 He did of course have to pay attention to specific aspects of behavior in order to conduct the experiments. 
For example, if petrels are removed from their nests before eggs are laid, they will almost certainly not 
attempt to return. It is therefore crucial to capture them during brooding season, which for the petrels of 
Kent’s Island, is in early July.  
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(New Brunswick). Enlisting the help of cargo ship crews to release banded birds at 
different distances and locations offshore, he assessed homing performance by two 
metrics: speed and percent of returns to the nest.  
Griffin’s work between June and August of 1938 consisted of five distinct 
experiments, most of which utilized several different experimental groups along with 
controls.48 Because sensory mechanisms were his primary focus, he designed variations 
in the experimental conditions and handling of birds in order to isolate the senses used in 
homing. For example, in his third experiment he designed tests for two popular, yet 
unconfirmed, theories of distant homing: magnetism and the kinaesthetic sense, or 
directional memory. Twenty birds were released 280 miles from their nests after being 
rotated in their cages atop a phonograph on the outward journey. The rotations were 
intended to disrupt the mechanical sensations of the bird’s inner ear labyrinth, which was 
thought to play an important role in directional memory. A second experimental group of 
twenty birds was exposed to a powerful electromagnet before being released. This, 
Griffin supposed, ought to reveal whether the bird’s ability to sense magnetism played a 
role in homing. A control group of twenty untreated birds was released at the same time, 
and Griffin found that neither the phonograph nor the electromagnet had a significant 
impact on the return rates of the birds. In fact, the magnetized birds curiously found their 
way home slightly faster. He could offer no explanation for this result, although the 
difference was not statistically significant.49  
Apparently vision was not a significant factor in homing either, as the return rates 
for birds displaced out of range of visual landmarks did not vary significantly from the 
                                                
48 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Leach’s Petrels,” The Auk, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Jan. 1940): 61-74. 
49 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Leach’s Petrels,” p. 63-71. 
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rates of birds that were released within sight of the shore. In fact, in nearly all of his 
experiments, at least fifty percent of the birds eventually found their way home. 
Furthermore, birds released from more distant points homed about as fast as those 
released closer to their nests. This seemed to indicate that birds did not wander randomly 
home, since more distant releases should require exponentially larger areas of unfamiliar 
territory that the birds would have to explore.50 What explained the ability to home from 
unfamiliar territory? Essentially, these initial investigations left Griffin perplexed. 
However, the experience taught him how to design, execute, and evaluate future homing 
experiments. And the fact that his initial results were inconclusive indicated that it would 
be a worthwhile subject for his doctoral thesis. 
The bulk of that doctoral work took place during the following summers between 
1939 and 1941. With Lashley’s guidance, Griffin conducted additional homing 
experiments using common terns and herring gulls on Penikese Island in Buzzard’s Bay 
(Massachusetts).51 Over the course of these investigations, birds were shipped as far away 
as Chicago and Savannah, constituting the largest displacements that he tested. Griffin 
also realized that in order to secure any firm knowledge about homing, he would have to 
track the birds as they attempted to return from unfamiliar territory. Only by direct 
observation, he reasoned, could one solve the problem of homing, and he therefore 
arranged to follow birds by airplane for several experiments.52 He was evidently quite 
inspired by the airplane observations, explaining that “there is an indefinable feeling in 
                                                
50 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Leach’s Petrels,” p. 72-73. 
51 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” Bird-Banding, Vol. 14, 
No. 1/2 (Jan-Apr. 1943): 7-33. Griffin’s research was supported by a private donor, the Harvard Society of 
Fellows, Woods Hole, and Harvard physiologist Alexander Forbes, a professor in the medical school. The 
article was based on parts of his doctoral thesis. 
52 He was only able to follow a few homing flights, but several years later he expanded this method of 
studying homing. He also purchased a small aircraft, which he learned to pilot. 
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watching a bird from the air that one is in the bird’s own medium and can understand its 
problems and behavior far better than would ever be possible from the ground.”53 
Over the course of three consecutive summers, 176 herring gulls were released at 
distances ranging from 15 to 872 miles: 93% returned successfully. Griffin found that 
gulls were generally successful at homing from both familiar and unfamiliar territory.54 
In familiar territory, 100% returned from distances up to 300 miles, and 80% returned 
from 870 miles.55 From unfamiliar territory, the gulls were still fairly successful, 
although they homed better from coastal, as opposed to inland, release points: from 
releases in unknown coastal territory, 100% returned from 300 miles, and 87% returned 
from distances up to 445 miles. From unknown inland territory, 92% returned from 
distances up to 300 miles, 60% returned from 540 miles, and 67% retuned from 870 
miles away. Thus Griffin found that gulls could home very well from both familiar and 
unfamiliar territory, although releasing them in unfamiliar inland territory negatively 
affected their homing. The fact that the nature of the territory affected the gulls’ ability to 
return was a curious finding, and Griffin would attempt to make sense of this problem in 
future experiments. 
The terns did not fare as well: 42.5% of the 80 birds definitely returned to their 
nests from distances between 94 and 404 miles away. Of those released in known 
territory, 100% returned from 102 miles away, 60% returned from 234 miles away, and 
56% returned from 404 miles away.56 The results were notably worse when terns were 
                                                
53 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” p. 12. 
54 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” p. 13-30. The layout of 
Griffin’s data charts is particularly unclear, although it is possible to make sense of the average return data 
on page 19 by cross-referencing it with specific information on pages 13-15 and pages 27-30. 
55 Griffin did not provide specific numbers for the birds used in these releases. 
56 The total percent of returns was 68.4% (13 of 19 birds in total). 
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released into unfamiliar territory: 80% returned from 90 miles away, 30% returned from 
about 230 miles away, 24% returned from about 400 miles away. Unlike the gulls, the 
terns’ homing was starkly better in familiar versus unfamiliar territory, and the percent of 
returns consistently decreased as they were released farther into unfamiliar territory. 
Their homing ability, however, was not affected by inland versus coastal releases in 
unfamiliar territory. Griffin concluded that terns’ relatively poor homing performance 
was probably due to several factors, including the fact that gulls preferred soaring to 
flapping, and could therefore conserve energy while riding thermal updrafts. In addition, 
the feeding habits of terns were more specialized than gulls. This may have led them to 
become more inclined to explore local territory for the purpose of finding food, at the 
expense of their ability to home from unfamiliar territory where food was scarcer.57  
In general, the speed of returns varied greatly in his experiments, indicating that 
nearly all birds either deviated from a straight course or took long breaks during flight. 
Very few birds returned home from either familiar or unfamiliar territory at speeds even 
approaching their known velocities. Birds released close to home, in fact, returned more 
slowly relative to those shipped farther away. Griffin wondered if this meant that 
orientation required a minimum amount of time that was relatively constant and 
independent of distance. However, three herring gulls did show “marked improvement” 
in their speeds when they were released from the same location a second time (in 1940 
and 1941).58 This indicated that the birds had probably become familiar with at least 
some aspect of the formerly unfamiliar territory, or had in some way become more adept 
at homing, although Griffin could not say which. In addition, gulls that were released in 
                                                
57 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” p. 20. 
58 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” p. 20-22. 
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favorable weather conditions—replete with thermal updrafts—tended to home quicker, 
due to their inclination to soar along the thermals. Storms inevitably slowed or prevented 
the returns of both gulls and terns. And finally, birds released near unfamiliar coastlines 
tended to follow the coast, even if that took them farther from their goal; coasts thus 
seemed to be an important environmental cue, yet this insight did not clarify the problem 
of distant homing. The initial results led Griffin to conclude tentatively that birds 
probably found their way home by a process of random wandering, or exploration, until 
they reached familiar territory.59  
Griffin was able to test by direct observation, albeit in a limited fashion, the 
random exploration hypothesis. The first method involved using a telescope to follow 
birds after their release, but this failed to yield any helpful data since most birds released 
on land tended to alight upon the first body of water they reached. Also, the telescope 
was only good for tracking up to two miles. Following by aircraft proved more fruitful, 
and using this pioneering method Griffin was able to track the initial homing flights of 
eight gulls. Although the maximum distance he was able to follow a single bird was 37.5 
miles, the results of these observations were useful. He found that rather than flying 
initially in the direction of home, the gulls did indeed tend to scatter in random directions 
before wandering. Furthermore, the direction of their scattering did not correlate with the 
time it took each individual to find its way home. Therefore, the airplane observations 
seemed to indicate that birds did in fact use some form of random exploration to find 
their way home.60 
                                                
59 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” p. 31-32. 
60 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” p. 24-27. 
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Like his previous work on petrels, these experiments raised more questions than 
they answered. For Griffin, the data seemed to indicate that birds simply “scatter in any 
direction from the release point and return only when they encounter by chance some part 
of the area with which they are already familiar.”61 Nothing necessarily indicated that 
birds flew directly toward home upon being released, and the percent and speed of 
returns were consistent with the theory of random scattering. Those that happened to 
choose the correct initial direction may have returned home quicker than those that chose 
incorrectly, but Griffin could not be certain of this until he conducted more airplane 
observations.  
Griffin thus became convinced—under Lashley’s influence—that homing was 
more complex than a matter of simple sensory mechanisms. Unlike his experiments with 
petrels, which included extensive testing for orientation by direct vision (landmarks 
visible at a distance), kinaesthetic memory, and magnetic sensation, Griffin only 
conducted one sensory isolation experiment on gulls and terns—a rather superficial test 
for kinaesthesia. These four birds, transported in an unconscious state, were able to return 
successfully from familiar territory.62 Griffin was unable to arrange this test from 
unfamiliar territory, but he assumed that if the kinaesthetic sense played a role in homing 
at all, then it should be obvious based on experiments in familiar territory. He did not test 
any birds for magnetic sensitivity, thinking that the evidence in its favor did not warrant 
further exploration. First, birds possessed very few “ferrimagnetic” substances in their 
tissues, and consequently they were almost wholly unaffected by magnetic fields. 
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62 Donald Griffin, “Homing Experiments with Herring Gulls and Common Terns,” p. 30. Griffin noted that 
two of the anaesthetized birds returned much slower due to being released in a weak condition and in poor 
weather.  
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Perhaps more importantly, Griffin reasoned that even if birds did possess a kind of 
physiological compass, this would not provide them with any information about which 
direction was home.63 That is, when carried into unfamiliar territory, birds might be able 
to determine which direction was north; however, unless they knew the exact route of 
their outbound journey (and thus which direction they came from), that information 
would not be of much use in guiding them home.64 
Homing by way of visual exploration thus became Griffin’s preferred hypothesis, 
since he considered it to be the simplest explanation of his results. When he synthesized 
his data with that of other scientists, including Watson and Lashley, Rüppell, and others, 
he found that random exploration, as a probabilistic model, seemed to make sense of their 
data as well.65 The theories that had been previously proposed to explain migration—
namely vision, kinaesthesia, and magnetism—had made little progress in solving the 
problem. Instead, Griffin suggested, perhaps exploration as the result of radial scattering 
or in an expanding series of large spirals—which could be efficiently used to survey large 
areas of unfamiliar territory—could explain homing from unfamiliar territory. For 
example, if one were to assume that Rüppell’s starlings and swallows scattered randomly 
in a radial fashion, then quicker returns could be explained by assuming that those birds 
happened by chance to choose an initial direction that pointed them toward familiar 
territory.66 Therefore, when Rüppell increased the distance of his releases, the return 
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64 Donald Griffin, “The Sensory Basis of Bird Navigation,” p. 25. 
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66 Donald Griffin, “The Sensory Basis of Bird Navigation,” p. 22. 
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times would still vary arithmetically rather than geometrically, since those birds that 
returned quickly could simply have taken flight in a fortuitous direction.  
Despite the exploration theory’s ability to account for the results of several 
homing experiments, Griffin realized that it did not represent a total solution to the 
problem, since some of the data indicated particularly quick returns from unfamiliar 
territory. “Exploration may play in important part in the homing of many birds, 
particularly when speed or per cent returns are low; but it does not seem capable of 
accounting for all the recorded cases.”67 If these birds returned via exploring, then they 
did so quickly and efficiently. And although Griffin was skeptical of the evidence that 
indicated direct or mostly direct routes from unfamiliar territory, he took it seriously.68  
 
Turning to Ecology 
When his working hypothesis of random wandering and exploration had difficulty 
accounting for data such as direct returns from unfamiliar territory, Griffin returned his 
focus to the sensory physiology of birds.69 However, rather than looking for a specific 
sensory mechanism that correlated with an explicit environmental cue, he looked for 
more general environmental cues that birds could use for orientation and navigation. 
Thus he began to wonder if orientation depended on the perception of “ecological cues” 
that had yet to be considered.70 For example, birds “might know the relationship between 
                                                
67 Donald Griffin, “The Sensory Basis of Bird Navigation,” p. 24. 
68 Donald Griffin, “The Sensory Basis of Bird Navigation,” p. 22. He specifically cited Rüppell’s account 
of three starlings that seemed to take a straight course home. Although this was a tiny sample, Griffin took 
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mit aufgezogen Staren,” Vogelzug, Vol. 9 (1938): 18-22. 
69 The most compelling evidence of direct returns came in experiments on Manx shearwaters conducted by 
British ornithologists David Lack and R.M. Lockley: David Lack and R.M. Lockley, “Skokholm Bird 
Observatory Homing Experiments,” British Birds, Vol. 31 (1938): 242-248. 
70 Donald Griffin, “The Sensory Basis of Bird Navigation,” p. 18. 
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geographical features such as river systems and coastlines near their home and the 
direction of sunrise, or sunset, or conceivably of other celestial landmarks.”71 Knowledge 
of these relationships and of “other ecological and topographical regions” would permit a 
bird to orient itself in unfamiliar territory by following streams, for example, which 
flowed downward toward the coastline.72 Thus Griffin suggested that the relationship of 
the physical stimulus to the bird’s perception was more complex than simple cues, visual 
or otherwise.  
With Lashley’s guidance, Griffin began to pursue further the idea that birds 
perceived structural, or environmental, relationships in their landscapes, which helped 
them acquire information about where to go. For example, he suggested that migration 
might be considered an instinctual behavior—“in the meaning defined by Lashley 
(1938)”—insofar as it was guided by the bird’s use of environmental and geographical 
cues to navigate its course.73 In that 1938 essay, cited by Griffin, Lashley argued that the 
nature of the visual stimulus, rather than being simple, instead involved the perception of 
complex holistic qualities that were reminiscent of forms in Gestalt theory.74 Lashley 
further explained that “psychological theories based upon the relations of stimulus and 
response remain sheer nonsense so long as the stimulus is defined only as whatever the 
experimenter puts in front of the animal…In any complex situation the true basis of 
reaction can be discovered only by systematic variation of all the parts and properties of 
the supposed stimulus.”75 As a consequence, simplistic conceptions of stimulus and 
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response failed to capture that which was “so complex and precise in its execution that 
we can only stand aghast at the inadequacy of our concepts of its mechanism.”76 In 
essence, his concept of instinct thus complemented its classical definition: “the faculty 
which animals have instead of intellect which yet make their behavior seem intelligent.”77  
Lashley’s ideas about animal instinct and perception shaped how Griffin 
interpreted the results of his experiments. Thus Griffin came to understand orientation 
and navigation in terms of the bird’s perception of more general environmental cues: 
“The combined use of familiar landmarks, together with simple geographical, 
meteorological, and ecological relationships such as those described above seems more 
reasonable as an explanation of migration and homing than the postulate of a new sense 
organ.”78 These new ideas also began to shift Griffin’s understanding of what constituted 
‘familiar’ territory. Before this point he had understood it to mean that which the bird had 
visited before and remembered; thus the bird recognized landmarks encountered in its 
previous travels and oriented itself toward more distant goals based on those. In 
developing these new ideas about exploration, Griffin postulated that a bird might 
recognize certain types of landscapes or environmental cues; even if it had no visual 
memory of a particular river system, for example, it might recognize that river systems in 
general tended to flow toward coasts. And previous homing experiments had suggested 
that birds tended to home faster the nearer they were to coasts, since they were often 
more familiar with coastal territory. These environmental cues also included weather and 
wind patterns that were characteristic of certain environments, and the bird could 
leverage its familiarity with such cues in order to navigate unfamiliar territory more 
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effectively. Griffin explained his ideas directly in a letter to his colleague Dave Davis, 
who also worked on migration:  
The ideas are very vague and need much more work to confirm them before they 
would have any significance, but this is it in brief: that birds recognize air masses 
by stability (presence or absence of updrafts), temperature, humidity, visibility, 
cloud types, and possibly other factors, and also “know” that within each air mass 
there are strong tendencies for prevailing winds […] Translating this into a 
herring gull’s point of view, clear cool days with good soaring occurs when the 
winds are from the land towards the coast. If he flies inland on such a day he gets 
back by soaring and letting himself be carried downwind; if he is shipped in a 
crate to Lake Erie and finds such weather he also soars downwind and eventually 
reaches the coast, much of which he knows from previous wanderings and 
migrations. This is of course all stated in terms of local conditions and one 
species, but this sort of explanation seems much more reasonable to me than 
magnetic senses, etc.79 
 
Although in this passage Griffin focuses mostly on the perception of weather patterns, he 
conceived that birds would similarly perceive visible aspects of their environments 
(wooded areas, river systems) in order to “know” about where to fly in unfamiliar 
territory. While little direct evidence pointed toward a full solution, the breakdown of 
simpler, mechanistic possibilities opened up the creative space for Griffin to develop 
these ideas. 
Griffin received his PhD in the spring of 1942, and planned to extend his study of 
bird migration in order to better understand the problem. The next step was practical and 
technical: he planned to follow birds from airplanes, chart their exact routes, and attempt 
to correlate homing performance with the birds’ ability to perceive more general features 
of, or types of landscapes along their routes. However, the United States’ entry into 
World War II and Griffin’s subsequent years of military research delayed this project. At 
the war’s conclusion, Griffin decided that it was best to use the remainder of his Junior 
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Fellowship at Harvard to explore bat echolocation. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, his wartime investigations sparked new insights about echolocation, and so after 
the war he returned to his first love, bats. Then in July of 1946, he took a job at Cornell, 
where he became an assistant professor of physiology. His first year was frantically busy, 
as he prepared to teach courses in general and comparative physiology, but in the summer 
of 1947, Griffin was finally able to return to the problem of bird navigation. 
 By this time, Griffin had fully confirmed his view of bird migration as both a 
physiological and an ecological problem.80 That is, he thought that birds navigated not by 
a “unique sensory mechanism, but rather by an ability to perceive environmental cues 
which are within the scope of the receptors common to all higher vertebrates.”81 When 
displaced into unfamiliar territory, birds simply explored until they came upon a familiar 
landmark, or an environmental cue that might lead them toward familiar territory: “When 
landmarks (rivers, coastlines, mountain ranges, etc.), prevailing winds, or the direction of 
the sun are not available as guiding influences, or when birds are released in unknown 
territory where the environmental cues have no meaning, they may well reach their goal 
by a process of exploration.”82 Since nearly all homing data could be explained by 
assuming that birds did not fly directly home from unfamiliar territory, but instead 
explored large areas before finding their way home, Griffin needed to follow birds in 
order to chart and to make sense of their explorations. He sought to discover whether 
there were structural or environmentally determined patterns to their exploratory flights, 
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and so once again he designed homing experiments from unfamiliar territory that he 
could follow by plane. By this point, Griffin had learned to pilot the aircraft himself, and 
in the experiments he was joined by Cornell graduate student Raymond J. Hock.  
Gannets were well suited for homing experiments, since they spent most of their 
time near the shore. Any releases from inland points, therefore, would place the birds into 
what was almost certainly unfamiliar territory. Furthermore, with large, white bodies, and 
a 5-6 foot wingspan, they were easy to spot from low-flying airplanes. Finally, they 
gathered in large numbers on Bonaventure Island in Quebec, not too far from Ithaca. 
Griffin and Hock captured several gannets and transported them in covered cages to the 
Caribou, Maine regional airport, near the border of Canada. The plan was to track each 
bird from 2,000 feet above and to plot its course. After takeoff, an assistant at the airport 
hangar released the gannets one at a time, and Griffin and Hock tracked them for as long 
as they could.83 Many of the flights were cut short by losing sight of the birds, and the 
rest were concluded due to loss of daylight or fuel concerns. 
They followed nine birds in total, and released eight controls that were not 
followed. The gannets were apparently undisturbed by the plane when it flew above, and 
the controls, released from the same point, ensured that the presence of the aircraft had 
not fundamentally skewed the results.84 Both the observed and control groups performed 
similarly: about 60% of them found their way home in times ranging from 24-100 hours. 
The similarity in performance gave Griffin confidence that the birds had not been 
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disturbed by the aircraft. While tracking, he paid close attention to the local topography, 
including streams, valleys, and wooded areas. He also kept detailed notes about the 
weather conditions, including the direction of the wind at the time of release. The best 
homing performances, they found, were in favorable weather conditions—clear skies, 
winds blowing in the home direction, and plenty of updrafts (since gannets, like gulls, 
prefer soaring).85  
Griffin described in some detail the paths of tracked birds that homed 
successfully, noting for example, whether the bird’s behavior changed upon encountering 
new topographical features. In one telling instance, they followed a gannet that did seem 
to indicate some sort of environmental recognition. This bird flew east from the airport 
toward the Gulf of St. Lawrence for about five hours. As Griffin and Hock first arrived at 
the Gulf’s inlets, “at almost the same moment…the bird rather suddenly dropped to 
below 2,000 feet. Probably the ocean was visible to the gannet as soon as to us…As it 
approached the shore, the bird turned gradually north and dropped still lower...to 
investigate the salt water. It seemed as though it recognized the ocean, for it certainly 
altered its flight on approaching it.”86 Their observation was cut short, but the bird did 
eventually return successfully, albeit it in an amount of time indicating that it did not fly 
home directly. While this observation was hardly a smoking gun, it did indicate that birds 
reacted to changes within environments that were probably unfamiliar to them. 
On the whole, however, the paths taken by gannets did not seem to follow a fixed 
structure, nor were they greatly affected by topographical or environmental elements. 
When plotted on a map, none of the gannets showed evidence of spiral exploration either. 
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Rather, the birds took seemingly random paths and were only able to return after dozens 
of hours of exploration. This seemed to confirm the exploratory theory. One important 
finding, however, was that the gannets that reached the coast relatively quickly found 
their way home sooner. Griffin supposed that this probably was due to the fact that they 
were most accustomed to life on the shores, and had come into contact with familiar 
territory once they started following the coasts. The experiments, however, provided few 
clear answers. As Griffin explained, “one salient and simple fact emerges from a study of 
these data – the gannets did not fly at all directly home.”87 Essentially, he was back to 
square one.  
When Griffin began his migration research in 1938, he looked for simple sensory 
mechanisms to explain homing. This was in accordance with the mechanistic framework 
of animal behavior that he had learned in his undergraduate years at Harvard. With 
Lashley’s guidance in further experiments, he came to see the bird’s use of environmental 
cues as an exploratory process, rather than one based on stimulus-response mechanisms. 
Thus by the mid 1940s Griffin’s approach to the problem of homing and navigation had 
become equal parts physiological and ecological. Although he still understood the ability 
to be a matter of sensory physiology—that is, not one of cognition or consciousness—he 
began to expand his view of what constituted an environmental cue, and how birds 
explored their environments using the traditional senses. His new understanding of 
environmental cues included holistic phenomena such as general weather patterns, and 
structural features of unfamiliar landscapes such as river systems and coastlines. Rather 
than positing some mysterious sense, he argued that birds merely explored unfamiliar 
territory and looked for general features that might lead them homeward.  
                                                
87 Donald Griffin and Raymond Hock, “Airplane Observations of Homing Birds,” p. 190. 
 153 
For Griffin, the exploratory theory did not constitute a complication of the 
problem; rather, he considered it to be the most conservative interpretation of his 
experimental data. Not only did the theory make sense of his data, it did not require 
positing unknown, or unproven sensory mechanisms. For him, this conservative approach 
constituted good science: it restrained the imagination, attempted to account for animal 
behavior using known sensory mechanisms, and restricted the interpretation of 
experiments to the simplest explanation supported by the data. As a consequence, Griffin 
was very surprised in the late 1940s to learn of a new theory, which once again claimed 
to explain orientation as a simple matter of magnetic sensation.  
 
Magnetic Orientation and the Yeagley Controversy  
For Griffin, the problem of bird navigation became even more urgent when a new 
theory of magnetic homing in pigeons was proposed by physicist Henry Yeagley in 1947. 
Griffin had actually done preliminary research on pigeons upon arriving at Cornell in the 
fall of 1946, although that work had failed to shed any new light on the problem of 
navigation.88 Over the course of these brief investigations, however, Griffin began 
seeking the advice of Yeagley, an expert on pigeons at Pennsylvania State College.89 
During the war, Yeagley had become closely associated with the Army Signal Corps’ 
pigeon group in Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. The head of the pigeon group, Major Otto 
Meyer, advocated Yeagley’s wartime work, which was supported by military dollars. 
                                                
88 Like his work on gannets, Griffin tried to determine if pigeons used environmental cues to navigate from 
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440. 
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Griffin first wrote to Yeagley in the fall of 1946 to inquire about purchasing 
pigeons for homing experiments at Cornell. In turn, Yeagley revealed that during the war 
he had found a solution to the problem of orientation that involved the perception of the 
Coriolis force and terrestrial magnetism: “Our work started in 1943 with a proposed 
theory involving the vertical component of the earth’s magnetic field intensity and the 
Coriolis effect associated with the earth’s rotation…Because of the military importance 
of the findings, our reports have all been of the restricted class and were released only to 
the Army Service Forces of the Army Signal Corps.”90 Yeagley explained that it was now 
time to go public with his findings, since the war had ended and his results were “very 
strongly indicative of the validity of the theory.”91 Griffin was intrigued, but skeptical. 
Magnetic theories were hardly new, and nearly all the evidence he had come across 
militated against it. He wrote to Yeagley a few days later, explaining that his initial 
experiments on pigeons seemed to indicate that their homing could be explained on the 
basis of familiarity with landmarks, which they acquired during training exercises. 
Perhaps this ability could be accounted for “on the basis of learning of other sensory cues 
such as magnetic ones,” but Griffin doubted they were necessary.92 Nevertheless, much 
of Yeagley’s theory depended on arcane physical calculations, and so Griffin decided to 
withhold further judgment until the work was published. 
Their correspondence trailed off shortly thereafter, and Griffin ceased most of his 
pigeon work in 1947 when he had the opportunity to study gannets. As he explained, 
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gannets were more intriguing since they were naturally migratory and undomesticated: 
“the studies with wild birds are somewhat more closer to my interests, and I think they 
will be more profitable from my point of view.”93 Then in the late-summer of 1947, 
Griffin went to the Arctic Research Laboratory in Pt. Barrow Alaska on a grant from the 
Office of Naval Research. In addition to basic research on physiological 
thermodynamics, he conducted homing experiments on arctic terns and plovers.94 While 
there, he received word from colleagues that Yeagley had begun to discuss his magnetic 
theory publicly, although it had not yet been published.  
Yeagley’s theory was first published in December of 1947 in the Journal of 
Applied Physics. The problem of orientation was complex, Yeagley explained, but he and 
his colleagues had discovered a rather straightforward solution. It held that migratory 
birds—not just the pigeons on which his research was based—possessed an organ or 
organs that were sensitive to two main sensations: the electromagnetic effects generated 
by the bird’s motion through the earth’s magnetic field, and “the effort exerted to 
overcome the Coriolis force, due to the earth’s rotation.”95 The Coriolis effect, generated 
by the rotating earth’s centripetal force, varies in its intensity between the poles, where it 
is greatest, and the equator, where it is zero. According to Yeagley, birds could determine 
their latitude based on differences in the strength of the force. The theory also held that 
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birds were “visually sensitive” to their own “velocity over the earth’s surface (land 
speed).”96 They supposedly used a comparison of their groundspeed with that of their 
absolute velocity, which was affected by the Coriolis effect, in order to orient themselves. 
The perception of these forces apparently created a navigational grid on which birds 
oriented their horizontal and vertical position on the earth’s surface. While Yeagley had 
yet to demonstrate the existence of the organ or organs involved, he claimed that 
experiments on homing pigeons validated the theory. 
Previous theories had attempted to calculate the effects of a stable magnetic field, 
but Yeagley’s theory was based on the electromagnetic force generated by the bird 
moving through the earth’s field. Displaced birds, he supposed, could make adjustments 
in their flight “in a direction which will bring its land-speed magnetic vertical-field effect 
back to that to which it is accustomed during its normal flight and home territory.”97 
Essentially, birds would become accustomed to the magnetic and rotational forces 
characteristic of their home territories. When they flew in unfamiliar territory, they 
adjusted the direction of their flight in order bring the sensation of these forces into 
alignment with that of their home territory.98 Ultimately, the relationship between the 
magnetic and Coriolis forces would provide the bird with a grid on which it oriented 
itself toward home territory. 
A corollary to the theory, Yeagley explained, was that due to the distribution of 
the earth’s magnetic field and the properties of Coriolis velocity between the poles and 
the equator, there should be several points on the earth’s surface that were characterized 
by the same ratio of magnetic to Coriolis force. He termed these “conjugate points,” and 
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plotted them on a map of the United States.99 At each conjugate point, the intersecting 
lines of magnetic and Coriolis force were identical, and thus from the bird’s perspective, 
the navigational cues should be identical.  
Yeagley’s article included details of several experiments with pigeons that 
supposedly demonstrated the importance of these forces in orientation. His “magnetic 
wing” experiment, for example, showed that when magnets were attached to the wings of 
pigeons, their homing ability was disrupted.100 Of the ten magnetized pigeons that he 
released into unfamiliar territory, none returned, and initial observations indicated that 
most of them did not immediately fly in the home direction. Ten control pigeons had 
similarly sized copper plates (nonmagnetic) attached to their wings, and their homing 
performance was significantly better: eight of ten returned within two days.101 Yeagley 
argued that this was sufficient to demonstrate that pigeons could perceive significant 
magnetic forces, and that the ability to perceive those forces affected homing 
performance.102 The crucial experiment, however, involved the conjugate points.  
Yeagley hypothesized that if a bird were displaced into unfamiliar territory that 
was near a conjugate point, then it would mistake that point for its home territory and 
navigate towards it. Thus he trained several hundred birds to home toward a mobile loft 
near campus in State College, Pennsylvania. While training his pigeons in Pennsylvania, 
Yeagley occasionally moved the mobile loft to different locations so that the birds 
became “accustomed to looking for the loft and not for familiar landmarks nearby.”103 
According to the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Map, there was a conjugate point for 
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State College ten miles north of Kearney, Nebraska.104 The plan was to release 120 
pigeons, which had been trained to home toward their loft in State College, at points 
surrounding the conjugate. Each bird was tagged with instructions for reporting the 
recovery data so that Yeagley could determine if it had taken a relatively straight course 
(a “vector”) between the release point and its “home” loft at the conjugate point. In the 
summer of 1944, Yeagley’s team released eight groups from their displacement points. 
Only one bird actually returned to its loft, but about fifty others were recovered and 
recorded in various locations. Recoveries within 25 miles of the lofts were interpreted as 
successful homing. Yeagley averaged the data based on the recovery locations, 
trajectories, and speeds of the birds in each group, and from this he plotted the vector of 
the group. According to Yeagley, six of the eight vectors pointed toward the conjugate 
point, thus supporting his theory.105  
Further experiments in the summer of 1945 increased the number of pigeons to 
200. These tests involved “handicapping” the birds in order to secure more trustworthy 
conclusions. This was accomplished by training the birds to home solely from points 
northwest of their Pennsylvania lofts. In the Nebraska experiments, these birds were 
released northeast of the conjugate point. In this way, it was thought that any directional 
habituation would be disrupted; if the birds did fly toward the conjugate point, Yeagley 
reasoned, he could be confident that they did so according to his theory.106 After being 
released, 32% of the birds were recovered at various points in the surrounding areas; 
none were recovered at the lofts. When analyzing the data, Yeagley curiously excluded 
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all the recoveries that had taken place ten or more days after the release. Based on the 
reports of racing pigeon fanciers, he assumed that after a period of ten days, these birds 
would have given up on trying to find their way home, and had probably flown off in 
random directions. The vectors established by the recoveries confirmed the earlier 
experiments, as most of them pointed toward the conjugate point.107  
Yeagley concluded that his experiments had gone a long way toward solving “the 
age-old mystery of bird migrations.”108 Despite the fact that virtually no direct evidence 
demonstrated that pigeons were physiologically capable of perceiving magnetic or 
Coriolis forces, Yeagley based his conclusion on the homing experiments and on the 
limited “magnetic wing” experiments. His method of averaging bird recoveries into 
vectors also seemed quite suspect, as he used these to conclude that pigeons were homing 
toward the conjugate points even though very few pigeons were actually recovered near 
the loft. Finally, his assertion that he had solved—or at least “clarified”—the whole 
problem of bird migration in experiments on trained pigeons was certainly problematic.  
Not surprisingly, Yeagley’s theory was truly exciting to those scientists working 
on the problem of homing and migration. It was widely disseminated and discussed, and 
many initially welcomed the elegant solution that he had found via seemingly rigorous 
experimentation. The theory was simple, physiologically and physically grounded, and 
clarified a complex behavioral problem in such a way as to suggest further investigation. 
Within a few years, however, physicists, physiologists, ecologists, and ornithologists 
alike discovered numerous problems with Yeagley’s methods, interpretations, biological 
and physical assumptions, and most importantly his sloppy research practices. By the 
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early 1950s, this litany of negative criticisms had largely discredited his work and 
reputation. Griffin was central to the critical response. 
 
An Unwelcome Theory: The Skeptics Respond 
Griffin was already skeptical of magnetic orientation theories, and of Yeagley’s in 
particular, especially upon receiving an advance copy that Yeagley sent him in October 
of 1947.109 For Griffin, magnetic theories of orientation harkened back to Loebian 
conceptions of behavior as the product of simple and automatic stimulus-response 
mechanisms. By the late 1940s, he had begun to see animals as more complex agents that 
explored their environments while acquiring and processing information that informed 
their patterns of behavior.110 Thus Griffin firmly rejected both Yeagley’s faulty methods 
and wild assumptions, but more importantly his tropistic formulation of the problem of 
migration. He would wait several years until publicly disclosing his problems with the 
theory, but in the interim, Griffin privately discussed its problems with others in the field, 
many of whom issued published criticisms.  
One of the major problems that Griffin immediately noticed involved publicity 
surrounding the conjugate experiments in Kearney, Nebraska. A few weeks after the 
theory became public, he wrote to German ornithologist Erwin Stresemann (1889-1972), 
who in the 1930s had also proposed a magnetic theory of orientation.111 Griffin doubted 
Stresemann’s theory as well, but he explained to him that corrupt records of Yeagley’s 
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pigeon returns near the conjugate point had probably skewed the results.112 “You would 
be interested in Yeagley’s work with pigeons, although I am most skeptical of his 
conclusions…I feel that the results could be due to the newspaper and radio publicity 
asking people to be watching for pigeons, since this probably centered around the 
‘conjugate point’, but this is only my personal opinion.”113 Despite the fact that only 
about 25% of the pigeons released were recovered and reported in those experiments, 
Griffin thought that the public, on whom the experiments relied to help with pigeon 
recoveries, would be more inclined to look for pigeons near the conjugate point where 
they were predicted to be. The fact that publicity about the experiments (which called for 
the public’s assistance) was limited to the immediate area around the conjugate point was 
even more problematic. A few months later Griffin wrote to Yeagley, inquiring further 
about the nature of the publicity and other problems that had been raised against his 
theory.114 Yeagley replied, explaining that they had considered generating wider publicity 
in order to increase the returns, but because their work was “an Army project of the 
restricted classification,” they limited their publicity to the areas surrounding the 
conjugate point.115  
Just a few days after receiving that rather unsatisfying explanation from Yeagley 
concerning the nature of publicity about his experiments, Karl Lashley wrote to Yeagley 
and carbon-copied Griffin. Lashley’s handwritten preface to Griffin explained, 
“Yeagley’s study seems to include a lot of post hoc explaining and special pleading. The 
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theory seems physiologically impossible and I am not impressed by this evidence.”116 In 
the body of the letter, Lashley explained to Yeagley that his theory was merely the latest 
in a long line of attempts to explain bird migration by positing the existence of 
mysterious abilities:  
My feeling, after following work on homing for many years, is that there has been 
a tendency to exaggerate the mystery, as there has been in the case of supposed 
telepathic phenomena, with a similar mystical reluctance to accept commonplace 
explanations…I see no reason to look for other explanation than a good 
topographic memory (even wasps show this within limited range), good 
‘woodsmanship’, and random wandering.117 
 
He further explained that Yeagley had not demonstrated that the perception of magnetic 
and Coriolis forces was anatomically or physiologically possible, and that “for these 
biological reasons your assumptions seem to me extremely improbable.” In three richly 
detailed pages, Lashley went through each of Yeagley’s experiments, pointing out 
problems with his assumptions, methods, and interpretations. He held nothing back, 
explaining that Yeagley’s vector numbers, which were too minimal to be trustworthy in 
the first place, could further be explained by the existence of the Platte River near the 
conjugate point. Lashley explained that migration routes and other experiments had 
demonstrated that “coastlines, mountains and rivers play a part in bird navigation.” 
Several releases, therefore, may simply have followed the river rather than a magnetic 
sense, thus yielding the vector data. Hence Yeagley’s results were “meaningless.”  
Yet another problem was the way Yeagley interpreted the recoveries. One group 
of birds, for example, was released about 60 miles east of the conjugate point, and was 
recovered 100 miles west of the point. They were therefore recovered farther from the 
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conjugate point than they were released, but because of the way Yeagley calculated the 
vectors, the apparent direction that the birds took upon being released was toward the 
conjugate point. Thus he included it as positive evidence. Lashley concluded, “Much of 
this may seem like quibbling but I want to emphasize that in studies of this sort there are 
many variables which must be considered; topography, opportunities for feeding, 
distribution of human and hawk populations, prevailing wind directions, etc., none of 
which have been even referred to in your study.”118 One of Lashley’s most significant 
criticisms, therefore, was that Yeagley had approached the problem as one of physics, 
rather than as one of ecology and zoology. Apparently Yeagley never responded: “He 
asked me for criticism but apparently did not like what he received.”119 
Griffin thanked Lashley for copying him on his “masterly letter to Yeagley 
regarding his crazy theories.”120 The theory and Yeagley’s experimental findings, as 
Lashley mentioned at the outset, were improbable for “biological reasons.” Perhaps 
Yeagley decided not to respond because Lashley’s criticisms were so comprehensive and 
delivered in such an unambiguously critical tone. Or maybe he felt incapable of 
responding to the biological objections raised against his theory. Nevertheless, there were 
physical and theoretical problems as well, and the physicists in fact were the first to 
challenge the theory publically. 
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These first printed criticisms were included in the very next issue of The Journal 
of Applied Physics, in March of 1948.121 Three physicists—Joseph Slepian, Russell 
Varian, and Leverett Davis—offered separate but related critiques of Yeagley’s work. 
Slepian focused on the claim that birds perceived electromagnetic forces generated by 
their motion through the earth’s magnetic field. According to the theory of relativity, he 
explained, the bird’s uniform motion through the earth’s magnetic field would not 
produce an electromagnetic force distinguishable from a resting state. Hence, it would not 
perceive magnetic forces merely by virtue of its motion. Furthermore, any magnetic 
effects that the bird could possibly perceive would be “completely overshadowed and 
obliterated by the indistinguishable ‘sensitivity’ to changes in the earth’s horizontal 
field.”122 According to Slepian, the “intensity of the earth’s electric field is normally 
thousands of times larger” than the effects that the birds supposedly perceived. Therefore, 
in order for the theory to work, birds would have to be sensitive to the earth’s magnetic 
field itself, not to the effects of their own motion through the field.  
Stanford physicist Russell Varian offered a similarly devastating critique, arguing 
that Yeagley had jumped “to unwarranted conclusions concerning the operation of these 
senses.”123 Varian reiterated Slepian’s criticism based on relativity, and further charged 
that Yeagley’s Coriolis assumptions were faulty. As Varian explained, the pigeon’s 
ability to orient itself within 25 miles on the grid would require it to sense extremely 
minute gravitational accelerations. He concluded, “this appears to be practically 
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impossible, even though it may be theoretically possible.”124 He further doubted that an 
organ sensitive enough to make such discriminations would have ever had enough 
survival value to become further improved by natural selection. Leverett Davis, a 
physicist at California Institute of Technology, offered the final critique. He reiterated 
Slepian’s and Varian’s objections concerning the perception of minute forces, but 
suggested that pigeons might still be able to determine their latitude by observing the 
position of the sun and stars. He then suggested some experiments to help refine the 
problem since he thought it was “desirable to test such a remarkable theory in as many 
ways as possible.”125  
Coming as they did from within the physics community, these critiques certainly 
painted Yeagley’s theoretical claims in a negative light. In April of 1948, the renowned 
ecologist G. Evelyn Hutchinson further challenged Yeagley’s assumptions about the 
birds’ perception of what must be, according to physical laws, the exceedingly minute 
electromagnetic and mechanical effects proposed by the theory.126 “The chief 
difficulties,” he explained, “are of a theoretical and physiological nature.” Hutchinson 
was willing to grant the validity of Yeagley’s experimental findings, and in fact he 
congratulated him on the work. But he doubted Yeagley’s physiological assumptions 
about the perception of magnetism and the Coriolis effect.127  
Other responses from biologists and ecologists were more damning, and focused 
almost entirely on flaws in Yeagley’s methods. Evolutionary biologist V.C. Wynne-
Edwards, for example, charged that Yeagley’s primary statistical metric—combined 
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“vectors”—were wholly inadmissible for two reasons.128 The first concerned the way that 
Yeagley obtained the average direction and distance that pigeons took in homing toward 
conjugate points. As Wynne-Edwards cleverly explained: “If one bird after release goes 
in the right general direction, misses the loft and continues on ten times too far beyond it, 
and five others travel in the opposite direction to lesser distances, then the vector-sum of 
all their efforts combined comes out exactly right as to distance and direction.”129 The 
vectors, therefore, did not accurately represent the actual mean course adopted by the 
pigeons. Furthermore, Wynne-Edwards explained, Yeagley had not employed a control 
group. The controls should have been released in unfamiliar territory that was not near a 
conjugate point, in order to measure whether or not they homed in a similar fashion.  
Another problem was due to the logarithmic nature of sensory perceptions. 
According to Wynne-Edwards, Yeagley’s theory held that pigeons would have to sense 
whether they were getting “hotter or colder” in searching for their home territory. 
However, due to the extremely small fluctuations that pigeons were supposed to sense, it 
was “physiologically unlikely, to put it conservatively, that the nervous system could 
comprehend changes in mechanical and electrical stimulation such as occur over an 
interval of say 15 miles.”130 Therefore, the directional precision required by Yeagley’s 
definition of good homing far outweighed the physiological precision that was capable of 
being generated by the perception of forces. He concluded the critique by reiterating 
Griffin’s 1944 assessment that the problem of navigation was essentially one of 
exploration, not of finding a previously unknown sensory mechanism: “As Dr. Donald 
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Griffin concluded…we must seek what satisfaction we can in explanations based on 
known senses, especially vision, together with such adjuncts as, for example, the sense of 
daylength and elapsed time…Griffin and Hock’s [work on gannets] lends very strong 
support to the view that the first steps in orientation are made by random exploration.”131 
A few months later, ecologist H.T. Odum offered a synthetic review of the 
controversy, and he took a similar position in preferring Griffin’s theory to Yeagley’s.132 
Odum’s critique was particularly devastating, as he characterized most of the conclusions 
as fundamentally flawed or insubstantial. He mostly reiterated the critiques of previous 
writers, but he did so assessing each of Yeagley’s individual experiments and pointing 
out their many flaws. As Odum explained, several unacknowledged factors could have 
skewed the results of the conjugate experiments, such as the existence of a river system 
that birds could have followed, in addition to weather patterns that may have led to 
favorable results. In any case, the results were not even that favorable: “if this magnetic 
effect is a valid one it is not possible to tell from these experiments whether there is any 
real aid to the bird. As Griffin has shown, a wandering search by the birds could get them 
home quicker than the time of this experiment. Yeagley’s experiments don’t tell us which 
is the case.”133 Odum also attacked Yeagley’s theoretical assumptions, especially when it 
came to the Coriolis force. As he argued, the atmosphere contains numerous pressure 
gradients that the birds must fly through, and the effects of these would surely dominate a 
bird’s perception of the mechanical forces impinging on its body.134 Odum concluded by 
reiterating his preference for Griffin’s exploratory theory: “The wandering and visual 
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orientation theory is certainly part of the correct explanation. The magnetic theory is 
lacking…and upheld by experiments which for various detailed reasons need to be 
repeated. Even if valid magnetic effects exist, that they are anything but grossly 
inefficient has yet to be shown.”135  
While Griffin did not issue a formal rejection of Yeagley’s theory, he privately 
disparaged it in correspondence with numerous individuals who were interested in bird 
migration. Griffin’s colleague Harold Hitchcock (1903-1995), for example, had 
conducted some initial homing work with pigeons at Middlebury College, where he was a 
professor of biology.136 Hitchcock was evidently more impressed than his colleagues by 
Yeagley’s work, and Griffin attempted to convince him of its numerous problems. In 
December of 1948, he complained, “I think Odum’s criticisms were very kind, and Odum 
omitted necessarily some of the most damaging considerations.”137 He then explained 
what Odum had missed. First, Griffin attacked Yeagley’s “magnetic wing” experiment, 
which supposedly demonstrated that attaching magnets to the wings hindered their 
homing ability. Griffin noted that in a private conversation, Yeagley apparently admitted 
that he had attached the magnets by passing wires through the flesh of the pigeon’s 
wings, a method he had not used to attach the copper controls.138 This of course increased 
the chances of injuring the pigeon, which undoubtedly could have explained its relatively 
poor homing performance. Even worse, Griffin explained, was that Yeagley failed to 
mention this in the paper. Yeagley also apparently miscalculated the magnetic effects of 
                                                
135 Howard T. Odum, “The Bird Navigation Controversy,” p. 596. 
136 At Harvard, Griffin was friends with Hitchcock, who took his Ph.D. in biology in 1938. 
137 Donald Griffin to Harold Hitchcock, 6 December 1948, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 61, RG 450G875  
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
138 These conversations took place in the fall of 1946 when Yeagley visited Cornell. Griffin’s 
correspondence with Yeagley intimates that they met briefly, but I have found no direct evidence to 
characterize those meetings. 
 169 
the attachments, and he failed to report the results of running the experiment a second 
time, in which none of the magnetized or control birds returned. Moreover, when Griffin 
studied the vector maps, he realized that the average deviation of the vectors, which were 
interpreted to indicate the direction of the conjugate points, was barely better than 
chance. Even more damning was the fact that most of the birds “averaged farther from 
conjugate point [sic] after their flights than when released.”139  If anything, this indicated 
that the pigeons flew away from the conjugate points, not toward them.  
Around the same time in October of 1948, Griffin’s colleague Ed Folk attempted 
to arrange a public debate between Yeagley and Griffin at Bowdoin College, where Folk 
worked. Griffin replied, “Regarding a debate with Yeagley I am a little hesitant. By this 
time I have strong and derogatory ideas about his work, and I am afraid that the debate 
might get quite warm. The paper in the J. Appl. Physics is really a fraud – whether 
intentionally or so I can’t say. But the ‘Vector’ maps presented in it are grossly 
misleading, as becomes clear when one studies the tables of data and plots the return on a 
map.”140 Despite the fact that Yeagley’s work was so problematic, however, Griffin had 
little confidence that it would go away any time soon. He therefore agreed to the debate, 
although he warned Folk that it would likely become quite heated: “Regardless of my 
opinion it will not be forgotten; and its appealing simplicity has made it spread far and 
wide, so that one meets it at every turn. Therefore I should be glad to publicly show why 
I think it is so unsound, either in a two-sided debate or otherwise. But if you plan such a 
                                                
139 Donald Griffin to Harold Hitchcock, 6 December 1948, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 61, RG 450G875  
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
140 Donald Griffin to Ed Folk, 25 October 1948, Series 1, Box 3, Folder [Corr. – Folk, G. Edgar], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
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show be prepared for fireworks.”141 For various logistical reasons, the debate never took 
place, but Griffin continued to disparage Yeagley’s work any time the subject was raised. 
He also took steps to prove Yeagley wrong experimentally. One of Griffin’s 
major problems was with the “magnetic wing” experiment, which had been tried several 
times in the past by other ornithologists seeking to demonstrate that pigeons were 
sensitive to magnetism—all of this previous work yielded negative or inconclusive 
results, which raised serious questions about Yeagley’s relatively simple experiments. 
And so Griffin sought the advice of behaviorist psychologist B.F. Skinner, an expert on 
both operant conditioning techniques and pigeon behavior.142 In February 1948, Griffin 
invited Skinner to participate in a AAAS panel on bird navigation for the upcoming 
September meeting to discuss, among other developments, Yeagley’s theory.143 Griffin 
lamented that Yeagley too would be invited: “I have serious doubts about his work, but 
he should be heard.” Griffin then explained that he was interested in conducting 
conditioning experiments on pigeons to see if they showed magnetic sensitivity: “This 
business I expect to be tedious and the results negative, but some one must do it with 
adequate controls to show that the birds could respond to other stimuli (visual, auditory, 
thermal, etc.) in the apparatus but yet could not respond to magnetic fields, static or 
moving.”144 Skinner was the perfect person to ask. He replied, explaining that he was 
                                                
141 Donald Griffin to Ed Folk, 25 October 1948, Series 1, Box 3, Folder [Corr. – Folk, G. Edgar], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
142 Donald Griffin to B.F. Skinner, 23 February 1948, Series 1, Box 10, Folder [Corr. – Se-Sm], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. During the war, Skinner 
was infamously involved in a project to develop a ‘pigeon-guided missile’ for the military. Dubbed 
“Project Pigeon,” it never actually came to fruition, but it was an interesting instance in demonstrating the 
potential applications of operant conditioning. See C.V. Glines, “Top Secret WW II Bat and Bird Bomber 
Program,” Aviation History, Vol. 15 No. 5 (2005): 38-44.  
143 The panel never materialized. 
144 Donald Griffin to B.F. Skinner, 23 February 1948, Series 1, Box 10, Folder [Corr – Se-Sm], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
 171 
impressed by Griffin’s work on orientation, and that he too doubted Yeagley’s findings. 
Furthermore, he informed Griffin about conditioning techniques that would “make it easy 
to discover whether pigeons are sensitive to magnetic of other forces.”145 A few years 
later Griffin did conduct a series of conditioning experiments, all of which yielded 
negative results.146  
Within a few years, Yeagley’s theory had been discredited. But it had, at least for 
a short time, diverted the attention of those in the field from theories based on the known 
senses—such as Griffin’s exploratory theory—toward yet another speculative theory 
based on a stimulus-response mechanism. Griffin wrote to his friend Hal Hitchcock, “It 
makes me sick to think of all the fine birds and great effort wasted by Yeagley chasing 
the pot of gold at the end of the magnetic rainbow.”147 Beyond its many methodological 
faults and dubious assumptions, Yeagley’s theory was unappealing to Griffin because it 
offered such a simplistic picture of bird behavior. Even though Griffin admitted that birds 
might sense magnetic and Coriolis fluctuations, those sensations would be so minor 
compared to their perception of more proximate and powerful stimuli that the birds 
almost certainly could not rely on them as orientation cues. Qualitatively, the effects 
might be sensible. But quantitatively, they would not register as part of the bird’s general 
perception of its environment.148  
                                                
145 B.F. Skinner to Donald Griffin, 22 March 1948, Series 1, Box 10, Folder [Corr – Se-Sm], RG 450G875 
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
146 Donald Griffin, “Bird Navigation,” Biological Reviews, Vol. 27 (1952): 359-390. Griffin later explained 
that he had in fact learned Skinner’s conditioning techniques, although I do not have details of his magnetic 
experiments. Donald Griffin to Major Otto Meyer, 28 March 1949, Series 1, Box 7, Folder [Corr – Meyer, 
Otto], RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
147 Donald Griffin to Harold Hitchcock, 6 December 1948, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 61, RG 450G875 
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
148 Donald Griffin, “Bird Navigation,” Biological Reviews, p. 359-360. 
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Thus for Griffin, Yeagley’s theory was overly tropistic: it confined bird migration 
and navigation to movements along physiologically determined gradients.149 That is, 
rather than actively exploring their environments for visual cues, birds were simply 
drawn in specific directions according to inner sensations that were perhaps 
imperceptible as compared to their other senses.150 Yeagley’s approach, according to 
Griffin, relied on mechanistic assumptions that over-simplified bird behavior, and it 
failed to appreciate the true nature of the bird’s complex relationship to the diverse 
features of its environment. The controversy would lead Griffin to treat magnetic theories 
with extreme skepticism for the rest of his career, even in the face of more legitimate 
evidence for magnetic perception that appeared in the 1970s.  
 
Conclusion  
Griffin’s work on bird homing and migration between 1938 and 1948 had an 
important effect on his view of animal behavior in general. In approaching this problem, 
he found that one could not make sense of complex behavioral phenomena merely 
through the analysis of sensory mechanisms and basic environmental cues. That is, the 
means by which animals utilized information acquired from their surroundings was more 
complex than mere stimulus-response mechanisms. Instead, Griffin argued that birds 
seemed to perceive more holistic qualities of their environments, and utilized these 
complex sources of information in order to accomplish tasks for which they lacked 
precise physiological mechanisms. For Griffin, homing was not merely a matter of 
                                                
149 Donald Griffin, “Bird Navigation,” Biological Reviews, p. 364-368. 
150 The episode affected Griffin for the rest of his career. Even as credible evidence in favor of magnetic 
sensibility emerged later in the 1970s, Griffin was consistently skeptical of it, to the point that he self-
consciously recognized that he seemed to be the only scientist unwilling to grant the validity of mounting 
evidence. 
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external stimulation that automatically guided birds back to their home territory. Rather, 
it was a process of trial and error, which required that birds perceived more general 
environmental cues that could be used for navigation.  
Griffin considered his exploratory theory of homing as a conservative 
interpretation of the facts. That is, he attempted to account for the homing ability in terms 
of the known senses, rather than the product of some mysterious or unknown sensory 
mechanism. He strengthened his view by drawing on Lashley’s concept of instinctual 
behavior as that which was driven by the interaction of complex, holistic stimuli. 
However, this did not lead Griffin to a full explanation of homing. Some cases seemed to 
indicate that birds took direct paths homeward, which could not be explained merely by 
exploration. And while most of the data seemed to fit the theory, even his own airplane 
observations of homing routes could not make sense of the precise ways that birds 
utilized the information acquired during their apparently random wanderings.  
Thus where the exploratory theory was conservative, it was also inelegant. Griffin 
still suspected that some piece of the puzzle was missing, but overly speculative ideas 
such as Yeagley’s magnetic theory caused him to restrict his view to the known senses. In 
my next chapter, I analyze how additional work in the early 1950s showed that birds were 
able to use more complex sources of information—the shifting position of the sun and 
stars—in order to orient themselves homeward. While Griffin initially approached these 
findings with the same skepticism that he applied to Yeagley’s theory, the solar 
orientation theory eventually proved to be an essential feature of bird homing and 
migration. These later developments would further expand Griffin’s view of animal 
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complexity, which played a crucial role in leading him to reconsider the question of 
animal consciousness in the 1970s. 
The next chapter demonstrates how several lines of animal behavior research in 
the 1950s and 1960s led Griffin to expand his view of animals and their capabilities. 
Rather than continuing to interpret behavior through “simplicity filters,” Griffin came to 
realize he needed to think of animals as complex and dexterous problem solvers. Like 
echolocating bats, birds were also active agents that acquired and processed information 
from their environments, informing their daily activities. Not only was behavior flexible, 
at times it was seemingly the product of intelligent thought or deliberation. The ultimate 
outcome of this new way of thinking fully emerged in the 1970s, when Griffin proposed 
that animals were in fact conscious beings, capable of complex mental calculations, and 
that it was time to set aside behavioristic and reductionist approaches to the study of 
animal behavior once and for all. 
 175 
CHAPTER 5 
Birds, Bats, and Bees: Donald Griffin and the Emerging Picture of 
Animal Behavior, 1948-1970 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I analyze Donald Griffin’s professional and intellectual 
development during the middle decades of his career, from 1948 to 1970. During this 
period several new discoveries expanded his view of the complexity and versatility of 
animal behavior, a shift that would culminate in his subsequent investigation of animal 
consciousness in the 1970s. The most influential of these findings included the solar and 
celestial orientation of birds, the bat’s use of echolocation in hunting prey, and the “dance 
language” of the honeybee, discovered by Austrian zoologist Karl von Frisch. Each of 
these discoveries surprised Griffin, and together they led him to think of animals as 
agents that actively utilized sophisticated sensory tools while engaging in a wide range of 
complex behaviors.1 He argued that by studying the patterns of animal behavior in their 
natural environments, in tandem with a careful analysis of their sensory physiology, one 
could get a fuller and truer understanding of each. As he explained in a 1953 article on 
the sensory basis of orientation in birds, bats, and bees, “the baffling, almost mysterious, 
nature of the original phenomenon has given way to at least a partial understanding once 
the sensory basis was clarified…The really critical discoveries that have wholly or partly 
dispelled these mysteries of animal orientation have resulted from a fuller knowledge of 
the environmental factors actually utilized by the animals, together with new information 
                                                
1 In his historical survey of ethology, British ethologist William Homan Thorpe specified bird homing and 
the dance language of the honeybee as phenomena that, due to their apparent complexity, challenged 
zoologists and ethologists in the postwar era to rethink their relatively simple frameworks for interpreting 
animal behavior. William H. Thorpe, The Origins and Rise of Ethology (London: Praeger, 1979), p. 93-94. 
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about their behavioral capabilities.”2 Thus rather than restricting his view to the 
proximate physiological mechanisms themselves, he sought to illuminate more general 
features of animal behavior through the analysis of their “sensory windows” and the 
environmental cues mediated through those windows.3 
Griffin also began in the immediate postwar years to establish his career as a 
professional scientist. Given his extensive work on animal and human physiology before 
and during the war, he positioned himself as a comparative physiologist in order to secure 
an academic job at Cornell University. He quickly learned that despite the war’s end, 
military dollars were still flowing and could support his research on birds and bats. He 
consequently made strategic choices about how to frame the significance of his work 
more broadly in order to secure funding. His scientific output also greatly increased 
during the postwar period, as he published approximately seventy journal articles 
between 1946 and 1970. His writings also included several books and popular articles, 
which in addition to his well-known discovery of echolocation, significantly raised his 
profile in American science. His 1960 election to the National Academy of Sciences 
reflected the breadth of his interests and expertise, as he was appointed to both the 
zoology and physiology sections. Thus by the mid-1960s Griffin enjoyed the fruits of a 
successful academic career, and he had earned a reputation as a rigorous experimentalist 
and an expert on animal behavior. 
Concurrent to these professional developments were significant changes in 
Griffin’s intellectual life. Between 1948 and 1951 three major discoveries concerning the 
                                                
2 Donald Griffin, “Sensory Physiology and the Orientation of Animals,” American Scientist, Vol. 41, No. 2 
(Apr. 1953): 243-244. 
3 Donald Griffin, “Sensory Physiology and the Orientation of Animals,” p. 244. He first introduced the 
“sensory window” metaphor in this 1953 article, and he frequently invoked it in several publications 
thereafter.  
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complex behaviors of birds, bats, and bees transformed his approach to animal behavior. 
The discoveries were significant for Griffin in two ways. First, they showed that 
animals—even the “lower” insects—were capable of complex behaviors such as solar 
orientation and symbolic communication. Thus they defied the conventional wisdom that 
animals were both simple and machinelike. Secondly, the concomitant frameworks for 
interpreting animal behavior—such as stimulus-response mechanisms and chains of 
associations—failed to account for these phenomena. According to Morgan’s canon, 
scientific explanations of behavior ought to be formulated according to their lowest order 
of complexity, but in the case of the honeybee’s dance language, for example, such 
explanations actually obscured the fundamental reality. The fact that these remarkable 
developments occurred within a short period surely intensified their influence on his 
scientific perspective. As a result, Griffin began to doubt that the use of “simplicity 
filters” were either necessary or beneficial for scientific progress. Instead, he began to 
think of these heuristics as harmful to scientific progress, insofar as they limited the 
imagination and failed to account for the complex patterns of animal behavior. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Griffin thus experienced a significant transformation 
in what might be called his philosophy of science. Gradually, his thinking about animal 
behavior became increasingly less mechanistic, insofar as those mechanisms were 
understood as the product of simple reactions. While the immediate causes of behavior 
might still be understood through the analysis of physiological mechanisms, he no longer 
felt compelled to reduce explanations of behavior to their simplest forms. Animals, he 
realized, were capable of behaviors far more complex than he had been conditioned to 
expect. Von Frisch’s dance language theory was probably the most significant 
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development in this regard, and the ensuing controversy in the 1960s illustrated the 
dangerous power of simplicity filters to inhibit the discovery of the true causes of 
behavior. In the remainder of this chapter I analyze how these intellectual developments, 
along with several professional factors, forever influenced the trajectory of Griffin’s 
distinguished career in American biology. 
 
Establishing a Career: From Harvard to Cornell and Back 
In order to support this postwar work Griffin deployed his familiarity with the 
military research and funding complex that he had cultivated during his wartime projects. 
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s he maintained a fertile partnership with funding officers 
at the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and these contracts provided him with unique 
opportunities for animal behavior research. One such multiyear project during the 
summers between 1948 and 1951 brought him to the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory 
(NARL) in Pt. Barrow, Alaska, where he studied the physiological thermodynamics of 
heat insulation in mammalian fur.4 Conducted under NARL director Laurence Irving and 
alongside Swedish physiologist Per Scholander, this applied research aimed to improve 
clothing for soldiers in extremely cold environments.5 Griffin, however, considered it to 
be “pot boiler” work, particularly useful insofar as it funded his primary area of interest 
while in Alaska, bird migration.6 He eventually learned that ONR was not averse to 
                                                
4 On the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory and its work, see: M.C. Shelesnyak, “Some Problems of Human 
Ecology in Polar Regions,” Science, Vol. 106, No. 2757 (Oct. 1947): 405-409. A separate but related 
institute, the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory in Fairbanks, focused on human physiology and medicine. 
See: Matthew Farish, “The Lab and the Land: Overcoming the Arctic in Alaska,” Isis, Vol. 104, No. 1 
(Mar. 2013): 1-29.  
5 This research was similar to that which Griffin conducted at the Harvard Fatigue Lab during the war. 
6 The migration and homing work in Alaska was never very successful, although while there he did develop 
a novel technique using radioisotopes to record the precise time that homing birds returned to their nests 
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funding animal navigation research outright, and so he also secured contracts to study 
echolocation and bird migration back home in New England.7 His main associate at ONR 
was Sidney Galler, head of biology research from 1950 to 1965. Galler, who would later 
become the assistant Secretary of Science at the Smithsonian, was deeply interested in 
animal navigation, and thought that such research might yield more general insights 
about navigational principles useful to the military.8 He later oversaw two of Griffin’s 
ONR contracts in the 1950s on bat perception, which led to the significant discovery that 
bats use echolocation not just to navigate but also to hunt their insect prey.9  
Substantial changes in Griffin’s academic life occurred alongside these other 
professional developments. In 1946 he was appointed assistant professor of physiology in 
Cornell University’s department of zoology. He leveraged his work on the sensory 
physiology of birds and bats, along with his wartime research on human physiology, in 
order to position himself as a comparative physiologist. Cornell was a good first job for 
Griffin. Its zoology department had a strong ornithological tradition, having maintained 
the Lab of Ornithology since 1915.10 And its location in Ithaca kept him near the wild 
                                                                                                                                            
during displacement experiments. Donald Griffin, “Radioactive Tagging of Animals Under Natural 
Conditions,” Ecology, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Jul. 1952): 329-335. 
7 Griffin’s airplane tracking of gannets in 1947 was funded by ONR, which was not particularly concerned 
with the research topics provided that they were conducted at the Alaska station. He justified the study of 
gannets in New England as a sort of ‘test run’ in advance of that Alaskan work. On the NARL’s arctic 
research, see: John C. Reed and Andreas G. Ronhovde, Arctic Laboratory: A History of the Naval Arctic 
Research Laboratory at Point Barrow, Alaska (Washington, DC: ONR, 1971).  
8 Frederick Davis, The Man Who Saved the Sea Turtles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 164. 
9 Donald Griffin, “Acoustic Location of Insect Prey by Bats,” Anatomical Record, Vol. 111, No. 3 (1951): 
448-449; Donald Griffin, “Bat Sounds under Natural Conditions with Evidence for Echolocation of Insect 
Prey,” Journal of Experimental Zoology, Vol. 123, No. 3 (Aug. 1953): 435-465; Donald Griffin, Frederick 
A. Webster, and Charles R. Michael, “The Echolocation of Flying Insects by Bats,” Animal Behaviour, 
Vol. 8, No. 3-4 (1960): 141-154; Donald Griffin and Alan D. Grinnell, “Ability of Bats to Discriminate 
Echoes from Louder Noise,” Science, Vol. 128, No. 3316 (Jul. 1958): 145-147; Donald Griffin, J.H. Friend, 
and Frederick A. Webster, “Target Discrimination by the Echolocation of Bats,” Journal of Experimental 
Zoology, Vol. 158, No. 2 (Mar. 1965): 155-168. 
10 Established by Arthur A. Allen in 1915, the Laboratory of Ornithology was the first U.S. graduate 
program in ornithology. It remains a prestigious research institution today. 
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populations of birds and bats upon which his research relied. He was thus able to 
continue seamlessly his work on migration and echolocation while taking on new 
pedagogical and professional duties.  
In his teaching at Cornell Griffin applied the physiological view of biology that he 
had learned at Harvard in the 1930s and 1940s. As discussed in my second chapter, 
luminary of Harvard zoology George Howard Parker had developed a unified vision of 
biology that subsumed physiology, botany, and zoology under a single intellectual and 
administrative framework—the Institute of Biology (later known simply as the 
department of biology).11 Parker and others within the department encouraged their 
students to view these subdisciplines as inherently integrated, based on the idea that 
physiological mechanisms constituted the core of functional explanations in biology. As 
Griffin later recalled, this philosophy led him to view physiology as a single field, “not 
readily divisible along phylogenetic lines.”12 Thus rather than preparing three separate 
courses in vertebrate, invertebrate, and general physiology, as Cornell chair of zoology 
Howard Adelmann initially requested, Griffin successfully argued that he ought to teach 
instead a single course in comparative physiology that spanned the evolutionary 
spectrum. Intellectually, this was consistent with his view that physiology was the 
common substrate of biological phenomena.13 And pragmatically, preparing only a single 
course smoothed the transition from his research-oriented Harvard Junior Fellowship to 
                                                
11 The second chapter of my dissertation discusses this influence in greater detail. 
12 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” in Leaders in the Study of Animal 
Behavior, ed. Donald Dewsbury, p. 120-142 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated Universities Press, 1985), p. 134. 
13 Beyond Griffin, the field of comparative physiology greatly expanded during the 1940s and 1950s. Much 
of these developments entailed experimental work on hormones and the endocrine system more broadly. 
On the exploration of stress physiology in endocrinology, comparative physiology, and biochemistry, see: 
Tulley Long, “Constituting the Stress Response: Collaborative Networks and the Elucidation of the 
Pituitary-Adrenal Cortical System, 1930s-1960s,” (Doctoral Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 2011). 
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pedagogical work at Cornell, where he immediately began teaching upon his arrival in 
the fall of 1946.  
Due to his teaching commitments, however, the Cornell position grew 
cumbersome, and Griffin complained that he had increasingly less time for his own 
research.14 In addition, his teaching remained in comparative physiology, but his field 
research continued to push him further away from laboratory approaches in physiology 
and toward more naturalistic studies of animal behavior in the wild. While he was 
primarily interested in the sensory physiology of birds and bats—particularly in its 
bearing on their navigation—his undergraduate and graduate teaching was restricted to 
large laboratory courses and small seminars on such topics as cellular physiology. Indeed, 
he had been hired as the zoology department’s sole physiologist, and so naturally it was 
his responsibility to teach such courses. Griffin also privately complained about the low 
quality of graduate students in zoology at Cornell.15 Although he was promoted to 
professor in July 1952, shortly thereafter he learned about a promising opportunity 
elsewhere.16 When his uncle Alfred Redfield informed him that Harvard’s biology 
department was seeking a new professor of zoology, Griffin jumped at the chance to 
return to Cambridge.17 The teaching duties were lighter and more commensurate with his 
research, and as Griffin later recalled, “the stimulating environment of the Harvard 
Biological Laboratories and the superior facilities available at Harvard did permit better 
                                                
14 As he became increasingly involved with coursework at Cornell, things were also becoming busier at 
home. Between 1944 and 1948, he and his wife Ruth Griffin (née Castle) had four children (including 
twins): Nancy Griffin (b. 1943), Janet Griffin (b. 1945), and twins John Griffin and Margaret Griffin (b. 
1948).   
15 Donald Griffin to George Wald, 12 January 1948, Series 1, Box 12, Folder [Corr – Wa-Whi], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
16 In 1948 Griffin was promoted to associate professor with tenure. 
17 By this point few people referred to the department as the “Institute of Biology,” as G.H. Parker had.  
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research work than [he] would have been able to accomplish at Cornell.”18 Immediately 
upon returning to Harvard, he began teaching an advanced course on the physiological 
basis of animal behavior—clearly a move away from his Cornell teaching, and toward 
topics more relevant to his own research.19 
Evidently Harvard’s chair of biology at the time, Frank M. Carpenter (1902-
1994), construed Griffin’s role as a professor of animal behavior more generally.20 
Carpenter, a former student of William Morton Wheeler, was more focused on the 
museum side of biology, and lacked the physiological orientation of his predecessors in 
the biology chair. He hoped that Griffin, unlike Lashley in the 1930s, would make strong 
interdisciplinary connections between Harvard’s biology and psychology departments.21 
Doyen of American psychology E.G. Boring was also sanguine about the appointment, 
writing to Griffin: “So many times I have wanted to write you to tell you how welcome 
you would be at Harvard among the people in our Department and among the biologists 
whom I know…And of course our whole Department has felt that this was the best 
appointment Biology had made in the history of anyone here…I hope it can be worked to 
bring certain sensible liasons [sic] between the two departments where there is natural 
overlap.”22 Lashley too thought Griffin was a great fit at Harvard, having recommended 
                                                
18 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 139. 
19 Donald Griffin to Howard Adelmann, 15 October 1955, Series 1, Box 2, Folder [Unnumbered], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
20 Frank Carpenter was chair from 1952-1959. 
21 In fact, Griffin’s doctoral advisor Karl Lashley had been jointly appointed to the departments of biology 
and psychology for the same reason, although he was largely unsuccessful in creating interdisciplinary 
connections. Several interdepartmental squabbles eventually led Lashley to leave Harvard for the Yerkes 
Laboratories of Primate Biology in 1942. See Nadine Weidman, Constructing Scientific Psychology: Karl 
Lashley’s Mind-Brain Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 143-154. 
22 Edwin G. Boring to Donald Griffin, 4 February 1953, Series 1, Box 1, Folder [Corr. Bi-Bo], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. Boring’s views on the 
importance of interdisciplinary work in biology and psychology were consistent with Harvard’s 1945 report 
on the future of psychology in the American university. See: The Place of Psychology in an Ideal 
University (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 20-23. 
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him earlier in 1951 for another position.23 According to Lashley, there was “no other 
young biologist who equals him in range of interest in animal behavior, in experience in 
devising experimental controls in field studies, and in the energy and enthusiasm with 
which he carries his work.” Among those at the top of the field in animal behavior, 
Lashley continued, “Griffin is by far the ablest in breadth of interest and grasp of 
problems.”24 These lofty expectations proved correct, as Griffin would go on to a 
successful career in the biology department, where he eventually served as chair of 
zoology from 1963 to 1965. He also formed institutional and intellectual bridges between 
the biology and psychology departments, serving on the latter’s hiring committee 
throughout the 1950s.25 
Griffin’s appointment in the biology department, along with the promise of his 
contributions to interdisciplinary science, were consistent with a larger trend at Harvard 
in the early 1950s. As recommended by the famous 1945 report, General Education in a 
Free Society, Harvard pedagogy in the postwar period began to shift from a tradition of 
specialization toward a more generalist character, which emphasized synthetic research 
and the formalization of interdisciplinary bodies.26 The report recommended that the 
sciences, and in particular introductory courses therein, ought to forgo overspecialization 
and emphasize instead general principles and “broad syntheses” in order to meet the 
                                                
23 In this earlier episode, Lashley recommended Griffin for a new Agassiz professorship in the Museum of 
Comparative Zoology (MCZ). That position instead went to Ernst Mayr of the American Museum of 
Natural History, who was evidently thought to be better suited for museum work than Griffin. Mayr would 
become director of the MCZ upon Alfred Romer’s retirement in 1961. 
24 Karl Lashley to Alfred Redfield, 18 April 1951, Series 1, Box 9, Folder [Corr. Ra-Ri], RG 450G875 
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
25 Nathan Pusey to Donald Griffin, 24 March 1954, Series 1, Box 10, Folder [Corr. – Personal, Harvard 
University], RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
26 General Education in a Free Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), p. 221. On 
interdisciplinarity within the “Harvard complex,” see: Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human 
Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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demands of a changing intellectual landscape. Provost of Arts and Sciences Paul H. 
Buck, who chaired the “Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free 
Society,” similarly saw Griffin as a promising contributor to this new vision of science at 
Harvard.27 Griffin’s work on animal behavior, sensory physiology, and perception 
reflected such a synthetic approach to solving biological problems, and thus institutional 
leaders such as Buck, Boring, Lashley, and Carpenter saw his work as embodying that 
interdisciplinary ideal. 
Griffin returned to Harvard in the summer of 1953 as a tenured professor of 
zoology, bringing with him several ONR contracts for research on bird and bat 
navigation.28 This was an important year not just for his professional, but for his 
intellectual life as well, as several key developments in the early 1950s led him to think 
about his work more broadly. As we have seen, he was particularly focused on animal 
navigation, an interest that was catalyzed not only by his discovery of echolocation, but 
by Karl von Frisch’s theory of the honeybee “dance language.” Griffin considered the 
study of navigation as an important means to investigate more general features of animal 
behavior such as its psychological, evolutionary, and ecological dimensions. For 
example, the discovery of echolocation in marine mammals and cave-dwelling birds 
indicated that one could study comparatively the relationship between behavior and 
perception by examining how different species employed their sensory modalities in a 
variety of environments and behavioral contexts. He also began an extensive comparative 
                                                
27 Professor of zoology and Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences Leigh Hoadley was also on the committee 
that made these recommendations, which was chaired by Paul H. Buck, the Dean of Arts and Sciences at 
Harvard. Buck happily recommended Griffin as the department’s choice to the Harvard Corporation, who 
similarly approved of the appointment. Paul H. Buck to Donald Griffin, 20 November 1952, Series 1, Box 
5, Folder 58, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
28 F.M. Carpenter to Donald Griffin, 24 October 1952, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 58, RG 450G875 Donald 
Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
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study of echolocation in different genera and species of bats, analyzing how 
environmental and behavioral factors led to differences in the biophysical properties of 
their ultrasonic signals.29 Thus while Griffin continued to focus on the sensory basis of 
animal perception, he also began to inquire about broader features of their behavior. This 
entailed searching for evolutionary explanations for the development of different modes 
of perception, and more detailed inquiry into the environmental factors utilized in the 
behavioral patterns of various animals.30 
The shift toward a more general study of animal behavior also paralleled the 
expansion of European ethology, with which Griffin became increasingly familiar due to 
the proliferation of international journals and conferences in the postwar years.31 The 
intellectual maturation of ethology in this period, most notably characterized by the work 
of Niko Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz, focused on the study of instincts in wild 
populations (Tinbergen) and freely-ranging domesticated species (Lorenz).32 Although its 
                                                
29 On these comparative studies, see for example: Donald Griffin, “High Frequency Sounds of Tropical 
Bats,” Anatomical Record, Vol. 117 (1953): 567; Alan Grinnell and Donald Griffin  “The Sensitivity of 
Echolocation in Bats,” Biological Bulletin, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Feb. 1958): 10-22; Donald Griffin, A. Novick, 
and M. Kornfield, “The Sensitivity of Echolocation in the Fruit Bat, Rousettus,” Biological Bulletin, Vol. 
115, No. 1 (Aug. 1958): 107-113; Donald Griffin, Listening in the Dark: The Acoustic Orientation of Bats 
and Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 203-255. 
30 For example, Griffin became interested in echolocation in porpoises and bottlenose dolphins after 
Winthrop N. Kellogg made this discovery in the early 1950s: W.N. Kellogg, Robert Kohler, and H.N. 
Morris, “Porpoise Sounds as Sonar Signals,” Science, Vol. 117, No. 3036 (Mar. 1953): 239-243; Donald 
Griffin, “Hearing and Acoustic Orientation in Marine Animals,” Deep-Sea Research, Vol. 3 (1953): 406-
417.  
31 On the more general postwar influence of European ethology on the study of animal behavior in the U.S., 
see: Richard Burkhardt, Patterns of Behavior: Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and the Founding of 
Ethology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), especially chapters five through seven; Donald 
Dewsbury, “A Brief History of the Study of Animal Behavior in North America,” in Perspectives in 
Ethology, Vol. 8, eds. P.P.G. Bateson and P.H. Klopfer, p. 85-122 (New York: Plenum, 1989), p. 110-114; 
Donald Dewsbury, “Americans in Europe: The Role of Travel in the Spread of European Ethology after 
World War II,” Animal Behaviour, Vol. 49 (1995): 1649-1663.  
32 Burkhardt characterizes Tinbergen, who was more keen to study wild animals in their natural habitats, as 
the “hunter,” as opposed to Lorenz, the “farmer,” who worked mainly with domesticated animals. On 
Lorenz’s theory of instinctive behavior, see: W.H. Thorpe, The Origins and Rise of Ethology: The Science 
of the Natural Behavior of Animals (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 87-107; Richard Burkhardt, Patterns of 
Behavior, p. 127-186. 
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theoretical components were largely ignored by behavioral scientists across the Atlantic, 
many ideas and discoveries generated by European approaches became more extensively 
known in the United States in the late 1940s and 1950s.33 And in fact Griffin’s 
popularization of Karl von Frisch’s work contributed to the increasing familiarity with 
European inquiry on animal behavior. These ethological approaches, however, stood in 
rather stark contrast to much of the work on animal behavior conducted by American 
comparative psychologists, who were primarily interested in the laboratory analysis of 
learning and conditioning in domesticated animals such as the white rat.34 Like 
comparative psychology, however, European ethology was also largely behavioristic vis-
à-vis questions about animal subjectivity. For Tinbergen and Lorenz, the seeming 
impossibility of objectively studying animal minds rendered such mentalistic categories 
useless in analyzing the causes of behavior.35 While he never embraced the theoretical 
contributions of ethology, Griffin’s work on the naturalistic behavior of wild birds and 
bats nevertheless had more in common with his European counterparts than with the 
main currents of American work on animal behavior.  
In the remainder of this chapter I analyze three major developments in the 1950s 
that profoundly altered Griffin’s understanding of animal behavior. The first of these was 
                                                
33 Konrad Lorenz’s theoretical constructs such as innate releasing mechanisms and the psychohydraulic 
model of motivation, for example, did not find a receptive audience among comparative psychologists 
studying animal behavior. On the American critical reaction to ethology, especially psychologist Daniel 
Lehrman’s acclaimed 1953 critique of Lorenz’s theory, see: Richard Burkhardt, Patterns of Behavior, p. 
384-390; Daniel Lehrman, “A Critique of Konrad Lorenz’s Theory of Instinctive Behavior,” The Quarterly 
Review of Biology, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec. 1953): 337-363.  
34 W.H. Thorpe, The Origins and Rise of Ethology, p. 94-96; Richard Burkhardt, “On the Emergence of 
Ethology as a Scientific Discipline,” Conspectus of History, Vol. 1, No. 7 (1981): 73; Donald Dewsbury, 
“Americans in Europe: The Role of Travel in the Spread of European Ethology after World War II,” 
Animal Behaviour, Vol. 49 (1995): 1649-1663. 
35 Gordon Burghardt, “Animal Awareness: Current Perceptions and Historical Perspective,” American 
Psychologist, Vol. 40, No. 8 (Aug. 1985): 909. In fact Lorenz thought that subjectivity was an important 
feature in driving the appetitive behavior of animals, although he was unwilling to make any strong claims 
about the nature of such subjective desires. 
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Karl von Frisch’s theory of the “dance language” of honeybees, a famous discovery for 
which he eventually shared the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine. As Griffin 
later recalled, von Frisch’s discovery was a “startling development” that “shook up [his] 
whole scientific viewpoint.”36 Complementing that breakthrough were further surprises in 
the field of bird homing and migration. As of 1950, Griffin had yet to identify a 
physiological ‘smoking gun’ that accounted for the ability of birds to orient themselves 
homeward from unfamiliar territory. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this led 
him to opt for what he considered the most parsimonious explanation, which held that 
birds scattered randomly and only found their way home when they chanced upon 
familiar territory recognizable from previous flights.37 In the early 1950s, new research 
subverted his exploratory theory by showing that birds oriented themselves based on 
information gleaned from the motion of the sun—a method that he had tentatively 
considered but never seriously examined. German ornithologist Gustav Kramer and 
British ornithologist G.V.T. Matthews conducted the most important research on this 
novel theory of orientation. The theory gained further credibility from von Frisch’s 
demonstration that bees, thought to be vastly simpler in their behavior and 
neurophysiology than birds, were nonetheless capable of solar orientation.38 And finally, 
Griffin’s own research on bats yielded more surprises about the versatility of their 
behavior and the refinement of echolocation. He was stunned to find that bats used 
echolocation not merely for basic functions such as avoiding obstacles or finding the 
                                                
36 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 135-136. 
37 As I show in the previous chapter, most experts in ornithology agreed with Griffin’s interpretation.  
38 Griffin explained to von Frisch, “This point of view [of sun orientation in birds] is certainly more 
attractive after your evidence showing the complex and precise use made of the sun’s bearing by bees.” 
Donald Griffin to Karl von Frisch, 8 May 1948, Series 1, Box 11, Folder 105, RG 450G875 Donald 
Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC.  
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entrances to their caves, but for the seemingly complex feat of hunting insects on the 
wing. He also later found that their target discrimination was extremely precise, and that 
the high signal-to-noise ratio of their echolocation had significant implications for 
understanding various additional features of their behavior. These new insights partially 
resulted from moving his study of bats from the laboratory into their natural habitats, 
where he was uniquely able to analyze their hunting behavior.  
For Griffin, the impact of the whole of these discoveries was greater than their 
sum, and together they caused him to broaden his understanding of the complexity of 
animal behavior. They also led him to dismiss the utility of applying “simplicity filters,” 
such as his exploratory theory of bird navigation, which restricted scientific explanations 
of behavior to their lowest order of complexity. And most significantly, this changed 
perspective opened the possibility for Griffin to explore new questions about animal 
cognition and consciousness in the later decades of his career. 
 
Karl von Frisch and the “Dance Language” of the Honeybee 
Austrian zoologist Karl von Frisch (1886-1982) spent a long, illustrious career 
studying the sensory physiology and behavior of bees and fish.39 In a long series of 
experiments beginning in the 1910s and culminating in the 1940s, he famously 
discovered that honeybees communicated precise information about the location of nectar 
                                                
39 On von Frisch’s life and work, see Tania Munz’s recent work: Tania Munz, “Of Birds and Bees: Karl 
von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and the Science of Animals, 1908-1973,” (Doctoral Thesis, Princeton 
University, 2007); Tania Munz, “The Bee Battles: Karl von Frisch, Adrian Wenner and the Honey Bee 
Dance Language Controversy,” Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 38 (2005): 535-570. Von Frisch 
self-identified as a physiologist rather than an ethologist, but Munz has argued for his inclusion as a 
significant contributor to the development of professional ethology. 
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sources to one another using what he characterized as a “dance language.”40 He also 
found that bees could perceive ultraviolet radiation and the polarization of sunlight across 
the sky, and that this allowed them to determine the sun’s position for the purpose of 
orientation in adverse visual conditions. According to historian of science Richard 
Burkhardt, von Frisch’s “remarkable discovery of the dance ‘language’ of the honeybee 
is generally regarded by ethologists as the single most important contribution to the study 
of animal behavior of the twentieth century.”41 The dance language theory was both 
shocking and controversial, as it challenged the view that symbolic language was the 
exclusive provenance of human beings. Whereas it was widely accepted that 
invertebrates were capable of communication via mechanisms such as chemical 
signaling, von Frisch’s theory suggested that bees possessed a language, which seemed to 
indicate a far more complex neurophysiological basis for that communicative behavior. 
The discovery was also surprising because it demonstrated that the information 
transmitted via the honeybee language was not only abstract, but also impressively 
precise, indicating both the direction and distance of nectar sources.  
As historian Tania Munz has explained, von Frisch’s theory sparked a heated 
controversy in the late-1960s that centered on the question of whether bees actually 
utilized the information encoded in their dances in order to locate nectar.42 On one side of 
this debate were von Frisch, Donald Griffin, and other zoologists who were impressed by 
the complexity and versatility of animal behavior as demonstrated by the symbolic 
                                                
40 Von Frisch first published his “dance language” theory in 1946: Karl von Frisch, “Die ‘Sprache’ der 
Bienen und ihre Nutzanwendung in der Landwirtschaft,” Experientia, Vol. 2, No. 10 (1946): 397-404. See 
also: Karl von Frisch, Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Language (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1950).  
41 Richard Burkhardt, “Karl Ritter von Frisch,” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. 17 
(Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2008), p. 312. 
42 Tania Munz, “The Bee Battles,” Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 38 (2005): 535-570. 
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communication system of bees. Opposed to this view were biologist Adrian Wenner and 
his behaviorist colleagues, who charged that the behavior in question could be more 
simply explained via olfaction, and that the linguistic elements of the theory rendered it 
unnecessarily complex.43 Wenner and his colleagues explained that although their 
experiments on olfaction had not disproved the dance language theory, they offered “a 
more simple interpretation” of the results.44 Their opposition was thus a quintessential 
application of Lloyd Morgan’s canon, a philosophical variant of Ockham’s razor intended 
to restrict explanations of animal behavior to their lowest order of psychic complexity.45 
Eventually the debate was settled in favor of von Frisch, whose victory culminated in his 
reception of the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (along with Konrad Lorenz 
and Niko Tinbergen for their own contributions to ethology).46  
Since von Frisch’s discovery of the dance language is a classic story in the history 
of ethology, I will only briefly recount it in broad strokes.47 Beginning around 1920, his 
observations of the social behavior of honeybees seemed to indicate that they conveyed 
to one another the location of nectar and pollen sources through some indeterminate 
communicative mechanism. He observed that foraging bees performed a ritualistic 
“dance” when returning to the hive from a profitable source of nectar or pollen, and that 
                                                
43 As Munz has described, Wenner took a particularly mathematical approach to biological problems, 
which led to both disagreements and confusion in his debates with von Frisch and his supporters.  
44 Karl von Frisch, Adrian Wenner, and Dennis Johnson, “Honeybees: Do They Use Direction and Distance 
Information Provided by Their Dancers,” Science, Vol. 158 (1973): 1077. 
45 On Morgan’s purpose for formulating the canon, and how subsequent scientists and historians have 
misinterpreted his intentions, see: Alan Costall, “How Lloyd Morgan’s Canon Backfired,” Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 28 (Apr. 1993): 113-122. Griffin eventually coined the derogatory 
term “simplicity filters” for such heuristics, which he criticized for unduly restricting scientific creativity 
and for obscuring accurate interpretations of complex behavior.  
46 On the history of ethology and the significance of the 1973 Nobel Prize, see: Richard Burkhardt, Patterns 
of Behavior: Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and the Founding of Ethology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), especially chapter ten. 
47 The definitive source on von Frisch’s discovery is Tania Munz’s dissertation (unpublished): Tania Munz, 
“Of Birds and Bees: Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and the Science of Animals, 1908-1973,” (Doctoral 
Thesis, Princeton University, 2007). 
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after mimicking the dance, other bees departed the hive and invariably discovered the 
source. For several decades von Frisch suspected that the bees’ highly refined olfactory 
sense was probably responsible: thus when a forager returned to the hive, other bees 
detected trace elements of the specific nectar or pollen lingering on the forager’s 
antennae, and they used their olfactory sense to locate its origin.48 Just after the war in the 
summer of 1945, however, von Frisch began analyzing the dance’s finer movements, 
which ultimately led to his famous discovery.49 
In these later experiments, von Frisch observed that the dance patterns varied 
according to the distance between the hive and the nectar or pollen sources.50 Bees 
performed the first type—the “Rundtanz” (round dance)—when returning from a source 
that was relatively close to the hive. In such cases, von Frisch concluded, olfactory cues 
constituted the primary mechanism by which other bees located the nectar sources; thus 
the forager’s round dance merely indicated that it had located a source relatively close to 
the hive, and other bees were stimulated by the dance to leave the hive in search of that 
nectar via olfaction. And when sources of nectar were richer and in greater supply, the 
foraging bees danced more vigorously in order to convince more of their brethren to seek 
out the prize.  
As the distance to the nectar increased beyond 50 meters, however, the round 
dance gradually gave way to another style. And at distances greater than 100 meters, the 
bees performed this other dance exclusively. Von Frisch termed the second dance the 
                                                
48 He also thought that the type of dance performed by the bees distinguished nectar from pollen sources. 
49 During the war von Frisch was commissioned by the Nazi regime to conduct applied research on 
pollination in the hopes of improving German agriculture. As Tania Munz has shown, von Frisch framed 
his work as useful to the state, although he opposed Nazi sociopolitical ideologies: Tania Munz, “Of Birds 
and Bees,” p. 106-149. 
50 Henceforth I will simply say nectar source, although von Frisch found that the dances also indicate 
sources of pollen and other objects of biological significance. 
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“Schwänzeltanz” (tail waggle or wagging dance), which entailed the repetition of a 
“straight run” movement followed by a figure-eight pattern, in which the bees vigorously 
waggled their abdomens on the surface of the honeycomb.51 He found that the straight 
run indicated the direction of the nectar source, but because the honeycomb is typically 
oriented vertically, bees transposed the horizontal direction of the nectar onto the vertical 
plane of the honeycomb. In order to do this, they utilized information about the location 
of the nectar source relative to the position of the sun. For example, if the nectar was 
twenty degrees to the right of the sun’s direction, then the straight run of the dance was 
20 degrees to the right of the vertical axis of the honeycomb. Von Frisch would later 
discover in 1948 that even when the sun was partially obscured by clouds, bees were able 
to determine its absolute position by sensing the polarization of light in the blue sky.52 
Remarkably, the dance also indicated the distance between the nectar source and the 
hive.53 This information was encoded by the frequency of the waggles in the figure-eight 
motion: more waggling indicated that the source was close to the hive, and less waggling 
indicated a greater distance.54 In addition, von Frisch found that the dances constituted a 
versatile language, as bees also used it to communicate the locations of other biologically 
significant resources such as potential hive sites and water. 
Upon learning about von Frisch’s work in the spring of 1948, Griffin became a 
champion of the dance language theory in the United States. Although he was initially 
                                                
51 He had discovered the waggle dance several decades before, but thought that it was used to designate 
pollen sources exclusively, whereas the round dance was thought to signify nectar. It was not until the 
crucial experiments of 1945 that he realized the true significance of the waggle dance. 
52 In addition, since ultraviolet radiation more readily penetrates cloud cover than visible light, the bee’s 
ability to perceive UV light aided them in determining the precise position of the sun. 
53 The distance was given in terms of the time it took the bee to fly from the hive to the source, rather than 
in absolute spatial terms. 
54 Karl von Frisch, Bees, p. 78. The distance was indicated not by its spatial position, but by the 
approximate time that it took the bees to fly from the hive to the nectar.  
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skeptical, he became satisfied with its general validity after successfully repeating several 
of the experiments at Cornell. For Griffin, who was “so fascinated by this revolutionary 
discovery,” the dance language theory had important implications about animals in 
general. For one, it indicated that lower animals were capable of exhibiting a type of 
symbolic language, which up to that point had been thought to be the exclusive 
provenance of human beings. As Tania Munz has emphasized, however, von Frisch was 
never quite comfortable comparing the dance language to human language, and in fact he 
typically wrote “language” in quotation marks in order to deflect charges that he was 
anthropomorphizing the phenomenon.55  
Regardless of its resemblance to human language, however, the bee dances 
obviously constituted a complex mode of communication insofar as they involved 
encoding abstract information about distance and direction into a coordinated system of 
physical gestures. But Griffin was also impressed by the complexity of the orientation 
behavior that undergirded the communications of bees. The fact that bees were able to 
determine the precise location of nectar sources relative to that of their hive and to the 
changing position of the sun was stunning; it implied that bees had a highly developed 
perception of time and space, and that they were able to encode spatial information onto a 
kind of cognitive map that led to distant goals. As he explained at the time of the 
discovery, “The ‘language’ of bees does not employ words or even sounds, but serves 
nonetheless to convey complex information, and even seems to involve something 
                                                
55 During mid-twentieth century work on animal behavior, to be accused of anthropomorphism was a 
serious indictment of the integrity and validity of one’s work, and von Frisch certainly wished to avoid that 
charge. See: John S. Kennedy, The New Anthropomorphism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 1-7; Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, eds. Robert Mitchell, Nicholas Thompson, and 
H. Lyn Miles (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), especially chapters 1, 11, and 16.  
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analogous to map reading.”56 For ten years Griffin had been trying to solve the problem 
of bird migration from within a mechanistic framework, searching for the environmental 
cues utilized in orientation. In the dance language of the honeybee, he found evidence 
that the mechanisms of animal orientation could be far more complex than the mere 
perception of environmental stimuli. Rather, it showed that animals were able to do 
something akin to rudimentary information processing, as they made calculations about 
direction and distance, and utilized a system of communicative gestures to encode and 
transmit that information to other individuals. 
So impressed was Griffin that he invited von Frisch to present his work at a 
special symposium on animal navigation that Griffin was planning for the 1948 AAAS 
meeting in Washington, DC. Due to financial difficulties and postwar travel restrictions, 
however, he was unable to commit in such short order, and so Griffin arranged for von 
Frisch’s former student Ernst Wolf, to present instead.57 In the meantime, Griffin began 
arranging a larger-scale lecture tour for von Frisch across several universities in the 
United States and Canada.58 To finance the trip, he turned to the Rockefeller Foundation, 
which had become a leading source of support for such international exchanges in the 
years following the war.59 And to help persuade the Foundation to support the trip, 
Griffin asked the esteemed Danish physiologist and Nobel laureate August Krogh (1874-
1949) to write a letter of support, which helpfully explained the unpopularity of von 
                                                
56 Donald Griffin, forward to Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Language, by Karl von Frisch 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), v-ix. 
57 At the time Austrian zoologist Ernst Wolf was a professor at Wellesley College. The symposium, 
“Mechanisms of Animal Migration and Homing,” was held at the AAAS meeting on September 13-17, 
1948, in Washington, DC.  
58 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 135-137. 
59 Janet Paine, who oversaw Rockefeller’s German and Austrian exchanges, was Griffin’s primary contact. 
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Frisch’s work with Nazi officials.60 The Rockefeller Foundation ultimately agreed to 
finance $2100 for the trip on the condition that other institutions matched their funding.61 
Griffin therefore began a mad scramble to secure funds and commitments from other 
universities for a months-long journey in the spring of 1949. The trip was largely 
successful, and von Frisch presented his work in various formats at several top 
universities.62  
In his efforts to popularize the discovery, Griffin also edited and oversaw the 
publication of von Frisch’s lectures in a short book, Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, 
and Language, published in English by Cornell University Press in 1950.63 In the 
forward, Griffin mused about the profound implications of the dance language theory, 
arguing that its “wholehearted acceptance involves a considerable revision of current 
scientific attitudes.”64 He further suggested that the discovery validated questions about 
the “higher mental faculties” involved in the behavior of lower animals, which had been 
rejected as unscientific in the heyday of behavioristic and mechanistic approaches to 
behavior: “In recent decades biologists have grown reluctant to credit any claim that the 
reactions of lower animals attain a high degree of complexity, or what one might be 
tempted to call intelligence.” He concluded that the “truly revolutionary” character of von 
                                                
60 Donald Griffin to August Krogh, 17 September 1948, Series 1, Box 11, Folder 105, RG 450G875 Donald 
Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. As Tania Munz has shown, von Frisch had 
been unfairly accused of cruelty to animals in the early 1930s, which rather ironically drew the ire of Nazi 
officials. Tania Munz, “Of Birds and Bees,” p. 106-108. 
61 Evidently this was a standard practice of the Rockefeller Foundation when supporting such trips. Donald 
Griffin to Karl Lashley, 21 December 1948, Series 1, Box 6, Folder 73, RG 450G875 Donald Redfield 
Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
62 The trip included stops at universities such as Cornell, Yale, Harvard, and the University of Chicago. In 
addition, von Frisch presented at the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Washington, DC, and made a trip 
to the Yerkes Primate Laboratories in Orange Park, Florida, where he was hosted by Karl Lashley. 
63 Karl von Frisch, Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1950). 
64 Donald Griffin, forward to Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Language, by Karl von Frisch 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), vii. 
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Frisch’s findings ought to lead scientists to “readjust our thinking about animal behavior 
in the light of these findings and the implications that flow from them.”65  
In a similarly provocative article on von Frisch’s theory, August Krogh explained: 
“I would ask you to give some thought also to the mind of the bees. I have no doubt that 
some will attempt to ‘explain’ the performances of the bees as the result of reflexes and 
instincts. Such attempts will certainly contribute to our understanding, but for my part I 
find it difficult to assume that such perfection and flexibility in behavior can be reached 
without some kind of mental processes going on in the small heads of the bees.”66 But not 
every scientist agreed with Krogh and Griffin. In his review of von Frisch’s book, 
American comparative psychologist T.C. Schneirla considered it “unfortunate that the 
Foreword offers a vague psychological interpretation which goes considerably beyond 
the evidence.”67 For Schneirla, years of study on conditioning and learning in insects had 
convinced him that behavioral complexity did not imply intelligence in its “higher-level 
sense,” since seemingly complex behaviors could result from basic conditioning and 
without explanations that invoked higher psychological faculties.68 Schneirla’s view 
found its ultimate manifestation in Adrian Wenner’s stimulus-response framework for 
explaining the nectar seeking behavior of bees, which incited the aforementioned 
scientific controversy in the late 1960s.69  
Griffin, however, was uninterested in laboratory conditioning approaches to the 
general understanding of behavior, and instead focused on the sensory basis of the natural 
                                                
65 Donald Griffin, forward to Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Language, by Karl von Frisch 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), viii. 
66 August Krogh, “The Language of the Bees,” Scientific American, Vol. 179 (Aug. 1948): 18-21. 
67 T.C. Schneirla, “Bees,” Ecology, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul. 1951): 565. 
68 Schneirla spent several decades working on insect learning at the American Museum of Natural History 
in New York. He and Griffin knew each other well, although their work rarely overlapped.  
69 Tania Munz, “The Bee Battles: Karl von Frisch, Adrian Wenner and the Honey Bee Dance Language 
Controversy,” Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 38 (2005): 535-570. 
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behavior of animals. While conditioning techniques were useful insofar as they revealed 
the physical limits of sensation (the presence or absence of magnetic sensitivity, for 
example), he did not view this as the key to understanding behavior. For him, von 
Frisch’s discovery firmly demonstrated that the lower organisms were capable of truly 
complex behavior, as it defied explanation from within a simple stimulus-response 
framework. And eventually the predictions set forth in his forward proved correct. As 
ethologist James L. Gould, a graduate student of Griffin’s whose work served as the 
conclusive confirmation of von Frisch’s theory, explained in 1975:  
Some of the resistance to the idea that honey bees possess a symbolic language 
seems to have arisen from a conviction that “lower” animals, and insects in 
particular, are too small and phylogenetically remote to be capable of “complex” 
behavior. There is perhaps a feeling of incongruity in that the honey bee language 
is symbolic and abstract, and, in terms of information capacity at least, second 
only to human language. Despite expectations, however, animals continue to be 
more complex than had been thought, or than experimenters may have been 
prepared to discover. Especially in ethology, it is difficult to avoid the 
unprofitable extremes of blinding skepticism and crippling romanticism.70 
 
Despite the relatively cold response from skeptics such as Schneirla and Wenner, most 
scientists eventually came to recognize that von Frisch’s discovery had fundamentally 
recast the question of intelligent behavior in lower animals. And this view was 
crystallized further when the theory was sanctified with the 1973 Nobel Prize, thus 
ending the Wenner controversy for all intents and purposes.71  
In his autobiographical memoir of 1985, Griffin would later recall that von 
Frisch’s work subverted the Loebian conception of animal navigation: “Good god, if 
mere insects communicate abstract information about distance and direction, where does 
                                                
70 James L. Gould, “Honey Bee Recruitment: The Dance-Language Controversy,” Science, Vol. 189, No. 
4204 (Aug. 1975): 692. Gould’s assessment of the controversy thus mirrors that of his advisor and mentor, 
Griffin. 
71 In fact the controversy dragged on for a few more years, but by the mid-1970s Wenner found himself 
increasingly isolated in his opposition. 
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that leave Loebian tropisms?”72 This sentiment, however, is somewhat disingenuous. 
Hardly any zoologist at the time would have invoked Loeb’s turn-of-the-century 
framework to explain the orientation of invertebrates, and there is no evidence that 
Griffin’s understanding of phenomena such as echolocation or bird navigation relied on 
such mechanisms.73 By 1950 the cachet of Loebian tropisms had long been surpassed by 
the work of physiologists such as Gottfried Fraenkel and Donald L. Gunn, who theorized 
a more elaborate scheme of “taxes” and “kineses” to understand and categorize a wider 
range of locomotion and modes of orientation.74 To be fair, Griffin mentions elsewhere in 
the essay that perhaps his ideas were more in line with those of Fraenkel and Gunn.75 In 
that framework, however, animal orientation was still understood as the product of 
mechanistic reactions, although it was far more elaborate than Loeb’s theory.76 What 
Griffin’s rhetoric really captures is the idea that animal navigation at the time was 
understood in simple, stimulus-response terms, which was certainly in keeping with 
Loeb’s mechanistic view of biology.77 And it was precisely the revision of this type of 
reductionist formulation that he predicted would result from a proper understanding of 
the “dance language” and its greater implications.  
                                                
72 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 136. Griffin repeated this rhetorical 
question in another autobiographical essay: Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of 
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73 In fact, he was openly critical of Yeagley’s magnetic orientation theory because its tropistic simplicity 
was reminiscent of Loebian orientation in lower animals (see previous chapter). 
74 Gottfried Fraenkel and Donald Gunn, The Orientation of Animals: Kineses, Taxes, and Compass 
Reactions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940). 
75 Donald Griffin, “Recollections of an Experimental Naturalist,” p. 135. 
76 On Loeb’s theory of orientation and his debate with Herbert Spencer Jennings in the early-twentieth 
century, see: Philip J. Pauly, “The Loeb-Jennings Debate and the Science of Animal Behavior,” Journal of 
the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 17 (1981): 504-515. 
77 On Loeb’s mechanistic vision of biology, see: Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the 
Engineering Ideal in Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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For Griffin, von Frisch’s theory revealed that animal behavior—even in the lower 
invertebrates—could be far more complex than that for which extant frameworks 
allowed. More specifically, it suggested that in order to understand how animals 
accomplish difficult tasks such as homing, one might have to seek explanations well 
beyond the type of basic sensory mechanisms for which Griffin had been searching. 
Beyond that, it signified that the use of “simplicity filters,” which restricted scientific 
explanations to their most parsimonious formulations, might actually inhibit rather than 
improve scientific inquiry. This revelation came at an important moment in Griffin’s own 
research on bird homing and migration, since he had for several years affirmed that the 
most conservative interpretation of his data was that birds utilized a simple and random 
exploratory method. Von Frisch’s work demonstrated that bees were able to perceive 
polarized light, to track the shifting position of the sun, to make calculations about 
distance and direction, and to encode such information for the purpose of communication. 
If bees could perform such complex feats, what might birds be doing when homing? 
Could the parsimonious theory of random exploration be obscuring a more fundamental 
understanding of birds and their behavior? At around the same time several new 
developments in the field of bird migration revealed that this behavioral ability was 
indeed far more complex than Griffin and others suspected, and this new knowledge 
further expanded his view of the complexity and versatility of animal behavior. 
 
Birds Do It Too: The Solar Theory of Orientation 
As was discussed in chapter four, Yeagley’s magnetic theory proposed in 1947 
generated much controversy and criticism, and failed to persuade Griffin because of 
 200 
serious flaws in his experimental methods. But new work that followed soon after the 
Yeagley controversy reopened the question of navigation via specific environmental 
cues, and had the opposite effect on Griffin, causing him to take these more complex 
mechanisms seriously. In the late 1940s, his exploratory theory was the most widely 
accepted explanation among American biologists, although it was hardly comprehensive 
or satisfying. Essentially, Griffin held that birds navigated homeward merely as the result 
of encountering by chance territory that was already familiar to them. In the early 1950s, 
however, several important discoveries were made across the Atlantic, significantly 
altering the terrain. As the result of this work, scientists came to realize that birds were 
capable of navigation by utilizing much more complex sources of information gleaned 
from their environments.  
A major breakthrough in the study of bird migration occurred around 1950, when 
British ornithologist Geoffrey V.T. Matthews (1923-2013) and German ornithologist 
Gustav Kramer (1891-1957) developed the solar orientation (or “sun arc”) theory of bird 
navigation. Through a series of clever experiments, Matthews showed that pigeons and 
Manx shearwaters used the sun’s shifting position across the sky to orient themselves in 
the direction of their goals. The theory held that these birds accounted for the sun’s 
position at the “local” time of the territory that they wished to reach, and compared that 
position with the relative trajectory of the sun in unfamiliar territory. Thus the sun arc 
theory relied on recent theoretical work on what came to be known as the “biological 
clock,” a concept that was becoming increasingly important in physiology during the 
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1950s.78 Kramer, who studied the natural migrations of birds, also contributed to the 
theory of solar orientation through his laboratory investigation of starlings. 
Although the sun arc theory was not a comprehensive or universal explanation of 
bird migration, it solved several major problems of orientation and took by surprise 
skeptics such as Griffin. And much like von Frisch’s discovery and Griffin’s concurrent 
work on echolocation in bats, this knowledge convinced him that problems of animal 
behavior were likely to be much more complex than he had imagined, due to the ability 
of animals to process complex information acquired from their surroundings. The sun arc 
theory challenged Griffin to think about the problem of migration in a new light, and 
fortified his skepticism of simplistic and mechanistic frameworks in the interpretation of 
their behavior. As he later explained, Matthews’s and Kramer’s work on birds “had a 
sobering effect on [his] reductionistic thinking.”79 Although these developments did not 
immediately push him toward cognitive interpretations of animal behavior, they began to 
legitimize ideas that would lead him down that path in the 1970s.  
The first of these developments was led by British ornithologist G.V.T. 
Matthews’s work on homing in pigeons, conducted between 1948 and 1953.80 In a series 
of experiments, Matthews demonstrated that pigeons were in fact able to choose 
particular directions when released into unfamiliar territory, although that skill varied 
considerably among individuals. In general, however, the ability depended on the 
visibility of the sun, which pigeons evidently used for orientation. Although Griffin and 
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others had previously suspected that birds might use the sun for orientation, Matthews 
was the first to demonstrate it with convincing experimental evidence. 
A skilled ornithologist, Matthews raised a group of pigeons and carefully trained 
them in homing exercises from a young age. After hundreds of training exercises in the 
territory around their lofts, he took them to a mostly cleared area in unfamiliar territory 
and released them individually, taking care to face different directions as he let each bird 
loose. He observed each as it flew away, and recorded the direction in which it was flying 
at the ‘vanishing point’ (the point at which he lost sight of the birds in his binoculars, 
approximate 1-2 miles away). He discovered that pigeons that flew within 30 degrees of 
the home direction returned to their lofts at higher speeds and more frequently than 
others, thus demonstrating a positive correlation between homing performance and a 
generally correct initial flight direction.81 The next step was to determine how certain 
pigeons chose the correct direction. 
In these experiments, Matthews employed a group of pigeons that were rigorously 
trained to fly in a specific direction upon being released. This was a long-established 
technique, accomplished by consistently releasing pigeons in the same cardinal direction 
in relation to their lofts.82 Matthews then took the pigeons into unfamiliar territory in the 
opposite direction of their lofts (“off the training line”). In the initial trials, most pigeons 
flew in their training direction, and many never found their way home. However, in 
further experiments with birds that had more extensive training, he found that a majority 
flew not in the training direction, but within 30 to 40 degrees of their home direction 
                                                
81 G.V.T. Matthews, “The Experimental Investigation of Navigation in Homing Pigeons,” p. 510. 
82 This directional training in fact dates back several hundreds of years, as it was used to train carrier 
pigeons. 
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(nearly opposite their training direction).83 Furthermore, Matthews showed that these 
pigeons were able to maintain the correct heading over long stretches of unfamiliar 
territory.84 This was a remarkable homing ability, which suggested that pigeons were 
capable of choosing the correct direction regardless of their training.  
Matthews was initially uncertain as to how the pigeons accomplished such feats. 
He ruled out random searching, since his experiments showed that pigeons mostly 
maintained the same heading as they flew across unfamiliar territory. He also rejected 
Yeagley’s magnetic theory, as did most ornithologists.85 One important clue, however, 
was that his pigeons did not home as well in overcast skies. To account for these data 
Matthews theorized a possible solution, which held that pigeons could measure the arc of 
the sun’s motion across the sky. He supposed that they were capable of estimating the 
altitude of the sun and the time that it would reach its highest point, and that they could 
compare those measurements with that of their home loft. If the pigeons could then 
“interpret the difference between the two sets of measurements,” they should be able to 
home in the correct direction, as they had in his experiments.86 The theory, then, relied on 
the assumption that birds possessed a biological clock of some sort, as they were capable 
of keeping track of the time that it took the sun to move across the sky. However, as 
Matthews mused, “there is little evidence of any independent time-keeping mechanism in 
birds, and none as to its accuracy, but some form of physiological chronometer cannot be 
                                                
83 G.V.T. Matthews, “The Experimental Investigation of Navigation in Homing Pigeons,” p. 518-519. 
84 G.V.T. Matthews, “The Experimental Investigation of Navigation in Homing Pigeons,” p. 525. 
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ruled out of hand.”87 In fact, he was not alone in suggesting the possible existence of a 
physiological clock, and over the course of the 1950s many physiologists, ecologists, 
biochemists, and ethologists became increasingly interested in the concept.88 For the time 
being, however, Matthews simply needed to assume that it existed in some form in order 
to make his theory work. Better yet, he needed experiments that could demonstrate that 
his theoretical assumptions were true. 
Over the next few years, Matthews conducted extensive research seeking to 
demonstrate the validity of his theory. In one set of experiments, his pigeons learned to 
select food according to the position of an “artificial sun” in laboratory conditioning 
experiments. By feeding birds at different times of the day, he showed that pigeons could 
be conditioned to choose the location of a food stimulus according to the shifting angle of 
the artificial sun. Thus, he concluded, pigeons were capable of perceiving and reacting to 
the fixed angle to the sun.89 While the theory relied on the existence of some kind of 
biological clock, Matthews was unable to specify the physiological basis of the clock. 
Nevertheless, more experiments in the field with pigeons seemed to indicate that partially 
cloudy conditions—when the sun was occasionally visible as opposed to fully overcast 
skies—affected homing in ways that suggested that birds did rely on the sun in order to 
choose the correct direction.90 His theory was supported by further experiments on Manx 
shearwaters, a species famous for its impressive migrations that span thousands of miles. 
He found that shearwaters were remarkable at homing from unfamiliar territory, and that 
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their ability, like the pigeons, depended entirely on the visibility of the sun. In overcast 
skies, or nighttime releases from unfamiliar territory, the shearwaters were unable to 
return or did so substantially slower as compared to releases in clear skies.91 Although the 
sun arc theory was not accepted quickly, additional evidence accumulated throughout the 
1950s led to its increasing popularity until eventually most ornithologists recognized that 
it was one of the major keys to bird navigation.92 
 Complementing Matthews’s work on bird navigation was that of German 
ornithologist Gustav Kramer at the Max Planck Institute for Animal Biology in 
Wilhelmshaven. Kramer took a laboratory-based approach to the problem of orientation, 
and in his experiments he employed starlings, a wild species with well-known migration 
routes in northern Germany. Using a large, circular orientation cage, Kramer tested the 
direction that starlings flew in a number of experimental conditions.93 He found that by 
raising starlings and caging them during their vernal migratory period, he could induce 
“Zugaktivität,” or migratory restlessness. When starlings entered this period of increased 
excitement and activity, they showed a strong and definite tendency to fly toward the 
northeast, the natural direction of their migration.94 Like Matthews’s pigeons and 
shearwaters, however, their ability to choose the correct direction depended on having a 
clear view of the sky above. Thus Kramer too held that the solar theory of orientation was 
the key to unlocking the mystery of bird migration. 
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To further confirm his findings, Kramer installed several inward-facing mirrors 
around the perimeter of the circular cage. By opening specific windows in the room 
surrounding the cage, and placing mirrors within it at particular angles, Kramer was able 
to shift the apparent position of the sun based on the starlings’ perspective. These 
adjustments indeed had the predicted effect, causing the birds to move in the apparent 
direction of northeast, depending on the direction in which they sensed the sun.95 Another 
ingenious variation demonstrated that starlings could determine absolute direction in 
conditioned feeding experiments. Kramer installed identical food compartments around 
the perimeter of the cage, and placed food within a compartment that was in a specific 
direction relative to where the starling was released into the cage. The entire cage could 
be rotated in order to prevent the starlings from using particular cues within the room or 
the cage itself in order to select the correct compartment. Within about two weeks of 
training, the birds demonstrated the ability to use the sun’s position in order to determine 
absolute direction, and thereby choose the compartment containing the food. And they 
were able to do so within a margin of error of about 30 degrees.96  
During the late 1950s, further research on sun compass orientation and the 
biological clock expanded the scientific study of bird migration, and new questions 
emerged concerning the ability of birds to utilize complex sources of information. For 
example, Kramer and Matthews found that some birds relied not only on the sun for 
directional orientation, but also on the positions of the stars when navigating at night. As 
surprising developments such as this came to the fore, the simpler, mechanistic 
conception of migration based on random exploration and simple environmental cues 
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gradually faded. For his part, Griffin turned his focus back to bats, although he remained 
an active contributor in the field of bird migration for the rest of his career. 
The theory of sun compass orientation did not solve the whole problem of 
migration, but it—like von Frisch’s work—suggested that biologists needed to reexamine 
their assumptions about the complexity of animal behavior in order to gain a full 
understanding of such behavioral phenomena. If birds and bees could use the position of 
the sun and stars to orient themselves, and to make judgments about time and its 
relationship to the sun’s position, then the whole problem of migration would be cast in a 
new light. His excitement about these new advances led Griffin to write a book, Bird 
Migration: The Biology and Physics of Orientation Behavior (1964), for which he 
received the prestigious Phi Beta Kappa Science Book Award.97 No longer could birds be 
thought of as physiological machines that merely reacted to environmental stimuli; rather, 
Griffin began to see them as agents that were capable of acquiring information about their 
environments from different sources, processing that information, and using it to guide 
their behaviors. This type of thinking pushed Griffin further away from simple 
mechanistic frameworks, and in the direction of cognitive interpretations of animal 
behavior. The transformation, however, did not happen overnight. And in addition to 





                                                
97 Donald Griffin, Bird Migration: The Biology and Physics of Orientation Behavior (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1964).  
 208 
Listening in the Dark: the Versatility of Echolocation 
In this final section, I analyze several developments in the study of echolocation 
during the 1950s and 1960s that further demonstrated the surprising complexity and 
versatility of animal behavior. This new knowledge about bats, like that generated by 
research on other winged creatures, resulted from the reciprocal analysis of behavior, 
ecology, and sensory physiology. The most important of these findings was that bats used 
echolocation to hunt insects. But Griffin also discovered that their target discrimination 
was impressively refined, as they were able to extract extraordinarily detailed information 
about different objects via echolocation. Thus by the late 1950s, he had come to 
understand echolocation as a “highly versatile mode of perception,” which served as the 
main “sensory window” available to bats.98 And the versatility of echolocation, which 
was found to be used in a variety of behavioral contexts and to accomplish different 
tasks, led him to view bats as active agents that wielded their specialized sensory tool in a 
highly specific and precise manner. Gradually, he gave up the idea that echolocation was 
in any true sense an “automatic” process. In this new conception, he ceded more agency 
to the bats themselves, who modified the physical properties of their signals according to 
the disparate purposes for which they used them.  
As explained in my third chapter, Griffin was truly surprised in 1951 to discover 
that bats used echolocation for hunting insects.99 Before then, he had assumed that it was 
primarily used for obstacle avoidance, and perhaps for other relatively simple tasks such 
as locating the entrance to caves.100 That bats might employ it in a complex manner to 
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hunt insects on the wing simply seemed too incredible, although thinking about bats in 
the context of sonar and radar surely validated this possibility. As he explained in the 
initial stages of that research, “It is certainly reasonable to assume that they do, since 
their avoidance of small inanimate objects is so clearly based on this natural analogy to 
radar or sonar instruments.”101 It is also likely that von Frisch’s demonstration that bees 
were capable of complex spatial and temporal calculations in their solar orientation and 
dance language led Griffin to question whether bats too could accomplish more complex 
feats using their own refined mode of perception. At the very least, von Frisch’s 
discovery legitimized such inquiry into the behavioral complexity of higher animals.  
Griffin’s discovery was made possible by studying the behavior of bats in their 
natural environments, since it was exceedingly difficult to coax them into hunting in the 
laboratory.102 Although this required special technical efforts to mobilize his ultrasonic 
equipment and experimental setup, he was eventually able to capture and analyze the 
acoustic record of both big brown bats (Eptesicus fuscus) and little brown bats (Myotis 
lucifugus). He analyzed the acoustic properties of the echolocation signals associated 
with hunting behavior, firmly concluding that the bats “employ the process of 
echolocation for more precise and complicated types of orientation than the mere 
avoidance of static obstacles.”103 He also stressed, however, that his conclusions were 
limited to the particular species that he studied, and suggested that there might be 
significant differences in the hunting strategies used by other groups of bats. 
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In his analysis, Griffin placed a new emphasis on the role of frequency 
modulation in the bat’s ultrasonic pulses. Signal theory in radar and sonar technology 
held that frequency modulation was useful in detecting small, moving objects, and thus 
Griffin proposed that it would be advantageous for the echolocation of insects at close 
range. As he explained at the time to James Brantley, a radar engineer at the Cornell 
Aeronautical Laboratory: “I have evidence that the frequency modulation is under the 
bats’ control, and…I am strongly inclined to believe that this frequency modulation has a 
very considerable significance [in their hunting behavior].”104 Griffin also proposed that 
such modulations would be useful in discriminating the finer details of the objects that 
bats perceived: “such variations in the amplitude and frequency pattern of the echo could 
theoretically convey to the bat rather detailed information about a small target.”105  
Yet another advantage of frequency modulation was that it rendered the bat’s 
signal less susceptible to jamming by those of other bats and by ambient noise, and so 
Griffin began to study the biophysics of jamming avoidance in the late 1950s. He had 
wondered about this for several years, as the problem was an important and obvious one 
in radar and sonar development. With his graduate student Alan Grinnell, he conducted a 
series of experiments to assess obstacle avoidance in adverse noise conditions in the 
laboratory.106 By filling the room with intense ultrasonic sound, they sought to discover 
the degree to which bats were able to filter out the external noise in order to navigate via 
echolocation successfully. Interestingly, these experiments were in fact directly 
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analogous to Griffin’s wartime research on military communications at the Psycho-
Acoustic Laboratory. He and Grinnell supplemented this behavioral research with 
neurophysiological analysis to determine if the bat’s auditory cortex was particularly 
suited to the perception of pulses of sound. Using standard electrophysiological 
techniques, Grinnell set out to determine the “neural correlates” of echolocation by 
measuring the effect of sound on the production of electrical activity in the inferior 
colliculus, the area of the brain associated with auditory processing. He and Griffin thus 
measured indirectly the bat’s sensitivity to pulses versus continuous tones, and found that 
the bat’s high signal-to-noise ratio allowed them to discriminate the echoes of their 
ultrasonic pulses from background noise.107 Griffin also employed obstacle avoidance 
experiments to measure the sensitivity of echolocation—that is, to determine what kinds 
of objects were detectable by echolocation, and at what distances bats could appreciably 
perceive them. In these experiments, which were supported by the Office of Naval 
Research, he and Grinnell performed extensive tests to correlate modifications of the 
physical characteristics of echolocation signals with changes in the size and distance of 
the objects being detected.108 
Griffin thus spent a large part of the 1950s and early 1960s conducting 
experiments both in the wild and in the laboratory on the behavior of bats and the 
biophysical properties of echolocation that accompanied those behaviors. The behavioral 
plasticity as demonstrated by the bat’s use of echolocation for various purposes 
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dramatically altered his view of animal behavior. He eventually came to see their use of 
modulation not as an automatic mechanism, per se, but as a tunable function that bats 
actively manipulated while pursuing insects. These new developments led Griffin to write 
an expansive book on bats, Listening in the Dark (1958), which includes elements of 
natural history, systematics, sensory physiology, ethology, and philosophy of science.109 
For his efforts, the book was awarded the prestigious Daniel Giraud Elliot Prize (1958), 
awarded by the National Academy of Sciences every three to five years for the best book 
in zoology.  
In Listening in the Dark, his magnum opus, Griffin began to state more explicitly 
his new view that bats were agents that actively utilized echolocation to accomplish 
various tasks, and he began to speculate for the first time about the subjective world of 
bats. He explained, “I believe we are justified in going on to infer that the whole behavior 
of the more specialized insectivorous bats involves primarily a world of sound rather than 
one of light. These bats must spend most of their lives conversing with the world around 
them.”110 But where he had previously described obstacle avoidance as an automatic 
process, he revised that view in light of new knowledge about echolocation. As he 
explained, “Echolocation cannot be an easy or automatic process for the bats; it must 
require attention, skill, and mental effort, albeit perhaps wholly unconscious effort like 
that involved in walking through underbrush or riding a bicycle.”111 Griffin thus argued 
that by studying echolocation, one could better understand the bat’s own awareness of its 
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surroundings.112 In doing so he invoked new psychological concepts, such as attention, 
memory, and distraction, in the attempt to make sense of the bat’s behavior: 
Evidently when bats are flying through familiar surroundings they rely to an 
increasing extent on their memory of spatial relations acquired on previous flights 
through the same space. Under these conditions their attention lapses, and they are 
easily caught napping, as it were, by newly placed obstructions. In the same way, 
I suspect, when they are migrating at night far above the ground they are not 
prepared for steel radio towers or tall buildings, and their occasional collisions 
with such obstacles are also the result of inattention or carelessness. Perhaps their 
thoughts are far away to the south, centered upon the fat beetles that they hope to 
catch as they swoop beneath the festoons of Spanish moss, so that they turn a deaf 
ear to the echoes which should warn them that the Empire State Building looms 
ahead.113 
 
Rather than flying machines, then, bats were agents that “actively probe their 
environment.”114 And in fact Griffin likened their use of echolocation to “tool using,” 
since “a bat fashions useful pulses of sound out of the air it breathes, projects them 
forward to explore its environment, and listens for echoes that can tell it about what lies 
ahead.”115 In his later work on animal consciousness, this line of thinking would take on a 
new significance when tool use became a common criterion for assessing the intelligence 
of higher animals such as apes.116 
However, for the time being Griffin vacillated as to whether echolocation was 
truly a conscious process. For example, in a particularly telling passage he described 
what it might be like to be an echolocating bat: 
While all these events occur within less than one second, we can imagine 
processes which must be involved—even though they probably occur 
automatically and unconsciously—just as we describe to a novice the 
manipulations involved in driving an automobile. We may surmise that while 
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a classic illustration of tool-use as a measure of intelligence in nonhuman animals. 
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resting quietly the bat emitted only a few pulses in order to keep itself posted as to 
where it was. On finding itself free to fly it sent out a rapid burst to be sure the 
way was clear, and then took off. Thirty pulses per second were enough to guide 
straight and level flight in the absence of immediate obstructions. But after flying 
a few feet our bat began to notice faint echoes from the wires and decided to 
increase its pulse repetition rate to about 50 per second in order to echolocate 
these small and difficult obstacles more precisely. Then, when it was close 
enough to the array of wires, the bat already had enough information about the 
wires, had decided upon its course betwen [sic] them, and relaxed its vigil to the 
extent of lowering the pulse repetition rate.117 
 
Interestingly, whereas before he had insisted that echolocation “cannot be an easy or 
automatic process,” in the passage above he refers to it as just that, although in doing so 
he seems to equate automatic with unconscious. In suggesting that the physiological 
processes associated with echolocation “probably occur automatically or unconsciously,” 
he most likely intended to adopt a skeptical position on the question of animal 
consciousness, which in 1958 was still very much a scientific taboo. In fact throughout 
the book he frequently adopted a conservative tone about issues that were not firmly 
settled, and such rhetoric over the course of his career had earned him the reputation of 
being a hard-nosed skeptic. On the whole, however, by the late-1950s his thinking was 
shifting in the direction of echolocation being an intentional process rather than an 
automatic one. It would be several years, however, until he began to speculate openly 
about these ideas and develop them further.  
   
Conclusion 
Research on birds, bats, and bees forever transformed Griffin’s understanding of 
animal behavior. He came to reject not only simple stimulus-response frameworks for 
interpreting behavior, but more fundamentally the philosophy of science that affirmed the 
                                                
117 Donald Griffin, Listening in the Dark, p. 78. 
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use of such “simplicity filters” in the first place. As he later explained privately to a 
colleague with whom he had an interpretive disagreement over bird orientation: 
“Concerning what I have come to call ‘simplicity filters’, you and I may be moving apart 
in a philosophical sense. I find myself less and less of a hard-boiled skeptic, having lived 
through several cases where the ‘from Missouri’ approach was proved by subsequent data 
to have been unduly restricted.”118 Later in 1973, Griffin speculated about the underlying 
causes for what he was beginning to see as unjustified reductionism in behavioral 
explanations:  
I sometimes wonder whether the appeal of reductionist models does not stem in 
part from insecurity vis-à-vis our colleagues who can be so scornful of anyone 
who studies phenomena less precisely measurable than chemical reactions. But in 
my view the insecurity should be the other way around. Having been fortunate 
enough to be involved in some discoveries that in the beginning seemed to be 
merely romantic speculation, I am perhaps in an unusually good position to 
appreciate these considerations.119 
 
Discoveries such as the dance language of the honeybee and the solar orientation of birds 
showed that animals were capable of vastly more complex behaviors than he had been 
conditioned to believe, and thus forever transformed Griffin’s approach to animal 
behavior. In his later work on animal consciousness, these various criticisms of 
reductionism would take center stage. 
As his administrative duties once again began to consume much of his time and 
energy in the early 1960s, Griffin’s own research became increasingly sidelined. 
Although he collaborated in several important developments with his graduate students—
                                                
118 Donald Griffin to Alvin Novick, 8 November 1971, Series 1, Box 7, Folder [Corr. - N], RG 450G875 
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. The “from Missouri” idiom refers 
to the supposed legacy of skepticism among the people of Missouri, who must be shown the evidence in 
order to believe something. Hence Missouri’s sobriquet, the “Show Me” state. See: 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/archives/history/slogan.asp (Accessed 10 September 2015). 
119 Donald Griffin to Don E. Wilson, 10 January 1973, Series 1, Box 12, Folder [Corr. – Wie-Wy], RG 
450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
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including Alan Grinnell’s work on jamming avoidance, and postdoctoral fellow Nobuo 
Suga’s work on the neurophysiology of echolocation—Griffin became swamped in 
administrative work and other professional activities. His participation on conference 
committees and as a frequent referee for journals, for example, kept him out of the field 
for much of this time. These unwelcome sources of work and occasional frustration 
increased exponentially when in 1962 he reluctantly agreed to become chair of zoology 
within the biology department.120 
On the whole, Griffin’s research ground down to a slow output in the 1960s, and 
so when he was approached by Detlev Bronk and others from the Rockefeller Institute in 
1965 (“Rockefeller University” as of 1968), he once again decided to head for greener 
pastures, this time in New York. As the head of a new interdisciplinary institute focused 
on animal behavior, the position guaranteed generous financial support for research, 
purposefully light teaching duties, and a large administrative support network. Along 
with Peter Marler, a British ornithologist who studied birdsong and avian 
communication, Griffin thus entered the latter stage of his career at Rockefeller’s new 
venture, the Institute for Research in Animal Behavior. 
As an established authority on animal behavior with a large budget, in this new 
setting Griffin began in the early 1970s to explore questions about animal consciousness. 
As part of those efforts, he became an outspoken critic of behaviorism, particularly in his 
defense of von Frisch’s theory of the honeybee language. In a 1974 letter to von Frisch, 
he reflected on why the dance language theory had generated such a controversy:  
                                                
120 I am unsure why he agreed to the position. He openly disparaged administrative duties and academic 
politics, and so his decision to become chair of zoology is perplexing. Perhaps he was forced by implicit 
agreement to do so, although I have no evidence for this. 
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There seems to be an almost ideological reluctance, bound up I suspect with the 
strong current of behavioristic reductionism that has been so prominent among 
behavioral scientists in America. But I am convinced that this tide has turned, and 
I can assure you that despite the many foolish publications from Wenner and his 
colleagues, almost no one takes them very seriously – at least no one whose 
opinion deserves respect.121 
 
Griffin continued to explain that he was in the midst of working out some new ideas on 
the “mental continuity between animals and men,” and requested that von Frisch put a 
critical eye to the essay once it was finished.122 For the remainder of his career, especially 
in his work on animal consciousness, Griffin insisted that opposition to von Frisch’s work 
and similar examples of animal complexity was rooted deeply in the pervasive climate of 
behaviorism and mechanism among students of animal behavior, especially in the United 
States. This and other developments led him to develop a new field, cognitive ethology, 
which he envisioned as the study of animal cognition and consciousness. In my next 
chapter, I explore Griffin’s cognitive turn and the development of this field in greater 
detail. 
 
                                                
121 Donald Griffin to Karl von Frisch, 25 September 1974, Series 1, Box 11, Folder 105, RG 450G875 
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC.   
122 Donald Griffin to Karl von Frisch, 25 September 1974, Series 1, Box 11, Folder 105, RG 450G875 
Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Cognitive Dissidence and the Return of the Animal Mind 
 
The Question of Animal Awareness 
In 1976 Donald Griffin published a remarkable book in which he raised the 
specter of animal consciousness, a taboo in the mainstream of behavioral science.1 The 
Question of Animal Awareness signaled a sharp pivot from his earlier work on the 
sensory physiology of animal behavior toward this new, speculative area of biology. 
Animal consciousness, for which he offered a “pragmatic, working definition,” consisted 
in “the presence of mental images, and their use by an animal to regulate its behavior.”2 
For most of the twentieth century, particularly in the United States, inquiry into the 
subjective lives of animals had been rejected as unscientific by the main currents of 
behavioral biology, psychology, and ethology.3 Animal research was instead largely 
characterized by behavioristic and mechanistic approaches, which were championed as 
the royal road to the objective understanding of behavior. Although Griffin’s work on the 
physiological basis of animal navigation shared little with behavioristic psychology, he 
too had ignored questions about consciousness. In his latest book, however, he argued 
that it was time to break free of those “obsolete strait jackets,” and to return once again to 
                                                
1 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience (New 
York: Rockefeller University Press, 1976).  
2 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 5. Griffin’s definition of awareness—“the whole 
set of interrelated mental images of the flow of events”—was similar and related to consciousness, and he 
occasionally used the terms interchangeably. Psychologist Gorgon Burghardt argues that during the 1970s, 
the term ‘awareness’ was widely understood as synonymous with consciousness in psychology: Gordon 
Burghardt, “Animal Awareness: Current Perceptions and Historical Perspective,” American Psychologist, 
Vol. 40, No. 8 (Aug. 1985): 909. 
3 Ethologists were less likely than behaviorist psychologists to deny the very existence of animal 
consciousness, but they shared with behaviorists the belief that it was impossible to study objectively. The 
degree to which it was omitted from the ethological analysis of behavior varied among individual scientists, 
as psychologist Gordon Burghardt has observed. Konrad Lorenz, for example, merely put consciousness 
“on the back-burner, whereas Tinbergen ordered it out of the kitchen.” Gordon Burghardt, “Animal 
Awareness: Current Perceptions and Historical Perspective,” American Psychologist, Vol. 40, No. 8 (Aug. 
1985): 909. 
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questions that had occupied biologists and psychologists at the turn of the century.4 
Drawing on the Darwinian framework of evolutionary continuity, Griffin charged that 
animals had mental experiences akin to those of human beings, and that it was high time 
to take such concepts seriously and to develop rigorous methods for their study in a new 
field of biology, which he termed “cognitive ethology.”5  
Griffin’s act of cognitive dissidence was surprising for at least three reasons. First, 
animal consciousness was particularly taboo in biology. Such mentalistic concepts were 
exceedingly difficult to define, and more problematically, they were considered 
impossible to study objectively; to inquire about animal consciousness (especially in 
print) risked one’s reputation as a serious and credible scientist.6 Furthermore, The 
Question of Animal Awareness was his first publication of any kind on the subject. 
Although he had discussed it in seminars at the Rockefeller University beginning in 1974, 
most scientists working on animal behavior knew Griffin for his work on echolocation, 
and were unaware that his interests had shifted so significantly. He first spoke publicly 
about these subversive ideas in an address to the 1975 International Ethological Congress 
in Parma, Italy, but even this was an invitation-only meeting, with annual attendance 
restricted to about 300 scientists. As a result most of the scientific world first learned 
about Griffin’s latest venture upon his book’s publication in the summer of 1976. His 
                                                
4 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 74. 
5 The term ‘cognitive’ can be a bit misleading, since Griffin intended for it to imply conscious awareness. 
In cognitive psychology and linguistics, however, the term signified approaches centered on information 
processing, and did not imply consciousness (although it could). In his later work Griffin parsed the 
differences in meaning more explicitly. Unless specified otherwise, I use the term throughout this chapter 
in Griffin’s looser meaning, more-or-less equating it with scientific approaches to understanding 
consciousness, or subjective awareness.  
6 According to his former student James Gould, some of Griffin’s colleagues and former students initially 
suspected that early-onset senility was to blame for his sudden shift to the cognitive. James Gould, 
“Thinking about Thinking: How Donald R. Griffin Remade Animal Behavior,” Animal Cognition, Vol. 7 
(2004): 1.  
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turn was all the more surprising given his reputation as a rigorous skeptic, working on the 
‘hard end’ of biology.7 Broaching the subject thus shocked many of his colleagues; 
perhaps paradoxically, however, it also had the effect that his claims were taken 
seriously. As sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson explained at the time, “the very 
suggestion of a cognitive ethology might have been considered dangerous or even foolish 
by anyone other than an experimental biologist of Professor Griffin’s stature. We will 
owe him a debt for breaking the taboo.”8  
While his work on animal consciousness seemed qualitatively distinct from 
Griffin’s prior scientific interests, firm continuities nevertheless linked these disparate 
phases of his career. In calling for its study he drew on evidence from areas of animal 
behavior with which he was closely familiar. He had discovered, for example, that bats 
occasionally ignored the information generated by their echolocation signals and instead 
relied on a seemingly internal mechanism for navigation.9 The behavior of these ‘Andrea 
Doria bats’ led him to wonder about the existence of mental images, or “cognitive maps,” 
and their potential use in the spatial orientation of bats and birds.10 Griffin named them 
after the SS Andrea Doria because they frequently crashed despite the fact that their 
echolocation signals should have alerted them to the presence of obstacles. A more 
                                                
7 On Griffin’s reputation as a skeptic, see: Charles Gross, “Donald R. Griffin,” Biographical Memoirs of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, Vol. 86 (2005), p. 14. British ethologist Marian 
Stamp Dawkins used the phrase “hard end” of biology when describing her surprise at Griffin’s turn. 
Marian Stamp Dawkins, e-mail message to Richard Nash, 12 November 2015. 
8 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1976). This 
quote appears on the dust jacket. In the previous year Wilson had published his provocative book, 
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, which sparked a series of scientific and sociopolitical debates in the 
1970s-1980s. E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Belknap, Harvard University 
Press, 1975). 
9 The SS Andrea Doria famously collided with the MS Stockholm despite the fact that both ships’ sonar 
systems were found to be in proper working order. 
10 While working on behavioral conditioning in rats, American psychologist Edward C. Tolman first 
proposed the existence of cognitive maps in the 1940s. E.C. Tolman, “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men,” 
The Psychological Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jul. 1948): 189-208.  
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intriguing line of inquiry came from the study of animal language, which took on a new 
significance in the 1960s with the emergence of cognitive linguistics and its implications 
for human thinking, information processing, and other mental processes.11 While various 
forms of expression and communication had long been acknowledged in animals, 
symbolic language—that which utilized words and symbols with abstract meanings—was 
thought to be uniquely human.12 Honeybees, however, possessed a symbolic language in 
the form of their gestural dancing, and further research on the versatility of their dance 
language led Griffin to wonder whether bees were subjectively aware while 
communicating with one another.13 
Even more impressive was the recent case of Washoe, a female chimpanzee who 
was taught to speak American Sign Language in the late 1960s. In their groundbreaking 
study, American psychologists Beatrice T. Gardner and R. Allen Gardner taught Washoe 
dozens of gestural signs, which she spontaneously used in creative combinations to 
communicate with her human researchers.14 Although Griffin never worked directly on 
primate communication, he was fascinated by Project Washoe and subsequent studies on 
simian language, writing to the Gardners that their work constituted “a major advance” in 
the study of animal behavior and communication.15 Despite pronouncements from 
                                                
11 In the 1960s many psychologists, philosophers, and linguists began arguing that thinking was 
inextricably linked to human speech. Chomsky, however, charged that only humans possessed true 
language, and he rejected the notion that mental continuities existed between man and animals. 
12 On debates about animal language versus communication, see: Gregory Radick, The Simian Tongue: The 
Long Debate about Animal Language (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), especially p. 280-319. 
13 On the honeybee language controversy, see: Tania Munz, “The Bee Battles: Karl von Frisch, Adrian 
Wenner and the Honey Bee Dance Language Controversy,” Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 38 
(2005): 535-570. 
14 R. Allen Gardner and Beatrice T. Gardner, “Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee,” Science, Vol. 
165, No. 3894 (Aug. 1969): 664-672. On the Gardners’ work, see: Gregory Radick, The Simian Tongue: 
The Long Debate about Animal Language (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 316-330. 
15 Donald Griffin to R.A. Gardner and B.T. Gardner, 24 January 1968, Rockefeller University Archive, RG 
450G875, Series 1, Box 3, Folder [Corr – G]. He also requested from them future reports on Washoe’s 
progress.  
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cognitive linguists such as Noam Chomsky, who claimed that human language was 
essentially different from the rest of the animal kingdom, Griffin emphasized how little 
was actually known about animal communication, and insisted that linguistic studies of 
animals such as bees and chimpanzees would likely yield new insights about their mental 
processes. If cognitive linguistics made human thinking accessible, he reasoned, might 
the study of animal language provide a similar window onto the animal mind?  
In addition to these empirical connections, Griffin’s earlier work on animal 
behavior formed philosophical bridges to his work on consciousness and to his criticism 
of behaviorism. His firsthand experience in several unforeseen discoveries about animal 
perception and communication, for example, had led him to impugn the use of 
“simplicity filters” in restricting scientific hypotheses to their lowest order of complexity. 
Research on the celestial method of bird migration, for example, had shown that simple 
frameworks (such as stimulus-response mechanisms) were incapable of providing 
conclusive scientific solutions to complex behavioral problems. Thus in the 1950s Griffin 
had been forced to give up his exploratory theory of migration, which he had adopted due 
to its philosophical consistency with Morgan’s canon, and to recognize that the basis of 
migration was far more complex than he had imagined. Similarly, Wenner’s opposition to 
von Frisch’s dance language theory had shown that the stubborn dedication to 
explanatory parsimony could lead to misinterpretations about the true causes of animal 
behavior. Griffin thus began to criticize the reductionist aversion to higher processes such 
as consciousness as a potentially harmful simplicity filter that was inhibiting progress in 
the study of animal behavior. However, this did not mean that one should speculate 
promiscuously with concepts for which there was little evidence; rather, his approach to 
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consciousness was pragmatic, as he argued that there were indeed good reasons to 
suspect that animals had subjective experiences, and that it was the task of behavioral 
scientists to develop novel methods for their exploration. And rather cleverly, he turned 
the argument for scientific parsimony against those who denied consciousness. As he 
explained, the fact of evolutionary continuity between man and animals—as 
demonstrated by genetic, anatomical, and neurophysiological similarities—was obvious 
to all biologists. Consequently, the truly conservative intellectual position was to assume 
that mental continuities existed as well. At most, he explained, one ought to remain 
agnostic on animal consciousness, while nevertheless admitting that it was a legitimate 
scientific question. 
With his book and subsequent research agenda, Griffin thus launched a new field, 
cognitive ethology, which was centered on the comparative and evolutionary analysis of 
animal thinking and consciousness. He argued that several dimensions of animal 
behavior—especially communication, behavioral flexibility, perception, and 
navigation—indicated that questions regarding the role of consciousness in behavior 
ought to be raised, despite the prevailing uncertainty about how to answer them. 
Recognizing that such a scientific venture would require developing novel concepts, 
evidentiary bases, questions, and methods, Griffin exhibited in this phase of his career an 
uncharacteristic willingness to consider tentative hypotheses as trailblazing forays into 
unknown territory. He also avoided wandering into treacherous byways such as animal 
welfare, which had become a highly controversial topic with the publication of 
philosopher Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in the previous year.16 Although Griffin’s 
                                                
16 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Random 
House, 1975). Griffin never referred to Singer’s work in print; when he did discuss animal welfare, it was 
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scientific work had obvious implications for bioethics and animal welfare, for the most 
part he strategically avoided those areas so as not to risk making his ideas even more 
unpalatable to scientists who relied on animal subjects in their research.17  
Reflecting on his career in 1996, Griffin characterized his turn to consciousness as 
symptomatic of “philosopause,” a period of philosophizing that scientists often 
experience late in their careers when their scientifically fertile days are behind them.18 
But his change was by no means the inevitable result of an otherwise skeptical scientist 
simply growing older, or perhaps more cynically, becoming senile.19 Rather, particular 
circumstances facilitated his outspoken commitment to exploring new ideas about animal 
consciousness and to criticizing behaviorism. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
surprising discoveries about the behavior of birds, bats, and bees played a large part in 
priming him to seek more complex explanations for animal behavior, and this later led 
him to impugn the mechanistic and behavioristic modes of twentieth-century biology and 
psychology. In addition, an important professional move in his later career bolstered 
Griffin’s intellectual fortitude. In 1965 Rockefeller Institute president Detlev Bronk 
(1897-1975) recruited him to the behavioral science program as the director of the newly 
                                                                                                                                            
typically in reference to the work of ethologists such as Marian Stamp Dawkins, who worked on the 
emotional continuity of man and animals. 
17 His choice not to rock the boat too greatly is analogous to Darwin’s omission of human evolution in the 
Origin of Species.  
18 Donald Griffin, “[Autobiographical Memoir],” in History of Neuroscience in Autobiography [Vol. 2]. Ed. 
Larry Squire, p. 68-93 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), p. 88. “Philosopause,” obviously a 
metaphorical play on menopause, was one among many creative terms that Griffin coined later in his 
career. The analog for historians might be called ‘tenurapause.’ 
19 Apparently some colleagues and former students initially suspected that senility might have been to 
blame for Griffin’s sudden turn. As the clarity and volume of his published works on animal conscious 
attest to, this was certainly not the case. See: Charles Gross, “Donald R. Griffin,” Biographical Memoirs of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, Vol. 86 (2005): 1-20, p. 14; James Gould, 
“Thinking about Thinking: How Donald R. Griffin Remade Animal Behavior,” Animal Cognition, Vol. 7 
(2004): 1. 
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established Institute for Animal Behavior Research.20 Bronk, who was firmly committed 
to the interdisciplinary ideal, challenged behavioral scientists to ask difficult questions 
and to develop novel approaches to solving them by breaking down traditional 
disciplinary boundaries. As an established scientist with an unassailable reputation as a 
rigorous experimentalist, Griffin thus entered an intellectual environment that encouraged 
heterodox thinking about behavior.  
It was in this context that Princeton philosopher Thomas Nagel accepted a visiting 
professorship at Rockefeller in 1973-1974. At the time, Nagel was drafting his now 
famous essay, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in which he argued that the subjective 
character of experience was inaccessible to minds other than our own.21 While he had 
already chosen the bat as his central subject, he met Griffin at Rockefeller and the two 
had “many fascinating and fruitful discussions” thereafter.22 Perhaps more than any other 
factor, these conversations with Nagel prompted Griffin to speak publicly on the subject 
of animal consciousness.23 In the remainder of this chapter I analyze the intellectual, 
professional, and disciplinary contours of Griffin’s cognitive turn, a watershed in the 
twentieth-century study of animal behavior. 
 
Rockefeller University and the Institute for Animal Behavior Research 
In 1953 the newly appointed president of the Rockefeller Institute, Detlev Bronk, 
began a vigorous campaign to expand the institutional and intellectual reach of the 
                                                
20 The Institute for Animal Behavior Research was jointly sponsored by the New York Zoological Society, 
and Griffin directed it until 1969 when ethologist Peter Marler (1928-2014) took over. 
21 Thomas Nagel, “What is It Like to be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Oct. 1974): 
435-450. 
22 Thomas Nagel, e-mail message to Richard Nash, 13 August 2015. 
23 Griffin mentions his indebtedness to Nagel in the preface to The Question of Animal Awareness. 
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Institute by awarding PhDs and by adding several new interdisciplinary research 
programs.24 A distinguished biophysicist and mandarin of American science, Bronk had a 
knack for accumulating accolades and powerful positions during his rise to the top, and 
he used that reputation (along with Rockefeller’s substantial purse strings) to lure 
prestigious scientists to the Institute in the postwar era.25 He was committed to a vision of 
“unified science,” which he sought to establish by breaking down traditional disciplinary 
barriers and by bringing together innovative thinkers from disparate fields. To this end, 
he sought creative researchers who were willing to defy convention in the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge. One of Bronk’s university ideals in his earlier tenure as president of 
Johns Hopkins, for example, was to attract scholars who would “investigate, debate and 
question conventional concepts and to seek new knowledge which fosters insecurity of 
established ways of thought and life.”26 He further applied this intellectual and 
institutional vision to transforming the Rockefeller Institute, where he presided from 
1953 to 1968. 
Immediately upon assuming the Rockefeller presidency, Bronk began expanding 
its interdisciplinary programs, which were heavily geared toward research and required 
                                                
24 The Rockefeller Institute, which in 1967-68 was renamed the Rockefeller University, is still located on 
the upper-east side of Manhattan. For an internal history of Rockefeller University, see: John Kobler, The 
Rockefeller University Story (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1970); on biomedicine at 
Rockefeller University, see: J. Rogers Hollingsworth, “Institutionalizing Excellence in Biomedical 
Research: The Case of The Rockefeller University,” in Creating a Tradition of Biomedical Research, ed. 
Darwin H. Stapleton (New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 2004); on interdisciplinary 
neuroscience at Rockefeller University, see: Darwin Stapleton, “Aspects of Instrumentation in the 
Neurosciences at Rockefeller University: Nobelists Herbert Gasser and H. Keffer Hartline” (paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Society for the History of the Neurosciences, Los 
Angeles, California, June 20, 2007). 
25 On Bronk’s distinguished career in American science, see: Frank Brink, “[Biographical Memoir of] 
Detlev Wulf Bronk,” Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
(1978): 1-87. 
26 Johns Hopkins University, “Annual Report of the President, 1953,” in Johns Hopkins University 
Circulars (1952-53), p. 16. Bronk was president of Johns Hopkins from 1949 to 1953. 
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minimal teaching.27 By 1965 he had substantially increased the breadth of the Institute, 
and he took steps to change its name to the Rockefeller University in order to reflect that 
expansion and reorganization. In the 1967-1968 university catalogue, he described his 
vision thusly: “The University is not an aggregate of departments dealing with 
specialized fields of science. It is a community of scientific scholars who are free to 
follow their interests in any field of scholarship.”28 To strengthen the behavioral sciences, 
in 1965 Bronk recruited Griffin and British ethologist Peter Marler (1928-2014), an 
expert on birdsong.29 He also enlisted American physiological psychologist Carl 
Pfaffmann (1913-1994) as a university vice-president and director of the newly formed 
behavioral sciences graduate program.30 An authority on the neurophysiology of taste and 
olfaction, Pfaffmann was interested more broadly in the relationship between chemical 
sensation and behavior.31 To add further depth and prestige to the group, in 1967 Bronk 
lured cognitive psychologist George A. Miller (1920-2012) away from Harvard.32 Griffin 
already knew Miller, a pioneer in psycholinguistics, from their communications work at 
                                                
27 On Bronk’s vision for Rockefeller’s expansion, see: J. Rogers Hollingsworth, “Institutionalizing 
Excellence in Biomedical Research: The Case of the Rockefeller University,” in Creating a Tradition of 
Biomedical Research: Contributions to the History of the Rockefeller University, ed. Darwin H. Stapleton 
(New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 2004), especially p. 26-30. 
28 Quoted in Frank Brink, “[Biographical Memoir of] Detlev Wulf Bronk,” p. 67. 
29 On Marler’s life and career, see: Peter Marler, “Hark Ye to the Birds,” in Studying Animal Behavior: 
Autobiographies of the Founders, ed. Donald Dewsbury, p. 314-345 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985). 
30 In August 1965, Bronk finalized the arrangements aboard his yacht in Maine, where Griffin and 
Pfaffmann helped him convince Marler to join them. Griffin’s memorabilia from the trip includes an 
intriguing photograph of a pensive Peter Marler, labeled “moment of decision.” [Photograph of Marler, 
Pfaffmann], Series 1, Box 6, Folder [Corr – Ma-me], RG 450G875 Donald Redfield Griffin Papers, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
31 Lorrin A. Riggs, “Carl Pfaffmann (1913-1994): A Biographical Memoir,” Biographical Memoirs of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States, Vol. 71 (1997): 261-279. 
32 On Miller’s contributions to cognitive psychology and linguistics, see: Paul Edwards, The Closed World: 
Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold World America (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1997), especially chapter seven; Hunter Crowther-Heyck, “George A. Miller, Language, 
and the Computer Metaphor of Mind,” History of Psychology, Vol. 2, No 1 (1999): 37-64; Jamie Cohen-
Cole, “The Politics of Psycholinguistics,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 51, No. 1 
(Winter 2015): 54-77. 
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Harvard’s Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory during the war.33 The resulting behavioral 
sciences program, which was enhanced with additional faculty and a collaborative 
arrangement with the new program in philosophy, consisted of an impressive array of 
researchers working on behavioral problems from many disparate approaches.34    
Griffin and Marler were tasked with developing the ethological arm of the 
behavioral sciences program, and to that end Griffin was appointed as the first director of 
the newly established Institute for Animal Behavior Research (known informally and 
hereafter as the animal behavior lab).35 Initially developed and co-sponsored by the New 
York Zoological Society, the lab included facilities at the Bronx Zoo, the New York 
Aquarium, and a partnership with the William Beebe Tropical Research Station in Simla, 
Trinidad.36 In 1971 Griffin helped secure an additional field station in nearby Millbrook, 
New York, a 1200-acre site for research on animals in naturalistic conditions. Under the 
lab’s auspices during the late 1960s and 1970s, he continued research on bat behavior, the 
neurophysiology of echolocation, and the physiological basis of bird migration. He 
appreciated that his new position allowed him to focus on research at the expense of 
teaching, confessing privately to his friend Karl von Frisch, “perhaps selfishly I was 
ready for this sort of change.”37 In this innovative work he developed new methods to 
investigate animal navigation, including a radar system to track homing birds hidden in 
                                                
33 On Griffin’s work at the Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory, see chapter three of this dissertation. 
34 Bronk sought to secure among its ranks philosophers interested in language, psychology, and philosophy 
of science. These included Joel Feinberg (philosophy of psychology), Donald Davidson (linguistic 
philosopher), and Harry Frankfurt (philosophy of mind). The philosophy program was established in 1967, 
but due to financial belt-tightening, it was scuttled in 1976, when Rockefeller administrators and trustees 
decided to focus solely on the natural sciences.  
35 Referred to hereafter as the animal behavior lab. Marler took over as its director in 1969. 
36 In 1969 Rockefeller took full control of the lab from the New York Zoological Society, which had other 
aims in mind. Also, the Simla station was scuttled in 1971 due to interpersonal problems, financial 
mishandling, and sociopolitical unrest in Trinidad. 
37 Donald Griffin to Karl von Frisch, 16 October 1965, Series 1, Box 11, Folder 105, RG 450G875 Donald 
Redfield Griffin Papers, Rockefeller University Archives, RAC. 
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the clouds, along with high-altitude balloons to study the atmospheric cues (including 
acoustic, climatic, and olfactory) available to migrating birds.38 He also oversaw the work 
of postdoctoral fellows and graduate students such as James Gould, whose honeybee 
research in the early 1970s confirmed von Frisch’s dance language theory in the face of 
objections raised by Wenner and his colleagues.39 For his part, Marler brought his 
birdsong expertise to bear on the general study of animal communication and sexual 
selection. In addition, he began studying primate communication, collaborating with 
Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth on the semantics of vervet monkey calls.40  
Thus the animal behavior lab exhibited a rather broad ethological character, and 
Griffin and Marler were able to attract promising researchers working on a diverse range 
of behavioral phenomena.41 However, the number of graduate students and postdoctoral 
researchers was kept low—two or three a year—a necessary consequence of the global 
economic downturn in the early 1970s. Rockefeller’s financial model relied heavily on 
federal dollars, and as Griffin explained at the time, the “golden age of scientific funding” 
was coming to a quick and unceremonious end.42 Nevertheless, the lab remained a 
stimulating intellectual environment due to the open-ended nature of Rockefeller’s 
interdisciplinary seminars and university-wide gatherings, where neurophysiologists, 
                                                
38 Donald Griffin, “Oriented Bird Migration in or between Opaque Cloud Layers,” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 117, No. 2 (Apr. 1973): 117-141; Eleonora D’Arms and Donald 
Griffin, “Balloonists’ Reports of Sounds Audible to Migrating Birds,” The Auk, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Apr. 1972): 
269-279. 
39 See chapter five, “Birds, Bats, and Bees,” of this dissertation. 
40 Robert Seyfarth, Dorothy Cheney, and Peter Marler, “Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls: Semantic 
Communication in a Free-Ranging Primate,” Animal Behaviour, Vol. 28 (1980): 1070-1094. 
41 Among the better known graduate students were Jack Bradbury and James Gould. The faculty also 
included prominent ethologists Fernando Nottebohm, who continues to research the neurophysiology of 
songbirds, and Roger Payne, who discovered the songs of humpback whales. On the graduate students, 
faculty, and postdocs working in the lab, see: Peter Marler, “Hark Ye to the Birds,” p. 331-342. 
42 Griffin frequently lamented the end of the “golden age of funding”—which referred to the heyday of 
federal support for basic science in the 1950s and 1960s—in personal communications with colleagues and 
potential students. 
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biophysicists, ethologists, psychologists, and philosophers shared their work and 
discussed ideas with colleagues.43  
By the time Thomas Nagel came to this vibrant environment as a visiting 
professor of philosophy in 1973-1974, he had written a first draft of what would become 
one of the most famous essays on consciousness in modern philosophy.44 In “What Is it 
Like to Be a Bat?” he took for granted the mental continuity between man and animals, 
assuming that bats, like other nonhuman animals, had conscious awareness and 
subjective experiences. He chose bats as his subject for two interrelated reasons: first, 
they were relatively close to humans on the evolutionary continuum, possessing the 
complex neurophysiological machinery of mammalian brains. But unlike most mammals, 
the primary mode of perception in bats was not visual, but rather auditory. Thus their 
reliance on echolocation for perceiving the world around them yielded a unique 
subjective character, virtually unimaginable to humans. In his thought experiment Nagel 
argued that while scientific investigation could generate an enormous amount of data 
about the anatomy, neurophysiology, and behavior of bats, when it came to their 
subjective experience—that is, what it was like to be a bat—there were no answers to be 
had. For Nagel, subjective experience was contingent on the point-of-view of the agent, 
and it was therefore irreducible for the purpose of objective analysis. One could not 
simply imagine what it was like to be a bat. At best, he could imagine what it was like for 
                                                
43 In her short essay about Griffin, cognitive ethologist Carolyn Ristau recalls her time as a postdoc in his 
lab: Carolyn Ristau, “Donald Redfield Griffin,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 
149 (Sep. 2005): 399-411, especially p. 401-403. 
44 Thomas Nagel, “What is It Like to be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Oct. 1974): 
435-450. Philosopher Dan Dennett describes Nagel’s essay as the “most widely cited and influential 
thought experiment about consciousness.” Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1991), p. 441. 
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him—from the perspective of a human being—to be a bat; to know the bat’s experience 
was impossible.  
Interestingly, Nagel took for granted that bats possess conscious awareness. And 
in fact, his definition of consciousness applied across the phylogenetic spectrum: “an 
organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be 
that organism—something it is like for the organism.”45 While this stance may have been 
reasonable in philosophy, it represented a radical position in behavioral biology and 
psychology. According to Nagel, he and Griffin had many fascinating discussions about 
animal behavior and consciousness, and he claims at least partial responsibility for 
inspiring Griffin to explore these ideas in his later career. Griffin confirmed this in the 
preface to The Question of Animal Awareness, where he credits Nagel for supplying “an 
immediate spur while visiting our campus when he raised the question of whether 
animals have mental experiences.”46 Nagel, of course, did not merely raise that question, 
but answered in the affirmative. And in Griffin’s ensuing book, he did likewise. 
 
The “Satanic Verses” of Animal Behavior 
In his conversations with Nagel, Griffin began seriously considering the question 
of animal consciousness and the climate of behaviorism that dismissed such inquiry as 
unscientific. During the next two years he further studied and discussed these issues with 
colleagues at Rockefeller, and began distilling his main ideas into a short manuscript, The 
Question of Animal Awareness. This landmark book served two interdependent goals: 
first, Griffin argued in favor of the mental continuity between man and animals. Like 
                                                
45 Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to Be a Bat,” p. 436. Emphasis in original. 
46 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, vii. 
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humans, he argued, animals likely had subjective experiences, and they were able to use 
simple thinking and conscious awareness in regulating their behaviors. He analyzed 
several lines of evidence about the complexity and versatility of animal navigation and 
communication, which suggested that these behaviors were likely accompanied and 
affected by mental processes and experiences. His other major objective was to break the 
taboo of animal consciousness, and in so doing to criticize the behavioristic reductionism 
that he felt was characteristic of biology and psychology at the time. He argued that 
behaviorism was an outmoded perspective, and that attempts to understand behavior 
based solely on the external actions of organisms—interpreted through stimulus-response 
mechanisms or other similarly reductionist frameworks—were wholly inadequate. 
According to Griffin, true understanding of behavior, like that which Darwin pursued, 
required investigation of the minds of animals, and how their mental lives affected their 
behavior.47 
Griffin acknowledged, however, that the tide of behaviorism was beginning to 
ebb, which was evident by the flourishing of cognitive psychology in the 1960s.48 
Nevertheless, he argued that behavioristic assumptions were so deeply instantiated that 
they continued to relegate certain fundamental questions, especially about animal 
consciousness, to the dustbin of pseudoscience or amateurism. While cognitivism was 
becoming increasingly acceptable in human psychology, he observed, animals had yet to 
                                                
47 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London: John Murray, 1872). 
Although Darwin’s approach to mental and emotional continuity was criticized for its overreliance on 
anecdotal evidence, Griffin nevertheless agreed that Darwin was asking the right questions when it came to 
the origin of consciousness in nonhuman animals: Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 
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48 On the gradual emergence of cognitive psychology, see: John D. Greenwood, “Understanding the 
‘Cognitive Revolution’ in Psychology,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 35, No. 1 
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regain their minds. For example, psychologists such as George A. Miller, who rejected 
behaviorism, had developed new cognitive approaches to the study of language and 
information theory in order to quantify and reify the content of human mental 
processes.49 Concepts such as thinking could therefore be quantified and understood as 
cognition, a form of information processing that used the discrete and quantifiable 
variables of human language. Likewise, memory could be conceived of as the precise 
retention of that information. In this way, human mental processes were stripped of their 
subjective character while being made accessible to apparently objective approaches. 
Miller’s use of the computer metaphor of mind helped to clarify these ideas and to 
ground them in the ‘hard’ sciences of electrical engineering and computing.50 As 
historians Paul Edwards and Jamie Cohen-Cole have shown, such approaches emerged at 
the expense of behaviorism’s dominance in the Cold War era, along with their far-
reaching political implications concerning the malleability of the human mind and human 
nature.51 By the late 1960s, cognitive linguistics had cracked open a window to the 
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human mind ever so slightly. However, few psychologists were willing to extend these 
applications to animals, and talk of animal consciousness was still nowhere to be found. 
Animal communication played a central role in Griffin’s critique of behaviorism 
and in his arguments supporting the reality of animal consciousness. The reasons for this 
are twofold. First, cognitive linguistics constituted an acceptable method for subverting 
behaviorism and gaining scientifically legitimate access to the human mind. By 
narrowing the distinction between human and animal language, Griffin hoped to 
illuminate an analogous pathway for exploring the animal mind. Second, and relatedly, 
the linguistic behaviors of animals were suggestive of complex mental processes. As he 
argued, if even the most skeptical scientists were to observe such behaviors in humans, 
then they would almost certainly conclude that those activities were accompanied by 
conscious awareness. By demonstrating the complexity of animal communication, 
therefore, Griffin hoped to show that it was actually unparsimonious to assume that 
animals were not conscious of their linguistic behaviors. Human language implied the 
existence of subjective experiences, and he therefore insisted that the most conservative 
intellectual position was to assume that animal language indicated something similar. 
Thus one of his major strategies was to demonstrate that certain characteristics of 
animal communication satisfied criteria that were assumed to be unique to human 
language. These included concepts such as displacement, flexibility, productivity, and 
creativity, and Griffin was keen to show evidence of such linguistic complexity even in 
insects, despite their phylogenetic distance from man. The honeybee dance language, for 
example, showed that bees encoded precise temporal and spatial information in their 
                                                                                                                                            
drew on the popular discourse of open-mindedness to bolster their own intellectual and disciplinary 
objections to behaviorism.  
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dances, which signaled the locations of food and other biological resources. According to 
Griffin, this constituted linguistic displacement, a term that signified the ability to 
communicate information about objects remote in time and space.52 Other research had 
shown that bees were flexible in their dances, which they adapted when performing on a 
horizontal surface as opposed to the typical vertically oriented plane of the honeycomb. 
On horizontal planes, the waggle dances pointed directly toward the food source, as 
opposed to taking into account the angle of sun relative to the vertical plane. Hence, the 
symbols and their interpretations changed, but their significance did not. This, Griffin 
explained, was no simple task, as it required that both parties understand changes to the 
linguistic rules given the physical context of their communication.  
Von Frisch’s colleague and former student Martin Lindauer had also shown that 
depending on the context, the dances signaled the locations of different resources such as 
potential hive sites, nectar, pollen, or water.53 Laboratory experiments even showed that 
they could indicate the location of types of objects that they had never before 
encountered. Lindauer also found that bees used a variation of the waggle dance to 
coordinate and to orient swarming behaviors, which in a very real sense constituted a new 
linguistic phrase. As Griffin explained, these dances signaled a “Let’s go!” imperative, 
which was followed by massive swarms.54 These linguistic behaviors, according to 
Griffin, satisfied the criterion of productivity, or the ability to signify new meanings using 
extant words or concepts.55 The versatility of the bee language meant that they could 
convey information about different objects, and that other bees understood the messages 
                                                
52 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 37. 
53 Martin Lindauer, “Schwarmbienen auf Wohnungssuche,” Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Physiologie, Vol. 
37 (1955): 263-324. 
54 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 24.  
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in context. Attempts to explain such behavior by stimulus-response mechanisms were 
wholly inadequate. Griffin also pointed to recent evidence of language acquisition in 
chimpanzees such as Washoe, who learned over 130 American Sign Language gestures. 
Not only did she learn the signs and use them appropriately to communicate with 
humans, but Washoe was able to combine several words creatively to form new 
meanings. For example, some phrases seemed to express Washoe’s desire or intent to do 
certain activities or acquire objects.56 According to Griffin, the use of multiple linguistic 
units to create new meanings demonstrated what George Miller termed “combinatorial 
productivity,” an ability that he had previously argued was unique to man.57 Chimpanzees 
and bees, it seemed, were capable of using language much as in the same way as humans. 
But did these complex linguistic abilities imply consciousness? Griffin observed 
that if such communicative behaviors were displayed by humans, surely most behavioral 
scientists would attribute them to complex mental processes that were accompanied by 
conscious awareness. However, in animals, Griffin argued, such versatility “raises basic 
questions for which we had been poorly prepared by the behavioristic tradition in 
psychology or the comparable reductionism in biology.”58 Indeed, he argued that the use 
of language in chimpanzees and honeybees likely indicated the presence of thoughts. At 
the very least, Griffin argued, one ought to consider Washoe’s desires for objects and her 
other creative uses of language as suggestive of underlying subjective experiences. 
Treating these behaviors as such, Griffin argued, would allow scientists to develop “a 
                                                
56 R. Allen Gardner and Beatrice T. Gardner, “Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee,” Science, Vol. 
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unifying framework into which many complexities of animal behavior can be fitted.”59 
And by analyzing their language in terms of its subjective content, he continued, 
“perhaps we can understand how, and to what extent, animals make sense of the flow of 
events of which their behavior forms a part.”60 
In addition to linguistics, Griffin drew on evidence from studies of navigation in 
birds and bats. As I have explored in previous chapters, he had come to understand bat 
echolocation as an active process, requiring both attention and skill, which was therefore 
susceptible to occasional breakdowns when bats for one reason or another lost focus. 
Moreover, he saw an elegant versatility in the bat’s use of echolocation for different 
purposes. As he explained, “Echolocating animals adjust and adapt the properties of their 
sonar systems for different modes of operation under varying conditions, and in most 
cases we are still uncertain of the extent of these adaptive changes in sonar technique.”61 
The bird’s method of celestial orientation was also suggestive of complex neural 
mechanisms, and research on navigation had shown their ability to use several different 
sources of information in order to navigate in shifting environmental conditions. Like 
Andrea Doria bats, these birds possibly used internal cognitive maps, consisting of 
mental images, which were useful and necessary for navigation. At the very least their 
complex behaviors were indicative of highly advanced neurophysiological processes, and 
Griffin argued that it was no large leap to assume that conscious awareness would likely 
be useful to the animals utilizing such complex modes of perception.62 Nevertheless, he 
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freely admitted that “on strictly logical grounds, complexity of behavior and conscious 
awareness are neither commensurate with or necessarily related to one another in any 
way.”63 And as Wenner’s opposition to von Frisch had shown, there was no shortage of 
reductionist strategies to explain away complex behavior with simplistic mechanisms. 
However, Griffin continued, “in the 1970s, the crippling limitations of such intellectual 
mypoia [sic] should be clearly apparent; the simplicity often lies not in the behavior, but 
in its description.”64 He concluded by observing, once again, that if one were truly 
committed to the spirit of parsimony, then he ought to remain agnostic as to whether 
conscious awareness accompanied such complex behaviors.  
Much of this evidence was merely suggestive. And given the difficult problem of 
consciousness, coupled with the fact that for decades it had been compartmentalized in 
biology, Griffin knew that he would have to offer a potential methodology for studying it 
objectively. Since cognitive linguistics seemed to be the most promising path toward 
understanding the human mind, and many of the linguistic behaviors of animals were 
complex and suggestive of subjective awareness, he explained that the study of animal 
language was the most likely candidate for opening a window to the animal mind. Other 
methodologies might prove more effective once scientists began to study consciousness 
seriously, but for the time being, language seemed best. And within that area, sign 
language in chimpanzees, given their behavioral and genetic proximity to man, was the 
best place to start. 
                                                                                                                                            
the Philosophy of Biology, Reduction, and Related Problems, eds. Francisco J. Ayala and Theodosius 
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64 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 52. 
 239 
Griffin’s proposed method was one of “participatory investigation.”65 It harkened 
back to introspective psychology at the turn of the century: by conversing with subjects 
about their thoughts and feelings, it was thought that the psychologist could create an 
accurate representation of the content of their subjective states, and coordinate that 
information with outward behaviors. As difficult and unprecedented as it may have 
seemed, Griffin nevertheless thought that communicating back and forth with animals 
was theoretically possible, and that it was likely to yield important evidence about the 
inner workings of animal minds. While chimpanzees seemed promising insofar as they 
could communicate with researchers using sign language, other animals would surely 
prove more difficult. Playback experiments were a possible solution. In this research, the 
communicative sounds and vocalizations produced by animals in known circumstances—
warning cries in vervet monkeys, for example—were precisely recorded. They were then 
played back in different experimental conditions in order to understand what they 
signified, how linguistically flexible they were, and how such communications affected 
animal behavior.66 Another possibility, he imagined, would be to use animal models, such 
as tiny mechanical ‘insects’ that were able to mimic the gestural dances of honeybees. 
These ideas were admittedly rudimentary, Griffin admitted, but one had to start 
somewhere. 
Throughout the book, Griffin deployed several empirical and logical arguments to 
develop his case for consciousness. As we have seen, one of the most effective was 
turning the logic of scientific parsimony against behaviorism, which championed such 
explanatory simplicity. For example, a behaviorist view of the human mind, such as 
                                                
65 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 89-90. 
66 On the history of playback experiments, see: Gregory Radick, The Simian Tongue (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), especially p. 322-370. 
 240 
Griffin’s doctoral advisor Karl Lashley’s, reduced all mental phenomena to the effects of 
neurophysiological processes.67 But mounting evidence showed that the differences 
between animal and human neurophysiology were only a matter of degree, not of kind. 
Furthermore, the flexibility and complexity of animal behavior—particularly in linguistic 
behaviors—suggested the existence of sophisticated neurophysiological machinery. 
Griffin therefore argued that the more conservative view was to assume mental continuity 
between man and animals, rather than the opposite. 
Griffin also argued from history, charging that the initial generations of 
behaviorists had forgotten the particular circumstances in which guiding frameworks 
such as Morgan’s canon and Watson’s behaviorist manifesto were developed.68 As 
Griffin explained, these ideas flourished during a period in which George Romanes’s 
uncritical anthropomorphism, along with his overreliance on anecdotal and introspective 
evidence, had sullied the reputation of comparative psychology. Morgan’s canon, Griffin 
argued correctly, was originally intended to ensure that explanations of behavior were 
rigorous, experimentally proven, and untarnished by anthropomorphic attitudes that 
attributed human emotions and reasoning to the behavior of animals. Morgan never 
intended to deny wholesale that animal behavior could be psychically complex; rather, he 
simply wanted to curb the anthropomorphic enthusiasm that had threatened the 
legitimacy of Darwinian psychology.69 Similarly, Watson’s commitment to behaviorism 
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was forged in the flames of infamous cases such as Clever Hans, the horse that could 
apparently solve complex mathematical problems.70 In 1907, psychologist Oskar Pfungst 
subsequently showed that Hans had simply relied on extremely subtle cues in its 
handler’s behavior, which signaled the correct answers to seemingly difficult questions. 
The cues were so subtle, in fact, that even the handler himself, Wilhelm von Osten, was 
unaware of them. This early-twentieth century episode taught behavioral scientists a 
sobering lesson about experimental rigor and the subtlety of perception. Moreover, the 
case showed that apparent complexity—especially in the behavior of animals—could 
actually be the product of rather simple explanations. Griffin charged that subsequent 
generations of behaviorists had forgotten that these historical circumstances were 
responsible for the ensuing devotion to behavioristic and mechanistic approaches. If later 
generations had properly recognized these contingencies, then perhaps they would not 
treat behaviorism as received wisdom, but would instead see it as a useful methodology 
for certain kinds of analysis. Questions regarding animal consciousness, he concluded, 
were not inherently unscientific, but historically contingent. 
When it came to charges of anthropomorphism, Griffin attacked the logical basis 
of that critique. As he explained, ideas about animal consciousness and thinking were 
frequently criticized as anthropomorphic, insofar as they implied that animal experiences 
were similar to those that humans might have under similar circumstances. Morgan 
formulated his canon, as we have seen, precisely to criticize this faulty reasoning. But 
Griffin subverted the modern anthropomorphic critique by pointing out the implicit 
assumption contained therein, namely, that human mental experiences were the only kind 
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that existed.71 Animals, he argued, may have substantially different subjective 
experiences, particularly when it comes to the content of those experiences. Nevertheless, 
he argued, their complex patterns of behavior and neurophysiological machinery 
suggested that such experiences were possible. Therefore, Griffin concluded once again 
that it was unparsimonious to assume that human mental experiences were the only kind 
to exist. He thus turned the anthropomorphic criticism on its head, explaining that the 
critique itself was inherently anthropocentric and conceited—a view that he would later 
come to term “species solipsism.”72 
Another of his discursive strategies was to argue that there were unfairly high 
evidentiary standards in behavioral biology, particularly when it came to subjective 
concepts. Again arguing from history, Griffin observed that several instances of scientific 
progress were the result of introducing a tentative idea, initially lacking in empirical 
rigor, that was nevertheless useful for investigating a complex scientific problem. The 
‘quark’ in theoretical physics, and the ‘gene’ in genetics and molecular biology, for 
example, had proven to be extremely versatile concepts that led to fundamental 
discoveries in these fields. If scientists had initially rejected research that was based on 
those concepts because of their unproven status, then perhaps these complicated 
phenomena would have continued to resist scientific clarification. Hypothetical concepts 
were commonly accepted in physics, the ‘hardest’ of the natural sciences. In the 
behavioral sciences, however, such concepts were considered nonstarters. Griffin would 
later refer to this double standard as demonstrative of “paralytic perfectionism,” by which 
he meant scientific exploration that was paralyzed by accepting only those concepts and 
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ideas that were fully formed, and for which there existed perfect evidence.73 New areas of 
science, such as the cognitive ethology that he was working to establish, relied on such 
inchoate and tentative hypotheses to construct intellectual frameworks. Therefore Griffin 
argued that behavioral scientists ought to shed their reflexive tendency to banish them. 
A final strategy was to avoid controversial topics that were unhelpful to his cause, 
regardless of their importance or relevance. Thus Griffin made a strategic choice not to 
discuss animal emotion or welfare. But there was a deep irony in this. As psychologist 
Gordon Burghardt has explained, behavioral scientists in the 1970s were actually more 
willing to accept the emotional continuity of man and animals than mental continuity. 
Animal consciousness was, for example, far more scientifically subversive than, say, 
animal pain or fear. However, where emotional continuity may have been more palatable 
intellectually, it was in another sense more controversial because of the rising animal 
welfare movement in the 1970s. Philosopher Peter Singer’s provocative book, Animal 
Liberation, had just appeared in 1975, and it caused a big row among ethologists and 
psychologists who relied on animal subjects in their research.74 Despite the fact that many 
commentators linked Singer’s and Griffin’s books as representing parallel movements, 
Griffin never mentioned Singer’s views on animal welfare and generally steered clear of 
bioethical discussions in his published works. There is no doubt that he recognized the 
ethical dimension of animal consciousness, but he was already fighting an uphill battle in 
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establishing the scientific legitimacy of animal consciousness, and thus he had little 
incentive to engage additional adversaries. 
Griffin’s book received mixed reviews. Many, such as linguist Caryl Haskins, 
praised him for breaking the taboo: “There can be no doubt of the importance of this 
emphasis, especially at this time. Certainly no one is more eminently fitted to speak 
strongly on the matter than Donald Griffin.”75 Others were unconvinced by his 
arguments, and some saw it as representing an exceedingly radical scientific position. 
Canadian psychologist Hank Davis, for example, would later criticize the expanded 
edition (1981) as the “The Satanic Verses of animal cognition,” referencing the well-
known controversy surrounding Salman Rushdie’s novel.76 Psychologist William Mason 
wrote the most critical review, which appeared in Science.77 He criticized Griffin for 
failing to improve upon the unsophisticated definitions of mental concepts that he 
provided in the introduction, and for spending too much time building up to the “lame 
and unsatisfying” conclusion that many of the supposed facts of animal behavior justified 
an agnostic position.78  
Mason’s most biting accusation was that Griffin spilled too much ink defending 
basic ideas that did not require defense. That awareness would be of adaptive advantage 
to animals, for example, was self-evident. Of course many animals experienced internal 
images that were helpful in navigation, Mason continued. Beyond that, Griffin had made 
too much of a fuss arguing in favor of the view that animals were subjectively aware—
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this was a fact that “could scarcely be questioned.” According to Mason, Griffin had 
stopped with these basic and obvious observations, and failed to go one step further in 
asking, for example, how such internal mechanisms may have evolved. Finally, Mason 
criticized Griffin’s proposed methodology for exploring the animal mind. The 
significance of communicating with chimpanzees, according to Mason, was not that it 
offered a means by which humans could communicate with them to learn about their 
subjective states. Rather, it was that such investigations showed how they acquired and 
used language artificially, shedding light on their cognitive processes. Mason continued, 
explaining that while such cognitive work was not as exciting as the “Dr. Doolittle” 
methods proposed by Griffin, they nevertheless constituted the only true method for 
understanding animal minds. Contra Griffin, Mason argued that there was no true 
“window” to the mind of another human, let alone to that of an animal. He concluded by 
suggesting that decades of cognitive investigations had led to the “hardest lesson of all: 
There is no royal road to the mind; we are forced to approach along the only paths that 
are open to us, through the tortuous byways of analysis, inference, hypothesis, and 
reconstruction.”79 
Other reviews seemed to miss the forest for the trees. Griffin’s decision to include 
several “rough and ready” working definitions of ‘mind’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘thinking,’ 
for example, was particularly problematic. And it resulted in exactly what he had hoped 
to avoid—many readers focused too much on the definitions, and quibbled over the 
precise language that Griffin offered. As he had explained in the introduction, the 
prevalence of behaviorism had prevented the serious consideration and experimental 
investigation of these concepts. Therefore, he merely offered unsophisticated definitions 
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of them as a strategic way to get the ball rolling, so to speak. Another reviewer, British 
psychologist Nicholas K. Humphrey, was particularly unfair, accusing Griffin of 
resurrecting the animal soul.80  
In his second edition and in subsequent books, Griffin answered his critics. To 
Humphrey, for example, he offered a pragmatic response: “It seems most reasonable and 
parsimonious to postulate, tentatively and pending new evidence, that thinking and 
experiencing are related in comparable ways to the functioning of the central nervous 
systems in various species. It contributes very little to our understanding of these difficult 
problems to erect and then demolish straw ghosts.”81 When it came to Mason’s more 
substantive claims, Griffin explained that he too had missed the mark. What Griffin was 
calling for was an exploration of the animal mind—that is, subjective experience, 
consciousness, and their influences on behavior. Within Mason’s cognitive approach, 
according to Griffin, questions about consciousness were still largely forbidden, and 
mental processes were reconfigured according to the tenets of information processing. 
Within this framework, he argued, it was unnecessary to assume that any thinking—
human or animal—was conscious. Convincing behavioral scientists to move beyond 
cognition to consciousness thus became one of Griffin’s overarching goals in the 
following years.82  
With the publication of his book, Griffin thus announced to the scientific world 
how he would spend the remainder of his career. The study of animal consciousness 
became the central organizing feature of his intellectual life, and he was firmly 
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committed to making such questions scientifically legitimate once more, as they had been 
in the initial decades after Darwin. Griffin continued this work at Rockefeller, where he 
was free to pursue such ideas that pushed the boundaries of behavioral science.   
Many scientists certainly shared Mason’s belief that Griffin’s pursuit of animal 
consciousness—particularly via the method of participatory investigation—would prove 
unfruitful. And yet despite these initial criticisms, Griffin’s work had a major influence 
on the study of animal behavior and consciousness. By breaking the taboo, he helped to 
make it respectable once again for scientists to research and to discuss animal 
consciousness publicly. As part of these reform efforts, in the late-1970s he began to 
shore up the disciplinary foundations of cognitive ethology by bringing graduate students 
and postdoctoral fellows interested in animal cognition and consciousness to Rockefeller 
University. In addition, he coordinated a special issue of the journal Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, which was focused on the topic of chimpanzee communication and 
consciousness.83 In subsequent years, Behavioral and Brain Sciences has become a 
central repository for research in cognitive ethology. Griffin also organized an 
international conference in 1981, “Animal Mind-Human Mind,” in Dahlem (Berlin), 
Germany. The “Dahlem model” of international scientific workshops consisted of a 
weeklong conference attended by 48 individuals with the goal of promoting 
interdisciplinary ideas about scientific problems in an international context. He conceived 
the 1981 workshop to “explore the nature of the animal mind and develop new 
approaches to its understanding.”84 He also used his tenure as president of the 
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Guggenheim Foundation from 1979 to 1983 to fund scientific projects that focused on 
animal consciousness and linguistics, such as Roberth Seyfarth’s and Dorothy Cheney’s 
research on the semantic communication and perception in vervet monkeys. Finally, he 
continued to write books that were directed at a broad, educated audience, which 
included behavioral scientists and his critics. In addition to The Question of Animal 
Awareness, in the 1980s and 1990s he wrote two more comprehensive books, Animal 
Thinking (1984), and Animal Minds (1992).85 The sequence of titles—from animal 
awareness, to thinking, to minds—reflects the further development of his thought, and the 
boldness with which he articulated these ideas.  
Since the late 1970s, the field of cognitive ethology has expanded and flourished, 
and new discoveries and approaches have shed further light on the animal mind. 
Cognitive ethologists Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff have documented this “rapidly 
growing interdisciplinary field of science,” observing that significant advances have 
occurred in the understanding of social play, anti-predation behavioral strategies, and 
animal communication.86 Bekoff includes himself among the critics of Griffin’s initial 
work for its anecdotalism and philosophical naivety, but he explains nevertheless, “few 
contest that it was [Griffin’s] 1976/1981 book that rekindled interest in the rigorous, 
comparative, and evolutionary study of nonhuman animal minds.”87 And despite 
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behavioristic criticisms of Griffin’s work, Allen and Bekoff explain, “The plethora of 
data and the volumes of work that are available now indicate that many scientists are very 
much interested in animal minds and that they are following Griffin’s courageous lead in 
attempting to study animal cognition more rigorously than has been done in the past.”88 
Collected volumes such as Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals (1991) attest 
to the wide-ranging interest and research agendas that trace their origins to his 
foundational work.89 
These new areas include patterns of behavior that are suggestive of animal 
awareness, due to the ways in which animals adapt their behaviors according to specific 
contexts and problems. The study of deception has become one important focal point in 
this line of inquiry. 90 Cognitive ethologist Carolyn Ristau’s work on intentional 
deception in piping plovers, for example, focuses on these shorebirds’ unique strategies 
for avoiding predation. When intruders near the plover’s nesting areas, the birds flexibly 
deploy several kinds of distraction behaviors to lure potential predators away with the 
promise of an easy meal. These including false brooding (to indicate that no eggs are 
present), “broken wing displays,” and other peculiar motions and vocalizations that draw 
the attention of the predator away from the vulnerable eggs and young in nests. The 
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plovers keenly observe the predators in order to gauge the effectiveness of their 
distraction strategies, modifying them as necessary in order to achieve their goals. In a 
wide range of experiments, Ristau has demonstrated the versatility in the distraction 
displays, which birds flexibly adapt according to the environmental circumstances and 
the behavior of the intruders. Although the biomechanics of the displays are largely 
genetic, as opposed to learned, plovers deploy them with great specificity. Thus Ristau 
has designed and interpreted her experimental results in terms of subjective 
intentionality: “the plover wants to lead the intruder away from nest/young.”91 While she 
admits that the behaviors might be entirely unconscious, Ristau maintains the importance 
of the cognitive ethological approach in understanding such behavior, explaining, “the 
stance led me to design experiments that I had not otherwise thought to do, that no one 
else had done, and that revealed complexities in the behavior” previously unknown.92 
Other fruitful areas included the deception behaviors of vervet monkeys, which 
frequently communicate false information to one another in order to gain social 
advantages.93 Ethologists Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth have shown that as a 
result, these monkeys have developed strategies for detecting deception, including the 
comparison of vocal signals based on their contextual meanings. Although much of 
cognitive ethology, and in particular the study of animal language, is focused on primates 
(especially chimpanzees), other animals such as African and Asian elephants, hognose 
snakes, and bottlenose dolphins are frequently employed in studies of animal 
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consciousness, self-recognition, and cognition.94 Studies of communication and cognition 
in African grey parrots constitute another thriving area in cognitive ethology.95 These 
birds are not only extremely adept at learning English words for different objects, but 
also show rudimentary understanding of concepts such as shape and color.96 In addition, 
Marc Bekoff’s work on animal emotions and animal play has contributed to a greater 
understanding of emotional subjectivity in a variety of species.97 More recently, 
primatologist Sarah Brosnan’s experiments on “fairness” in monkey behavior has been 
analyzed in terms of intentionality and calculated decision making.98 Despite the 
continuing presence of strict behaviorists who insist that the animal mind will likely 
forever remain in a black box, scientific inquiry into animal consciousness, self-
awareness, intelligence, and communication became almost commonplace by the late-
twentieth century.99 The taboo has largely been broken, and research on such questions 
continues to find steady sources of funding and outlets for publication.  
In the waning years of his career, Griffin wrote two short autobiographical 
memoirs detailing the scope of his research and his life in science. To conclude the 
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dissertation, I consider how Griffin’s memoirs reflected his broader intellectual and 
professional goals. 
 
Conclusion: The Return of the Animal Mind 
In 1985, Griffin wrote a short autobiographical memoir for a collected volume 
about the history of animal behavior research.100 The essay eloquently recapitulates his 
upbringing, family, education, major research agendas, professional moves, and the 
intellectual trajectory of his career in science. In the final paragraph, Griffin turns to the 
question of animal consciousness, explaining:  
I have often wondered in recent years why it took me so long to speak up on this 
subject. I believe the reason was my early indoctrination in the positivistic climate 
of science at Harvard and elsewhere in the 1930s. Many scientific developments 
and much shaking up of prior ideas were necessary before I was ready to think 
seriously about the thoughts and feelings of animals…It does seem that my 
firsthand involvement in several surprising discoveries is what prepared me to 
shift my thinking into new and I hope fruitful channels.101 
 
In a later memoir, he also explained the onset of his “philosopause” as the result of 
dissatisfaction with reductionism, and of having lived through several surprising 
discoveries.102 Elsewhere, in a 1985 research profile for Rockefeller University, he 
pointed to von Frisch’s work as the necessary condition for his cognitive turn. He 
recalled being shaken “out of my reductionistic complacency. I began to wonder whether 
animals might not be doing a lot of things we never imagined they could do.”103 And yet 
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despite these explanations, it was almost thirty years after learning about von Frisch’s 
work that Griffin decided to speak out on animal consciousness.104  
Although he may have publicly avoided speculating about the subjective lives of 
animals, his private correspondence contains an important clue as to how he thought 
about it, even years before he decided to break the taboo. In an intriguing 1959 letter to 
NIH neurophysiologist Wade H. Marshall (1907-1972) concerning the treatment of 
animal subjects in scientific research, Griffin showed his cards:  
I am not convinced that there is any real qualitative, moral difference, between 
regeneration experiments on planaria or those employing curarized frogs. Our 
scruples are very largely anthropomorphic, whether we like to admit this or not. 
No physiologist could well maintain that there was any great difference in the 
physiological likelihood of pain or suffering being inflicted by the same 
procedures applied to chimpanzees and rats; yet in terms of our own thinking as 
well as in public relations, I am sure we shudder more for the primate than for the 
rodent.105 
 
It is important to note that at this point in his career, Griffin’s approach to animal 
behavior was still largely consistent with behaviorism, insofar as he omitted from his 
analysis questions about animal thinking, feeling, and consciousness. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that his views on the subjective feelings of his experimental subjects were by no 
means uncommon or unorthodox among scientists working with animals, despite the 
prevalence of behaviorism. As historian Anne Rose has shown in the case of 
primatologist Robert Yerkes (1876-1956), for example, behavioral scientists were often 
led by practical considerations to analyze the mental and emotional lives of their subjects, 
even if the conventions of professional science precluded them from discussing these 
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dimensions in print.106 Despite their methodological commitments to objectivity, Rose 
argues, scientists’ pragmatic experiences with animal emotions and personalities 
influence the science in subtle ways.107 This was almost certainly true for Griffin, who 
grew up loving wild animals, and whose experimental work was largely on bats, 
creatures that are notoriously difficult to care for and to keep healthy in captivity. Later in 
that same letter, Griffin moved from pain and suffering to the question of animal 
consciousness:  
My feeling is that consciousness is present as a continuum roughly paralleling the 
refinement of nervous systems, but that there is probably no qualitative distinction 
to be drawn anywhere from man to coelenterate. […] I would personally reject the 
trading of unquestionable mammalian suffering for limited gain in knowledge that 
it seems to me is involved in many ablation experiments with dogs and cats. 
While I would not do such experiments myself, I do not feel any sufficient moral 
indignation to try to prevent others from doing them.108 
 
Griffin wrote this letter in 1959, fifteen years before he began to speak publically about 
animal consciousness. His prose shows no signs of hesitation or deference on the 
question of animal consciousness or subjective experience, and yet these were not areas 
that he openly investigated. In a little over a decade, however, he would argue that such 
questions were essential for understanding the complexity of animal behavior. 
While he used the term indoctrination to describe his scientific education at 
Harvard, that is probably just for rhetorical flourish. Instead, it is likely that in moving 
from an amateur naturalist to an experimental physiologist—with all of the intellectual 
and professional considerations that that entails—Griffin merely became accustomed to 
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the conventions of professional science. Years later, after enjoying a successful career 
and cultivating a reputation as a good and proper scientist, he found himself in a position 
at Rockefeller where he no longer needed to worry about convention. In this phase of his 
career he found himself with intellectual breathing room, where he could pause to 
contemplate what it was like to be a bat. 
The significance of Griffin’s cognitive turn, therefore, was not in somehow 
becoming convinced that animals were conscious and that they experienced emotional 
states. As we can see from the letter above, he was already convinced of that fact at least 
by 1959. Perhaps he never had to be convinced, for surely he did not simply ignore all of 
his early childhood memories of running through the woods and fields of New England, 
chasing down skunks, and banding bats to track their migrations. Rather, the true 
significance of his turn was that he finally felt compelled to speak outwardly about 
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